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ABSTRACT
VOCATIONAL SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE:
THE BOSTON MARINE SOCIETY, 1754-1812
by
Matthew Gaston McKenzie
University o f New Hampshire, May, 2003

Between 1754 and 1812 the Boston Marine Society developed vocational
scientific practices adapted from day-to-day work routines to expand the navigational
knowledge o f New England’s coastlines. For this reason, the Marine Society’s
navigational work suggests important parallels with the history o f colonial science in
other areas during the late eighteenth century. Notwithstanding most other studies in the
history o f American science, the Boston Marine Society indicates that colonial Boston
shipmasters were not dependent upon learned societies for their navigational research
needs. Rather, they adapted their mutual aid society and developed methodologies to
collect navigational observations, analyze them for reliability and accuracy, and in a few
cases, publish their findings for the benefit o f the community.
Given the close ties between seafaring, economic growth and political influence
in a mercantile economy, the Marine Society’s work in navigational research granted
them social and political influence in Boston during the Early Republic. With this added
influence, the Marine Society crafted themselves into Federalist “fathers o f the maritime
people” to legitimate their efforts to become one o f the town’s new post-revolutionary
elites. Ultimately, the Marine Society lost its political influence as changes in
navigational research, shifts in Boston and national politics, and new market centers for
scientific information combined to weaken the Society’s position in both the political and
navigational research worlds.

vii
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INTRODUCTION

In the spring o f 1755, Captain Hector McNeill was in command o f a merchant
vessel in a small flotilla convoying an army up the Bay o f Fundy. The fleet had left
Boston a few days before with the task o f safely delivering 2,000 N ew England soldiers
to fight against their French imperial rivals at Fort Beaussejour. As the fleet sailed along
the current swept, rocky shores, CoL Robert Monckton worried about the fete o f his
army. Back in Boston, there had been almost no charts for him to consult, and even
fewer descriptions o f the currents and tides that made this region so dangerous.
Moreover, his and his army’s fete rested in the hands o f a few Boston merchant skippers,
like Captain M cNeill, none o f whom likely knew the latest and best techniques in
navigation.
Despite his fears, however, and the dangerous shoals and hazardous headlands,
the fleet proceeded safely. When Monckton approached McNeill about their progress,
curious as to how a colonial trading skipper could successfully undertake such a
hazardous job, McNeill showed him information which no British commander in North
America or London knew existed. Trading along the coast, McNeill had collected five
years o f nautical observations, including (presumably) tides, currents, coastal
descriptions, and manuscript drawings. From these observations, McNeill had drawn a
chart covering the coast from Cape Cod to Cape St. Mary’s including the Bay o f Fundy.
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M cNeill’s chart impressed the British commander. And shortly after the Boston skipper
safely delivered his regiments, Monckton dislodged the French from Beaussejour.1
M cNeill was not alone in his interest in marine cartography in N ew England. In
1760, he joined a group o f master mariners in Boston, called the Boston Marine Society
(BM S), which had also been systematically collecting navigational observations since
1754. Both M cNeill and the Marine Society understood that local navigational
knowledge carried commercial, political, and imperial opportunities. Consequently,
when the organization united senior captains for mutual aid, they also recognized that
they stood in an important position between London imperial agents in North America,
and the coastline that interested them. Furthermore, they were actively collecting data as
every member returned to Boston—a feature that they would try to barter for greater
influence in Boston and within the Empire.
Historians are fortunate in the Marine Society’s meticulous record keeping and
parliamentary procedure. Two key issues help modem researchers see the society’s
collective w ill and motivation. First, as membership was limited to captains alone, the
Society was self-conscious that they spoke as an elite body in Boston’s maritime
community. Second, as an organization o f captains predicated upon fellowship and
mutual aid and with a distinct role within the port, the Society went to great lengths to
follow proper parliamentary procedures and to act only on decisions taken unanimously.
As part o f this process, the Society maintained meeting minutes recording the Society’s
(though not individuals’) opinions, resolutions, and approved actions. Consequently,
throughout its 250-year history, the society left committee reports, resolutions, and clear

1Hector McNeill to Lord Colville, January 17,1763, Boston Marine Society Papers (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston, Mass.).
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statements that reveal its collective w ill and motivations. These records allow historians
to uncover not only what the organization did, but why.
This is not the first study o f the Boston Marine Society. Earlier studies o f the
Marine Society have cataloged in some detail the work the Marine Society undertook
during its long history. Nathaniel Spooner stitched together a rough narrative in his 1879
G leanings o f the B oston M arine S o ciety (Boston, 1879,1999). In 1982, William A.

Baker’s A H istory o f the B oston M arine Society (Boston, 1982) integrated the Marine
Society’s history more closely with changes in Boston politics and economics and
assembled systematic information on the society’s more than 3,000 members. Both o f
these works greatly aided the project that follows. Yet neither delved into the society’s
influence upon the history o f American science, with the exception o f Baker’s study o f
the Society during the American Revolution, neither Baker nor Spooner were interested
in examining how the society operated as an active agent in Boston’s historical
development.
This study seeks to examine the society within the context o f the history o f
American Science. Academic centers and learned societies have been the focus for most
considerations o f American science because o f their prominence in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The Marine Society’s scientific interests indicate, however, that
colonial groups could and did develop their own scientific agenda that they pursued
through methods adapted from common vocational practices. In doing so, the Marine
Society’s navigational work draws important parallels to the history o f colonial science in
other areas during the late eighteenth century. In the simplest form, I argue that colonial
Boston shipmasters were not dependent upon learned societies for their navigational
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research needs. Rather, they adapted their mutual aid society and developed
methodologies to collect navigational observations, analyze them for reliability and
accuracy, and in a few cases, publish their findings for the benefit o f the community.
Furthermore, given the close ties between seafaring, economic growth and political
influence in a mercantile economy, the Marine Society’s work in navigational research
granted them social and political influence in Boston. With this added influence—power
would be too strong a term for it—the Marine Society tried to stabilize postRevolutionary Boston politics, and to legitimate their efforts to become one o f the town’s
new elites. Ultimately, the Marine Society lost its political influence as changes in
navigational research, shifts in Boston and national politics, and new market centers for
scientific information combined to weaken the society’s position in both the political and
navigational research world.
The Marine Society gives us a glimpse o f the rise and fell o f what I call
“vocational science.” In many previous studies discussed below, science and research
were considered as a purely intellectual—“academic”—exercise, centered in learned
academies, universities, and laboratories. I argue, to the contrary, that those who used
navigation to carry their vessels safely into port, and expanded navigational knowledge,
pursued science just as much as those who approached navigation from theoretical
understandings o f geodesy, mathematical astronomy, and spherical trigonometry.
Whether using complex mathematical models to develop an absolute understanding o f
coastal features, or using piloting techniques, rule o f thumb guidelines, simple
instruments, and best-as-possible guess-work, both vocational and academic researchers
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formed part o f a larger process by which the knowledge o f New England’s coast
expanded.
The idea o f vocational science also highlights an important mechanism by which
specific groups used science to shore up their economic, social and political positions
within their local area. While most prior work on American science has shown how the
pursuit o f scientific knowledge translated into improved cultural and social reputation,
most have seen these efforts as a neutral desire to expand humanity’s understanding o f
the world. Yet in this case, engagement in scientific research carried immediate
economic, political and social benefits that were anything but neutral. As Joyce Chaplin
has shown, colonial Carolina low-country planters sent botanical specimens to the Royal
Society and the Royal Society o f Arts in exchange for agricultural innovations. These
innovations—seeds, water control mechanisms, and processing machinery—helped them
secure political control over Carolina politics during the Early Republic and helped create
the land-owning elite o f the Ante-bellum south.2 James McClellan argues that while
French planters in Saint Domingue did not embrace science as openly as their Carolina
counterparts, science did serve the mercantilist interests o f the state, and helped
perpetuate slavery in the French Caribbean.3 Finally, John Lauritz Larson has shown that
experimental engineering designs for locks, dams, and internal waterways promised
America’s post-Revolutionary elite a means to promote private improvement schemes

2 Joyce Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South, 17301815 (Chapel Hill, 1993), 131-142.
3 James E. McClellan HI, Colonialism and Science: Saint Domingue in the Old Regime (Baltimore, 1993),
9,289-292.
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with public funds and in the face o f public opposition.4 In all these situations, science—
whether tied to European centers or not—worked to bolster a specific group’s local
political and economic positions. Not pursued solely for knowledge in its own right,
science expanded knowledge o f the natural world, yet at the same time advanced specific
interests.
Readers will find the terms “science,” “navigational knowledge,” and “research”
used quite liberally

perhaps over-interchangeabiy in the pages that follow. This is

intentional. The structured and distinct practices that we associate with science today had
yet to develop in the second h alf o f the eighteenth century. The lines between “amateur,”
“practitioner,” and “interested gentleman” were blurry to say the least. As others have
shown, to impose such categories on inquiries into the natural world and the inquirers
themselves clouds more than clarifies. Only after science underwent dramatic changes in
the early nineteenth century would science have such clear structures.5
The Marine Society’s scientific research forces a reconsideration o f how science,
politics, and society converged in the late colonial and early republican period. Early
understandings o f American science rested upon what George Basalla later called in 1968
“the cultural dependency model” o f scientific development that compared American
learned societies and institutions with their European progenitors. Authors such as Dirk
Struik, Brooke Hindle, John C. Greene, George Daniels, and Nathan Reingold, saw
American science as developmental^ stunted and wholly dependent upon British

4 John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise o f Popular
Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill, 2001), 1-37.
5See McClellan, Colonialism and Science, 7; and Roy MacLeod, “On visiting die Moving Metropolis:
Reflections on die Architecture of Imperial Science,” in Scientific Aspects o f European Expansion, ed.
William K. Storey (Hampshire, 1996), 24-27.
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intellectual centers o f scientific validation before Federal sponsorship began in earnest in
the 1830s.
This interpretive line has deep roots in the American p ast Benjamin Franklin, for
example, saw independence in the 1780s as allowing scientific institutions to thrive.
Once the colonists were finally free from the demands o f settlement, he wrote, “there are
many in every province in circumstances that set them at ease, and afford leisure to
cultivate the finer arts and improve the common stock o f knowledge.”6 In 1803, Samuel
Miller refined this criticism by complaining that American learning suffered for a lack o f
European institutional foundations. In his view, America suffered from a dearth o f
broadly funded universities, lacked leisure and a leisured class who would fund and
undertake scientific inquiries, and was hampered by a grasping commercial spirit that
supported few books and booksellers and offered few careers to intellectual research.7
Dirk Struik adopted this interpretive angle in 1948, but granted that Americans
held great interest in specific sciences in the course o f their daily lives. Struik recognized
that science was not limited to intellectual centers o f society.8 Yankee men o f science,
however, could not measure up to their British counterparts, even in the commercially
important field o f navigation.9 Economic relationships between Britain and America also
discouraged American scientific development, which “contributed to the primitive
condition o f colonial science, despite the ardent work done by many amateurs and some

6 Brook Hindle, The Pursuit o fScience in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill, 1956), 1.
7 John C. Greene, Science in the Age o fJefferson (Ames, Iowa 1986), 7.
8 Dirk J. Struik, Yankee Science in the Malang (Boston, 1948), 65.
9 Struik, Yankee Science, 39.
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s
professionals, and despite the relative prominence o f colonial science in the whole
framework o f British science.”10
In 1956, Brooke Hindle refined Strunk’s vision o f American science before the
Revolution. Hindle argued that American scientific work carried significant prestige
throughout British science circles o f the day. Using the “natural history circle” and
activities surrounding the transits o f Venus as models, Hindle demonstrated that
American researchers regularly contributed important observations ar»d raw data to
European intellectual centers for analysis and publication, often solely for validation and
access to cosmopolitan patronage.11 Despite the cases where accidents o f geography or
ecological diversity gave Americans different angles to European problems, Hindle still
saw the American scientific climate as developmentally lacking.12
In 1971, George H. Daniels took up Hindle’s argument that Americans
contributed significant findings to European research goals, but pushed the point one step
further.13 He argued that American novelties—new plants, anim als., phenomena,
observation points, weather, and currents— challenged European conclusions and pushed
scientific apparatus, both physical and intellectual alike, much further than old world
lim its.14 Daniels saw science as a strictly intellectual exercise that granted those within
intellectual circles patronage. Scientific work also gave a “sense o f membership in an
international community to [Americans] who keenly felt their provincial limitations, and

10Struik, Yankee Science, 28-29.
11 Struik, Yankee Science, 162.
12Hindle, Pursuit o fScience, 84.
13George H. Daniels, Science in American Society: A Social History (New York, 1971).
14Daniels, Science in American Society, 3-4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
made them feel that they were participating in an important intellectual enterprise ”15
Despite Daniels’ new insights into how New World flora, fauna, and natural observations
challenged and modified European knowledge systems, he persisted in centering the
sciences only within learned societies whose reliance upon European institutions
prevented American science from growing in the colonies.16 Ultimately, Daniels saw
American science suffering under post-Revolutionary hardships. Theoretical research
had to make w a y for more practical work, and the leisured patrons and generously
supported institutions o f the Old World did not yet exist in the new republic. In their
place, Daniels argued, science depended upon small local organizations that kept the
candle burning while American institutions grew to replace those lost in the breach with
Britain.17
By the 1980s, when John C. Greene gauged the state o f research in this field, little
had changed. He argued that “[The] conditions o f life in America militated against early
development o f the institutions requisite for maintenance o f a high level o f scientific
activity.”18 Greene concluded that early American “patronage” for science was limited
due to a lack o f public and private support. Ultimately, he concluded that between 1750
and 1820, “the development o f science had [not] reached the point where a few
strategically located men o f science could assemble the researches o f others less
favorably located and work them into comprehensive treatises.” 19

15 Daniels, Science in American Society, 51-52.
16 Daniels, Science in American Society, 63.
17 Daniels, Science in American Society, 128.
18John C. Greene, Science in the Age o f Jefferson (Ames, Iowa 1986), 11.
19 Greene, Science in the Age o fJefferson, 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
While historians o f colonial American science have focussed intently upon
scientific cultural dependency and the role o f science in bringing about the American
Revolution, work on other eighteenth century colonial settings has provided new angles
from which to evaluate the role o f colonialism and science. Recent studies o f Joseph
Banks by David Philip Miller, Peter Hanns Reill and John Gascoigne have shown that
science had a direct influence on international and domestic politics. Miller and Reill
argue that Banks’ position at the Royal Society and the Royal Gardens at Kew allowed
him to exchange governmental patronage for useful specimens from all around the world.
For the botanists and natural historians working in distant colonial lands, connections to
Banks gave them greater influence in their local area. For Banks, reviewing in-coming
contributions allowed him to further British imperial interests in the Pacific through the
successful transplantation o f plants that carried important strategic and commercial
value.20 Banks’s role at the center o f imperial science also held important implications
for domestic policy as well. John Gascoigne has shown that Banks’s prestige as a
botanist and as a quasi-govemmental official allowed him to use his scientific reputation
and governmental connections to influence the Com Law debates o f the 1780s and 1790s
for the benefit o f his social class, the landed gentry.21 More than just a pursuit o f
knowledge for its own sake, science in the late eighteenth century formed a tool by which
connected parties could expand their political interests.

20 David Philip Miller, “Joseph Banks, Empire, and ‘Centres of Calculation’ in Late Hanoverian London,”
in Visions ofEmpire: Voyages, Botany, and Representations o fNature, ed. David Philip Miller and Peter
Hans Reill (Cambridge, 1996), 21-37.
21 John Gascoigne, Science in the Service o fEmpire: Joseph Banks, the British State, and the Uses o f
Science in the Age o fRevolution (Cambridge, 1998), 81-87.
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Studies on the British expansion into India after 1763 have also provided
important parallels to the American experience. Matthew Edney’s study o f British
survey operations highlights the complex relationships between cartography and
colonialism. Edney argues that maps helped conceptually transform British possessions
in India into a solid idea o f empire. Maps aided in the expansion, cataloging and
exploitation o f natural resources, and conveyed to the British Raj a sense o f legitimate
ownership. Edney also sees surveying as a means by which British colonizers
distinguished themselves from native Indians and non-elite Europeans—a distinction that
helped reinforce power relationships between colonizers and colonized.22 Yet these
power structures were not clean cut. Kapil Raj argues that British scientific work in India
depended upon native informants for its success, a contradiction that Edney also points
ou t For Raj, British surveyors needed Indian technical knowledge to ensure the best
results. In addition, they needed Indian social knowledge that provided the basis by
which informants’ information was evaluated for reliability.23 Bayly further reinforces
Raj’s conclusion, arguing that access to Indian information networks was essential to the
expansion o f British rule.24
Examining the Marine Society’s work in Boston allows us to reconsider the role
o f science in the American colonies, with a new emphasis on the importance o f
vocational science. As a much smaller center o f observation and collection, the BMS
predated Banks in using their unique status for political influence. As this dissertation

22 Matthew Edney, Mapping An Empire: The Geographical Construction ofBritish India, 1786-1843
(Chicago, 1997).24-25,32-33,84.
23 Kapil Raj, “Colonial Encounters and the Forging of New Knowledge and National Identity: Great Britain
and India, 1750-1850,” Osiris, 15 (2000), 129-134.
24 C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 17801870 (Cambridge, 1986), 11,21,64.
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explains, they translated that status into political power at a national level after the
Revolution- Like British operatives in India, they used their navigational work to
distinguish themselves from others in the seaport, sometimes for explicit political
purposes. Furthermore, they also sought to catalog and exploit North American natural
resources through improved charts. And, though this cannot be pushed too far, the
Marine Society’s intimate local knowledge and social networks paralleled the role that
Indians played during early British survey operations. The point, as CoL Monckton
realized sailing east in the Bay o f Fundy, is that provincials’ local knowledge contributed
to the advancement o f imperial science in cartography and navigation.
Studying the Boston Marine Society allows us to track the rise and fall o f a set o f
practices, interests, and ambitions that defined “vocational science.” Chapter 1 sets the
Marine Society within its economic, political and scientific context. Chapter 2 explores
how its members applied vocational practices to meet their navigational needs, and how
that related to European practices developing at the same time. In Chapter 3 ,1 trace how
the Marine Society was able to apply the influence they gained through their navigational
work to Boston’s politics and national development before and after the Revolution.
Such successes, however, were short lived, and as Chapter 4 shows, the challenges o f
Pacific navigation and the sophistication o f Boston’s navigational market during the
1790s worked to undermine the Marine Society’s claim to influence. Ultimately, the
Marine Society’s vocational foundation for scientific authority waned as market forces,
changes in national politics, and changes in the organization itself encouraged the society
to return to local port management roles where they had long been dominant.
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A large community o f friends, family and colleagues developed around me
through this study. I have tried to let people know my gratitude as I went along, but
words, spoken or written, cannot convey the fullness o f my thanks. The help they gave
me, through close reading o f drafts, invigorating discussions, welcome distractions,
needed meals, and the occasional well-intended swift kick allowed me to finish this
project even when I had given up any hope o f doing so. To them, I give my greatest
thanks. While I may be the author, this study, if it is any good, is really a testament to
their kindness and generosity.
I would like offer my special thanks to the co-chairs o f my committee, Prof Jeff
Bolster and Dr. Jan Golinski. Their support and patience helped me develop this project
and encouraged me to explore all its implications. Both helped refine this work through
challenging questions, supportive and critical commentary, and close editing o f numerous
drafts. Dr. Golinski introduced me to the world o f the history o f science— a field that
formed one o f the foundations for this analysis. Jeff Bolster made available his deep
knowledge o f maritime history and gave me his appreciation for old fashioned, tedious,
and difficult social history research. I hope this work represents to some degree the
complementary synergy that I experienced working with both o f them. With Prof Dane
Morrison o f Salem State College, I drank numerous cups o f tea brainstorming ideas and
their implications. He generously gave his time encouraging me to see beyond the hard,
fast, and arbitrary barriers I had placed around my work, and opened opportunities to
publicly present my ideas at Salem State College’s summer seminars and through the
Bowditch Conference in November, 2002. Prof. Lige Gould read a manuscript draft o f
Chapter 3, and encouraged me to press on, and Prof. Jennifer Selwyn’s support about
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life-during-dissertafion-writing let me know she was in my comer. Danny Vickers
helped resolve some difficult conceptual problems at an all-too- brief lunch in Boston in
September 2002. Alan Taylor and Karen Haltunnen had a disproportionately beneficial
influence on my work during my brief tenure at the University o f California at Davis.
Jim Millinger started this whole process by opening my eyes to maritime history and
ecology during SEA’s Maritime Studies Semester (W-123). My thanks go to all o f them.
In more material terms, I want to thank Jeff Bolster again for awarding me the
Hayes Chair Research Assistantship in the final year o f this manuscript’s preparation.
Special thanks also go to the Boston Marine Society and the Massachusetts Historical
Society for awarding me the Short-Term Fellowship for Maritime History in the summer
o f 2002. Bill Fowler, Peter Drummey, Conrad Wright, and Brenda Larson gave their
insights and copious knowledge, and helped me meet Dr. Thea Hunter and Dr. Kate
Davies whose input was invaluable. I also wish to thank Cindy Larson and Judy Zubrow
at the College for Lifelong Learning for supporting my writing through letting me teach
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CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF THE BOSTON MARINE SOCIETY, 1742-1759

In December 1752, about a dozen senior ship captains in Boston met at the British
Coffee House to discuss business. Since 1742, this group o f captains had met monthly as
the Fellowship Club to manage and disburse funds they pooled together for mutual
assistance in times o f need. This evening, however, they voted to take their mutual aid
society a step further. After discussion, the assembly voted that Jeremiah Gridley, a local
lawyer working with the group, should present to the Massachusetts General Court a
petition for incorporation and charter.1
The petition languished in government hands for the next nine months, with the
club not receiving any word about its progress. In September, 1753, the group grew
impatient and voted that Capt. Joshua Loring, a prominent Boston captain, merchant, and
member should congratulate Governor William Shirley for his recent return from London
and to move the petition along. The ploy worked. Three months later in December 1753,
some o f the most significant and active Boston ship captains waited on the governor, and
publicly signed their petition for incorporation. On February 2, Governor William
Shirley granted a charter, and three days later, the newly incorporated Boston Marine
Society voted bylaws, elected officers, and created a committee to oversee the
distribution o f charity funds. They also voted some o f the same individuals who waited

1 Boston Marine Society Records, 1752-1762 [sic], Dec. 5,1752, Boston Marine Society Collection
(Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.), hereafter referred to as BMS Records.
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on the governor two months before to a committee set up to examine and review
navigational observations brought in by other members.2
In broadening the roles o f their mutual aid society, members o f the Boston Marine
Society responded to Boston’s particular need to stabilize the personal risks and dangers
in commercial seafaring. Dependence upon imperial markets in Europe and the West
Indies, and on financial centers in London, meant that Boston’s economic growth relied,
at some point, upon ocean travel Boston’s need to embrace risky maritime ventures
required some form o f insurance that would offset seafaring’s attendant dangers. In
Britain, such needs were met by a variety o f public and private institutions that supported
mariners, managed ports, and maintained navigational markers. Organizations such as
Trinity House and seamen’s charitable funds stepped in to offer some support when
maritime tragedy struck. Other institutions, such as Christ’s Hospital, the Royal
Observatory, and the Royal Navy, worked to reduce maritime disasters by rigorous
navigational instruction, improved almanacs and astronomical data, and better charts, all
geared to reduce loss at sea. The benefits o f these organizations, however, did not stretch
across the Atlantic. While the British Atlantic empire created avenues for Boston
mariners to find a profitable niche in the world, such opportunities came with great risks
to merchants, masters, and mariners alike.3
As the Marine Society developed, it looked back towards Europe for models to
shape its efforts. The society that emerged in Boston, however, was not a simple

2 BMS Records, Feb. 5,1754.
3 Jon Press, “The Collapse of a Contributory Pension Scheme: The Merchant Seamen’s Fund, 1747-1851,”
Journal o f Transport History, 5 (1979), 91-104; Roy Porter, Unpathed Waters: Account o fthe Life o f
Joseph Huddart, FRS (London, 1989); Joseph Cotton, Memoir on the origin and incorporation o f the
Trinity House o fDeptford Strond (London, 1818); Trinity House, The royal Charter ofconfirmation,
granted by his most excellent Majesty King James I I . . . (London, 1780).
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replication o f a British institution. Like many other elements o f European life transported
to America, the Marine Society embraced and adapted a variety o f British models to their
own particular colonial experience.
Three key concepts stood at the center o f the Marine Society’s publicly
proclaimed bylaws. First, technical merit and vocational experience formed the major
criteria through which Boston masters joined the membership. Only individuals who
currently or had previously commanded merchants ships in and out o f Boston, and who
had the sponsorship o f a current member, could join. No mere gentleman’s club,
common work experiences defined the society as a community, set aside from the rest o f
the town. That uniqueness, in turn, formed the foundation for mutual aid. In times o f
shipwreck, accidental death, or capture by an enemy, members and their families could
rely on the Marine Society to provide some modicum o f support
Second, members were also required to behave in a civil and orderly manner. The
13th article o f the 1752 Laws mandated that “the Society shall & w ill avoid all Quarrels,
Fighting, Chalenging [s/c] each other to fight & all Needless Contentions and debates,
that may tend to Create any fighting or Quarrelling or to disturb the Good Order, peace
Friendship & Love that each Member shall and ought to bear to the other.”4 The Society
also prohibited members from excessive drinking and cursing. Failure to conform to
behavioral rules or failure to pay dues in a relatively timely manner could lead to
expulsion.5 In requiring better behavior, the Marine Society reflected closer cultural ties
to Britain that accompanied an increased trade across the Atlantic. Increased trade in

4 Boston Marine Society, “Laws—Boston Marine Society,” Feb. 26,1754, as in William A. Baker, A
History o f the Boston Marine Society, 7742-79S7(Boston, 1982), 308-309.
5Boston Marine Society, “Laws.”
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luxury goods and fine artistry, helped educate and equip a rough mannered American
gentry in the ways o f their cultural betters in London.6 While only the most successful
Boston captains had the wealth that would justify genteel distinction within their
community, the Society’s orders against abusive, rough and publicly humiliating
behavior reflected a growing importance o f public “delicacy” that lay at the heart o f
refinement. “Delicacy forbade an individual to assert superiority or to degrade another.
Delicacy detested the slightest shadow o f blame or derogation and acted to lift that
shadow from any across whom it fell.”7 In general, delicacy, and its encompassing virtue
o f gentility, “heightened self-consciousness, not in any deep philosophical sense, but in
the common meaning o f becoming aware o f how one looked in the eyes o f others.”8
Gentility also helped present a unified face o f benefaction. For a body o f men
who looked after other impoverished members and dependent families, genteel behavior
at once reinforced social hierarchy and emphasized the generosity o f the Society’s
benevolence. The Marine Society required that applicants for charity petition the society,
a requirement that instantly put the applicant in a position as supplicant. The R elief
Committee would then “inquire into [their] circumstances & report at the next meeting o f
the society,” and would more likely approve some modicum o f aid.9 Marine Society
records also reveal, however, that members on the “Committee for R elief’ occasionally
issued moralizing judgements about the “objects” o f their charity. And in these cases, the
Society denied or withheld aid. For example in January 1757, the Society voted that,

6 Richard Bushman, The Refinement o fAmerica: Persons, Houses, Cities (New York, 1992), 181-186.
7 Bushman, Refinement, 81.
8 Bushman, Refinement, xiv.
9 BMS Records, Oct. 7,1755.
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whereas the sum of three pounds was ordered to be paid Elizabeth Rand by the
Treasurer last meeting but on information that said Elizabeth Rand would make
bad use of the money the Treasurer having informed the society that there still
remained in his hands thirty six shillings voted that this thirty six shall be
appropriated to the use and benefit of die children o f said Rand.10

It was important that, when the Society made decisions that affected people’s well
being, they did so with the appearance o f unanimity- Division and discord, manifested
through coarse and rude behavior, would inevitably lead to charges o f faction, interest,
and therefore, unfairness. Prohibition o f discord also reflected larger ideas about how
community politics should operate. Like the polities that surrounded them, the Marine
Society governed itself with the same emphasis upon unanimity .11 A s Michael
Zuckerman has argued about colonial Massachusetts’ town meetings, “the men o f the
province established their agreements on policies and places, and there they legitimized
those agreements so that subsequent deviation from those accords became socially
illegitimate and personally immoral”12 Marine Society regulations mandating poorly
behaved members to be expelled enforced unanimity in a similar fashion as in other
political bodies. “All those whose acquiescence in public action was necessary were
included, and all those whose concurrence could be compelled otherwise or dispensed
with were excluded.” 13 As the Marine Society grew in local significance, proper behavior

10BMS Records, Jan. 4,1757.
11 See also Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New York, 1976), 14-16.
12 Michael Zuckerman, “The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts,” in Colonial America: Essays
in Politics and Social Development, Fourth Edition, ed. Stanley N. Katz, John M. Murrin, and Douglas
Greenberg (New York, 1993), 436.
13 Zuckerman, “Social Context,” 439.
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would help support the socially prominent role they would assume, lending greater
credibility and certainty to their findings and assessments.14
The third, and most important focus for this study, required that each member
“Communicate his [s/c] Observations inwards & outwards o f the Variation o f the Needle
the Soundings Courses & distances and all other Remarkable things about this Coast in
writing to be Examined & digested by the Committee Appointed by the Society for that
purpose

Lodg’d with yc Clerk, o f s&id Society in order to be Recorded in the Records

o f said society.”15 As eighteenth century New England towns tended to view themselves
as an organic, unified community, at least in theory, it was only natural that an
organization receiving specific social sanction return the favor through applying their
unique skills to the betterment o f the whole. In this case, both the Marine Society and
Governor Shirley recognized that the Marine Society offered a unique opportunity to
provide accurate navigational information without incurring the costs o f a formal coastal
survey. The Marine Society’s ability to provide more information like this stood at the
foundation o f their incorporation. This relationship was not merely implied. In writing
Malachy Salter in March, 1754, Jonathan Clarke, the Marine Society’s first elected
Master, stated that “in order to obtain this charter [the society] have laid themselves
under an obligation to the government” to collect navigational data. This information
ultimately was to be “put upon the records o f the Marine Society so that in time a new
and correct draught o f this coast may be made for the advantage o f the public.”16

14 See chapter 2, below.
13 Boston Marine Society, “Laws.”
16 BMS Records, March 3,1754.
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The Society’s mutual aid mission and technical requirements attracted
experienced mariners well established in their careers. Data for BMS members is
surprisingly sparse: ages at time o f admission could be found for only 29 o f the 274
members admitted before the Revolution, and tax records list only 72 names that can be
confirmed as BMS members.17 Inducted members’ ages ranged from 20 to 61, but
averaged out at 33 years old, suggesting that if they survived ten years o f sea service,
they were willing to retire to more shore based livelihoods. Surviving a career at sea was
no sure thing, however. O f the twenty-three members known to have died before the
Revolution, seven—almost a full third— died in foreign lands, most often the West
Indies, or during a passage.18 If the individual survived, he was likely to attain some
respectable shore-side livelihood: 19 (47.5%) had made the jump to merchant, trader, or
shopkeeper by the end o f their lives. Consequently, the BMS attracted men who had
survived their stint as captains and who looked forward to more secure lives on shore.
The 1771 Massachusetts tax rolls show how members’ progress from the
quarterdeck to the counting house appeared at a frozen moment in time. Tax lists, rather
than probate records, give a fuller understanding o f how Marine Society members made
their livings. O f the 72 BMS members identified in the lists, 22 (31%) owned from £13
to £1500 in merchandise, and ten individuals (14%) owned from 20 to 203 tons o f

17Ages were determined mostly through death announcements in Boston. See Robert J. Dunkle, Deaths in
Boston, 1700 to 1799 (Boston, 1999). John Tyler faced similar, though not as extensive, difficulties in
determining the ages for many of his subjects. Where there was overlap with the BMS, ages were taken
from Tyler’s work. See John Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots: Boston Merchants and the Advent o fthe
American Revolution (Boston, 1986), 253-277. For Massachusetts 1771 tax records see Bettye Hobbes
Pruitt, The Massachusetts Tax Valuation List o f 1771 (Boston, 1978). The 72 names represent only about
29% of die total members inducted before the Revolution, minus the 22 individuals known to have died
before 1771, Howard A. Baker, A History o fthe Boston Marine Society, 1742-1981 (Boston, 1982), 318361.
18Dunkle, Deaths in Boston.
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shipping. Thirteen individuals owned warehouses or tan houses, and three people owned
from 1157 feet to 3450 feet o f wharfage. Several o f the wealthier members, such as
Samuel Harris and Nathaniel Greene, owned merchandise, shipping tonnage, warehouses,
and wharfage. Overall, this information further suggests that after retiring from sea
service, BMS members kept interests in all aspects o f coastal and overseas trade.19
Success fell in varying degrees upon BMS members. Generally, BMS members
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BMS members identified in the 1771 tax list paid no taxes at all. On the other end, John
Frazier’s house, shop, and £200 in merchandise, for example, generated a tax bill o f £46
13s 4d. Well over half, 38 (52%), owned enough property to pay between £9 8s and £27
4s in taxes.

Table 1: Assessed Taxes in 1771 by 20% Brackets (£)
Wealth Bracket

No. in bracket

Proportion of
Population
Top 20%
8
11%
2nd
6
8%
3rd
19
26%
4th
19
26%
5th
20
28%
Total Population
72
100%
Source: Pruitt, Massachusetts Tax Evaluation; and Baker, Boston Marine Society, 318-361.
Assessed Tax in 1771
(£sd)
£37 12s-£4
£28 6s-£37 12s
£18 18s-£284s
£9 10s-£ 18 16s
0-£9 8s

Other indicators further reinforce this im age o f varying material wealth. Sixtyeight percent owned their own homes in Boston, and it is likely that wealthier individuals
that did not have a house listed in their assessed taxes owned a home in one o f the nearby
towns. William Downes Cheever, for example, owned a warehouse, “2 servants for life,”
and £268 in merchandise, but lived in a home in Cambridge. A ll who owned their home

19Pruitt, Massachusetts Tax Evaluation.
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also owned an adjacent shop (though not all that owned shops always had merchandise
listed in their property listings). In addition, eight individuals owned at least one “servant
for life”, most likely a personal slave, and three, Nathaniel Greene, Cheever, and John
Bradford, owned two slaves each. Ultimately, most BMS members that retired to shore
achieved some form o f propertied security.
Some Society members also held civic leadership roles, sitting just below crown
uuiS/iaio a u u v ^ u c i a i v/uui i mwmcvlbm^/.

rvt iuu>t tWv ijuvmiA^Io, jv/uu JuupdUu cum

Henderson Inches, occupied positions to loan money to the colonial government for an
expedition against Crown Point in 1757. Two others were elected as Justices o f the
Peace: John Barret for Suffolk County in 1761 and Edward Davis for Plymouth County
in 1762. Barret also served as overseer for Boston’s poor in 1765, and helped the colony
manage French neutrals during the French and Indian War. Henderson Inches and
Edward Davis were also appointed Selectmen for Boston in 1769 and 1758, respectively,
and Joseph Bradford served as Suffolk County Sheriff in 1739.20 As prominent captains,
and then merchants, some members successfully drew upon their commercial successes
to leverage themselves into public service roles in town government.
Not all succeeded, however, in acquiring the financial resources that allowed
further participation as civic leaders. A full 28% o f the members identified in the tax lists
lacked the property to pay any taxes at a ll Some even lost wealth they had acquired.
Lewis Turner, for example, hanged him self in his bedroom in April 1772 to escape debts

20 [Creditors on account of Crown Point Expedition], 1757, voL 21,612; [John Barret appointment to
Justice of the Peace for Suffolk County], Nov. 12,1761, v. 85,321 and 330; [John Barret appointment to
overseer of poor in Boston], March 19,1765, vol. 24,534 and 537; [Charge of John Barret mentioned in
Boston account for care of French neutrals], Jan. 29, 1755, vol. 23,334 and 336; [Boston Selectmen] July
1,1769, vol. 118,394; [Selectmen’s receipts for account of French neutrals], May 28,1759, vol. 24,193;
[John Bradford appointment as Suffolk Co. Sheriff], June 3,1739/40, vol. 41,483 (Massachusetts State
Archives, Boston Mass.).
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he owed to one Dr. Sprague.21 Most o f the poorest members simply could not amass
enough wealth to purchase a house. Eleven members (15%) were tenants, and in at least
one case, one member rented from another. Despite their hard financial situations, poorer
members still pursued trade. Joseph Pierce, for example, owned £80 in merchandise, but
still rented from Benjamin Kent. Benjamin Homer owned 20 tons o f shipping and £60 in
merchandise, but did not own his own home, at least not in Boston. Less wealthy
members with homes also rented out rooms to bring in revenue: four members (all in the
second and third lowest 20% brackets) had tenants.
The Marine Society received significant support from Boston captains both before
and after its incorporation. During the years o f the Fellowship Club, from 1742 to 1751,
between five and seven new members joined each year, except for 1746 when no
members joined.22 As members began to discuss incorporation, however, Boston
captains responded with tremendous support. In 1752 alone, 26 new members joined the
Fellowship Club, with another 17 the following year, suggesting that captains supported
the Fellowship Club’s desire for incorporation. Support for Marine Society activities,
with some variation, would remain relatively consistent until the Revolution.

21 John Boyle, “Boyle’s Journal of Occurrences in Boston,” New England Historic and Genealogical
Register, 84 (1930), 359.
22 Baker, Boston Marine Society, 318-361.
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Table 2: M arine Society New Members by Year, 1742-1788.

Boston Marine Society NewMembers by Year, 1742-1775

1742

1752

1762

1772

Year
Source: Baker, Boston Marine Society, 318-361.

Members joined for a variety o f reasons. Some were sociable: members met
monthly when in town and used the meetings to catch-up as well as discuss business.
The society also kept tabs on members who were at sea and spread word when members
were over-due to keep track o f monthly membership payments. As a society based upon
acknowledged merit, some joined for the prestige that came from membership. Most
members joined to offset the dangers o f their trade. Early support for incorporation
suggests that masters actively supported expanding the mutual assistance networks for
members and their families, and embraced increasing the knowledge o f the coasts. With
the outbreak o f war in 1754, however, masters joined for more immediate concerns. The
Marine Society’s records reveal that many members fell into enemy hands during the
war. As the by-laws mandate, captured or castaway members were not held liable for
monthly dues during their forced absence, and as a result, Marine Society clerks kept
close tabs on the membership to keep financial accounts accurate. As more Boston
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captains were captured by French and Spanish forces during the French and Indian War,
more masters joined the Marine Society for the added security the organization held for
their families during their possible captivity.

Table 3: Members Captured and New Recruits by Year, 1755-1764.

BMS New Members and Captured Members, 1755-1764
25

20
w

"3

23
>
e

15

-Captures
-New

10
5

0
1755

1757

1759

1761

1763

Year
Source: BMS Records; Baker, Boston Marine Society, 318-361.

A few unfortunates fell into enemy hands early in the war. In 1756, Edward
Sohier returned from “being taken” in December and Robert Buttler returned from
captivity in June o f 1757.23 Alexander Inglish returned in May 1757 just in time to be
taken again and return to Boston by December o f the same year.

23 BMS Records and Boston Marine Society Minutes, Boston Marine Society Collection, (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston, Mass.), hereafter referred to as BMS Minutes. The Marine Society settled back
dues, levied fines, and excused fines Mien members returned from their voyages. Consequently, we only
know when individuals returned from their periods of captivity rather than when they were taken. In some
cases, however, the clerk did record how long the member had been taken, giving an indication as to when
he was captured. The Marine Society also levied dues on a two tiered system: a higher rate for those in
town, and a lower one for those at sea. Given this two tiered system, and die spotty nature of the records, it
is difficult to use the fines excused or levied to calculate length of captivity.
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A s bad as 1756 and 1757 were, however, 1758 proved disastrous. The Marine
Society heard o f Thomas Baker’s capture in April, followed shortly by news that Robert
Buttler and Nathaniel Holland had again fallen into French hands in May. The next
captain to foil into French hands is unclear, either a member named Nathaniel Howland
was taken by the French in June, or, somehow, Nathaniel Holland returned only to be
captured again in the same month.24 John Bradford was reported to have been “cast
away,” either by enemy action or by bad weather in July, the same month William Sharad
was also captured. Somehow, Sharad returned, but only to be captured again in
September. The French then captured Edward Emerson in August, Robert Jarvis in
October, and Andrew Newell in December. In all, about one-eighth o f all Boston Marine
Society members fell into French hands in 1758 alone.
As British forces won victories overseas and in Canada, BMS members faced
better odds. Only Thomas Cartwright was captured in 1759, marking a significant lull in
merchant losses in Boston from the previous year, or suggesting reluctance among
recently returned captains to return to sea immediately. Between 1760 and 1763,
however, captures again increased. Six members were captured in 1760, eight in 1762,
and nine in 1763. By the end o f the war, a total o f 39 Marine Society members had fallen
into French hands, almost half o f the 1754 membership total, and six were captured at
least twice.
Frequent, short-term periods o f captivity made these interruptions to daily life
somewhat routine for some. Alexander Inglish and possibly Nathaniel Howland, for
example, were undeterred from returning to sea after their internment. They returned

24 As with many manuscript sources from this time, proper names often witnessed different spellings,
making tracking individuals difficult
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from captivity only to turn around and ship out again within a matter o f weeks. William
Sharad took two months to get back out to sea after his capture in 1758. For most other
captains, however, one “vacation” in enemy hands was enough, and the costs to their
reputations and investments most likely represented hazards o f the job that they wished to
avoid. After 1763, Boston masters continued to join and support the Marine Society, as
captured members’ experiences continued to make a good case for membership even
after the restoration o f peace.
The Marine Society appealed to those looking to stabilize their lives after a career
at sea. Taking their earnings from voyaging, many members were able to achieve
merchant or trader status before the Revolution, or at least continue to make a living in
the overseas trading or shipping industries. That said, the society was far from a group o f
successful captains and merchants. As the technical base o f membership would suggest,
individuals who made their names as respected captains, and not necessarily as successful
traders, were also members. Almost a third o f the membership did not own homes and
had no taxable property. Consequently, seafaring experience, and not wealth, played a
greater role in determining membership.
That the Marine Society looked to character and ability, and not just wealth, for
the group’s leadership is best seen in the Marine Society’s office holding and committee
membership. Based on the 1771 tax lists discussed above, the Marine Society drew its
leadership from across the body’s range o f wealth holding.
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Table 4: BMS Office Holding and Wealth Bracket, 1753-1775.
Wealth
Bracket

Assessed Tax in No. office Holders
1771 (£sd)
within Bracket

Proportion of Officeholders

Top 20%
£37 12s-£4
42%
5
£28 6s-£37 12s
1
2nd
8%
3rd
£18 18s-£284s
3
25%
4th
£9 10s-£18 16s
2
17%
5th
0-£9 8s
1*
8%
Total
12
100%
population
Source: Baker, Boston Marine Society, 316-317; and Pruitt, Massachusetts Tax Evaluation. Note:
John Blake was not assessed real estate taxes in 1771, but owned f 150 in vessels and £600 in
merchandise, suggesting that he fell elsewhere in the distribution.

Almost as many members in the third and fourth 20% brackets held offices as did their
colleagues from the wealthiest. Hezekiah Welch, for example, who was the longest-term
office holder and held the post o f clerk from 1763-1775, was assessed the median tax o f
£16. The second wealthiest group had the fewest office holders.

The Marine Society itself grew out o f a dramatic expansion o f New England
shipping. During the first two-thirds o f the eighteenth century, New England merchants
and shippers adapted to a lack o f staple exports by diversifying their trading patterns in
goods and markets. Like sugar and tobacco plantation owners in Virginia and the
Caribbean, New England merchants looked to European markets to sell their timber and
fisheries products. London merchants eagerly bought New England fish as they
scrambled to find a commodity to trade for wine with Catholic southern Europe. In
addition, growing slave populations in the Caribbean gave merchants a market for New
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England livestock, grain, and fish. They imported molasses and sugar from the
Caribbean to distill into rum.25

Table 5: Average Annual Value and Destinations o f Commodity Exports from New England,
1768-1772 (£ Sterling).
Commodity

Great
Britain
£206
374

Ireland

Southern
Europe
£57,195
461

West
Africa
Indies
£94,754
89,118

Fish
Livestock, beef
pork
Wood Products
5,983
£167
1352
57,769
Whale Products
40,443
9
804
20,416
Potash
22390
Grains, Grain
117
23
15,764
3,998
Products
Rum
471
4
1,497
Other
6,991
1,018
247
296
Total
£76,975
£1361
£65,603
£278,068
Source: McCusker and Menard, Economy o fBritish America, 108.

£440

16,754
£17,194

Total
£152,155
89,953
65371
62,103
22,399
19,902
18,766
8,552
£439,101

Demand in the Caribbean and in other British colonies for timber products such as
planks, shingles, and ships, also generated considerable trade between New England and
the rest o f the empire. Beginning with England’s wars with France between 1689-1713,
New Englanders increasingly supplied ships needed for imperial trade. By 1730, Ralph
Davis estimates, and Jacob Price concurs, that one in six English ships were American
built, and by 1760 that ratio had increased to one in four.26 In 1769, Lord Sheffield
estimated that Massachusetts and New Hampshire alone built 182 o f the 447 ships built

25 See John J. McCusker and Russel R. Menard, The Economy o fBritish America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill,
1985), di. 5.
26 Jacob M. Price, “A note on die Value of Colonial Exports of Shipping,” Journal o f Economic History, 36
(1976) 706.
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in British America (about 41%).27 Alexander Cluny, an experienced merchant writing in
1769, reported that New England was responsible for 70 o f the 155 (45%) total vessels
sold to Britain between 1763 and 1768.28 In addition to exporting timber and fisheries
products, New Englanders also expanded into the imperial carrying trade. “Early in the
colonial era, New England developed a diverse and tightly integrated commercial
econom y. . .All [o f New England’s diverse industries] relied on a shipping industry to
disperse their products to market and bring back again those things that they
consumed.”29 James F. Shepard and Gary M. Walton estimate that New England earned
£55,000 in carrying charges in 1768 alone, the earliest data they offer on the subject.30
While other colonies relied upon the export o f staple crops to pay o ff debts to British
creditors, the imperial carrying trade allowed New Englanders to make up their balance
o f payments. As Boston shipping expanded, more Boston captains faced the risks o f
seafaring, and looked to the Marine Society to offset those risks.
The Marine Society’s charitable works also helped the town fulfill its obligations
as part o f a British commercial empire spanning the North Atlantic. Intermittent warfare
between Britain and France from the late seventeenth century required larger towns like
Boston to provide soldiers, capital, ships, and workers for an imperial struggle that raged
into the eighteenth century. War and the mercantilist theories that drove Europe’s

27 See Price, Table 1, p. 707. Figures were calculated by adding numbers of “Topsails” and “Sloops and
Schooners” for “Mass.” and “N. H.”, and determining their percentage from the total numbers of each
category built in the British American colonies for 1769 alone.
28 Price, “Note,” 710-711.
29 McCusker and Menard, Economy o fBritish America, 110.
30James F. Shepard and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development o f
Colonial North America (Cambridge, 1972), Table 7.6,128.
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political economy targeted enemy merchant vessels as much as they targeted enemy
warships. Despite the uncharacteristic long-term peace from 1713 to 1739, these threats
increased dramatically with the construction o f the French fortress at Louisborg, Cape
Breton Island in 1720. When war broke out again in 1739, French privateers and naval
vessels could more easily harass Boston shipping running from the Nova Scotian fishing
banks to the Caribbean. Consequently, Boston mariners faced as much risk o f capture,
death or mutilation as Boston soldiers and militia sent to fight in upstate N ew York. The
Marine Society’s desires to protect members and their families from harm grew
immediately out o f the imperial tensions that marked the eighteenth century northwest
Atlantic.
The Marine Society also addressed an imperial need for more navigational
information for the New England coast. Unlike Old Regime France, Britain came to
recognize the importance o f concerted coastal surveying relatively late in the eighteenth
century.31 The French government established an office for plans and charts in the
seventeenth century, and created the Academie Royale de Marine at Brest in 1752 to
improve French marine cartography.32 In Britain, however, British imperial agents
avoided centralized cartographic offices and were content to allow the free market to
meet the demand for navigational information. Consequently, throughout the eighteenth
century, few sources o f navigational information, such as charts, ratters, sailing directions
or harbor surveys, existed in published form to aid vessels. The Dutch, too, had long

31 James E. McClellan III and Frangois Regourd, “The Colonial Machine, French Science and Colonization
in the Ancien Regime,” Osiris, Second Series, 15 (2000), 36-37.
32 James E. McClellan III, Colonialism and Science: Saint Domingue in the Old Regime (Baltimore, 1992),
124.
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excelled in coastal cartography, dominating the British market until the early eighteenth
century. Most European energies were focussed on surveying home waters, leaving
descriptions o f colonial waters to brief vague information, often ages old.33
One o f the earliest and most consistent o f these was John Sellers’ The English

Pilot: The Fourth Book. Covering the entire eastern seaboard, this publication and its
handful o f charts offered at least brief instructions for vessels approaching American
ports. Comprehensive in nature, its brevity and initial lack o f charts made the work only
useful in the broadest terms. In addition, from its publication in 1689, the work was
rarely revised in its almost hundred years o f publication, even as coastal navigational aids
changed in the course o f the eighteenth century.34
In addition to Sellers’ work, Cyprian Southack drew charts o f the New England
and Nova Scotian coastline during his long tenure as the captain o f the Province Galley.
Beginning in 1694 with a draft o f Boston Harbor, Southack produced a series o f charts o f

the N ew England and Nova Scotian waters throughout the first third o f the eighteenth
century. After two manuscript maps that brought him acclaim, Southack published “A
New Chart o f the English Empire in North America” in 1717. He followed with charts o f
Canso Harbor and the coast from the Mississippi River to Cape Breton, many appearing
in revisions o f Sellers’ Fourth Book. Between 1718 and 1734— historians are not sure
when— Southack published The New England Coasting Pilot that combined charts with

33 William P. Cumming, British Maps o fColonial America (Chicago, 1974), ch. 3. See also Coolie Vemer,
“John Seller and the Chart Trade in Seventeenth Century England,” and Jeanette Black, “Mapping the
English Colonies in North America: The Beginnings,” in The Compleat Plattmaker: Essays on Chart, Map,
and Globe Making in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Norman Thrower
(Berkeley, 1978), 127-158 and 101-126.
34Cumming, British Maps, ch. 3. See also Vemer, “John Seller,” and Black, “Mapping the English
Colonies,” in The Compleat Plattmaker, ed. Norman Thrower, 127-158 and 101-126.
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over one hundred notes on safe harbors, currents, and soundings. These works, however,
were not much better than Sellers’ outdated publications.35
The dearth o f charts and sailing directions for the North American coast can be
largely attributed to the feet that few knew how to conduct even remotely accurate coastal
surveys until mid-century. Until the mid-1750s, when Murdoch Mackenzie published the
first standardized manual, most marine surveying was more o f an individual art than a
systematic process. Navigators often gathered data during their voyages and submitted
the information to European chart makers and plate engravers. Aside from the
inaccuracies inherent in these observations, the many individuals involved in chart
production, such as mathematicians, copyists, engravers, and translators, introduced
additional errors in the final publication. In 1753, for example, John Greene harshly
ridiculed Buache and D e L’lsle’s Countries to the North o f the South Seas for misplacing
“discoveries ascribed to De Font, 10 degrees more north than he ought to have done. . .
that the error had been owing to the copist [sic], or Translator, putting one Figure for
another.”36 Less forgivable errors also found their ways into this chart. On further
examination o f De L’lsle ’s work Greene “perceived that the 6 in 63 had not the
Appearance o f other sixes, wither in the Shape or Situation,. . .and on examination
found, that the Number had been actually printed o ff 53, and the 5 changed afterwards
into a 6 with the Pen.”37

35 Clara Egli LeGear, “The New England Coasting Pilot of Cyprian Southack,” Imago Mundi, 11 (1954),
141.
36John Green, Remarks in Support o f the New Chart o fNorth and South America in Six Sheets (London,
1753), i.
37 Green, Remarks, ii.
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Without any learned societies, academic institutions, or sources o f government
support for coastal surveys, New England captains relied upon age-old, relatively simple
navigational practices that had guided European ships for centuries. Beginning in the
mid-eighteenth century, however, European masters began to embrace new instruments
and new mathematical methods for determining a ship’s position, such as Hadley’s
Reflecting Octant and Maskeleyne’s lunar distance method for determining longitude,.
Most N ew England masters, however, continued to rely upon simpler Davis quadrants
until the end o f the century. Introduced in 1594, backstaffs, or Davis quadrants, remained
one o f the more popular instruments to take latitudinal measurements until the 1780s.
Relatively cheap— priced in the eighteenth century from four shillings to six guineas—
these instruments were preferred by New England masters to the more expensive
improvements available in Europe.38 Furthermore, eighteenth century New England
logbooks for trans-Atlantic voyages indicate that most masters estimated their longitude
from their dead reckoning track and did not use more complicated methods. For example
in 1778, navigators aboard the Sloop Peggy and the Schooner Success determined their
daily positions with course directions, distances run, differences in latitude from previous
measurements, latitudes by dead reckoning, latitudes by observation, “meridional
distances”—that is distance in meridians from departure, difference in longitudes, and

38 Deborah Jean Warner, “Davis’ Quadrants in America,” Rittenhouse, 3 (1988), 26. As Silvio Bedini
points out, Thomas Godfrey, an American instrument maker in Philadelphia came up with similar
improvements to the Davis quadrant as Hadley did, and even communicated his ideas to the Royal Society
of London before Hadley received a patent for his reflecting octant Because of Royal Society oversight,
Hadley received a patent for his work, and soon dominated the market for reflecting octants in Europe and
America. See Silvio Bedini, Thinkers and linkers: Early American Men o fScience (New York, 1975),
118-123.
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longitudes in degrees from Greenwich.39 From these pieces o f information, a navigator
could determine a rough idea o f the ship’s position, set and drift, and most importantly,
when to begin soundings. An exercise book from 1806 required students to calculate
similar information.40 In neither case did navigators use lunar distance calculations for

their daily positions.
Consequently, New England mariners relied upon practical and relatively simple
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technique, figured largely in their work. Position fixes by dead reckoning relied on the
simple compilation o f how far and in what direction the ship traveled over a period o f
time. This information was transferred hourly onto a specially designed board or a
framed piece o f slate. Before charting the ship’s position on a chart, the few masters who
knew how applied some basic spherical trigonometry to these notes to correct for the
earth’s curvature. The resultant distance and direct run for the day was tacked onto the
previous day’s position, and from that, a master could estimate the vessel’s longitude.
Masters also took daily sun sights when the sun approached the highest point in
the sky (called local apparent noon) to get an independent determination o f latitude. As
the sun approached local apparent noon, the navigator would observe the angular distance
between the sun and the horizon with a Davis quadrant. With the aid o f an almanac, the
navigator could correct the observed altitude for index error, dip, and refraction, and
make a few simple calculations to determine the ship’s latitude. The resulting figure,

39 Log of the Sloop Peggy, Schooner Success, Privateering Log, October, 1778 to January, 1779. Peabody
Essex Museum LOG 1778S, Salem, Massachusetts.
40 Student Exercise Log Book, LOG17952 (B24) (Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.).
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combined with the estimated longitude from the dead reckoning provided the ship’s
approximate position.
Maintaining as accurate a position as possible helped masters approach coastlines
and islands, but they rarely relied solely upon their calculated positions as they came onto
a coast. With only rough position calculations, masters could not rely upon their charted
positions to guarantee that they had made the landfall expected or were clear o f any
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soundings using a lead and line. This tallow-tipped lead weight attached to a known
length o f line gave masters not only depths, but also types o f bottom, which, when
compared to the ship’s calculated position and to charts or personal notes, offered more
information on the ship’s actual position.
Using these methods, masters not only navigated their ships, but also drew up
their own sailing directions and drafted their own charts o f the New England coast
These were then exchanged with colleagues by either copying notes into log books, or by
word o f mouth. The log o f the brigantine Duke from 1748 provides a good example o f
these practices. The keeper o f this log recorded directions for sailing from North
America to Whitehaven in the northwest o f England and then to the Orkneys, giving
courses and distances for important way marks. Because the directions fell in a neat
sequence at the beginning o f the journal, this master most likely copied these notes from
another master or from a set o f sailing directions owned by a colleague that would
provide sim ilar information. In either case, this mariner relied upon his peers as sources
o f information when no others were to be had.41

41 Brigantine Duke, “Shipping Logbook,” Apr. to Sept 1748, LOG 1748 D (Peabody Essex Museum,
Salem, Mass.).
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N ew England masters’ retention o f older methods in the face o f newer ones
highlights a current misunderstanding within navigational history circles. Many authors,
perhaps best represented by Dava Sobel, have implicitly assumed that newly developed
technologies and methods immediately translated into changed practices.42 Yet before
new practices and technologies begin to affect the practice o f a given craft,
“practitioners” must retrain and develop new skills, tasks that busy working professionals
rarely

the luxury to accomplish.
The ability to determine longitude was one o f the most famous scientific problems

for the eighteenth century. But practicing navigators, criss-crossing the Atlantic on a
regular basis, did not necessarily agree that they needed to embrace new methods. The
expenses incurred in retraining and purchasing new instruments—if available—offered
little incentive to New England masters to change.

Unlike other centers o f research in the N ew World in the mid-eighteenth century,
the BMS did not model their society on Old World academies and formal centers o f
intellectual work. Rather, they adapted procedures from a variety o f other Old World
organizations that addressed specific issues. A s an organization concerned with charity
and the welfare o f its members, the Marine Society borrowed features from Britain’s
Merchant Seamen’s fund. Founded in 1747, the fund was created by Parliament to offer
relief to poor and distressed mariners. Each port collected funds from common seamen’s
wages, pooling contributions that that specific port could give to “its” mariners. Unlike
the Fellowship Club, and later the incorporated Marine Society, this fund was created

42 Dava Sobel, Longitude: The True Story o fa Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem o fHis
Time (New York, 1995).
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through Parliamentary legislation and carried with it a larger desire to protect mariners
for future naval service in times o f war.43
Trinity House, Britain’s organization that maintained harbors and ensured safe
navigation in the largest ports, also blended charity with port management, and
consequently also appealed to Marine Society members as they defined their relationship
to the port o f Boston. Dating back to the reign o f Henry VIII, Trinity House regulated
and examined prospective pilots, maintained navigational markers, and managed the
port’s almshouses for mariners. They heard grievances from masters and mariners alike,
and held power to judge these cases pending approval o f the Lord Admiral.44 In addition,
Trinity House sponsored Christ’s Hospital, a school founded in the 16th century for the
instruction o f mathematics and navigation. In blending charity and navigational research,
the Marine Society took some elements from this British organization, and left out others.
A s a smaller port in the Atlantic basin, Boston lacked the shipping traffic that could
support all the charitable and educational roles that Trinity House embraced. The Marine
Society, could look to Trinity House for its focus upon the promotion o f local
navigational knowledge that helped shipping safely enter ports.
Organizing interested captains into collecting hydrographic data represents a
technical innovation that reflected members’ responses to their unique colonial setting
and needs for greater navigational knowledge. This process, too, was based upon
European precedents and reflected other trends towards more systematic data collection.
In learned societies and governments throughout Europe, more consistent data collection

43 “Collapse of a Contributory Pension Scheme,” 91-104.
44 Porter, Unpathed Waters, 71-73.
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revolutionized scientific and social understanding. Beginning on the continent, monarchs
began ordering more measurements o f key national information such as birth rates and
population censuses not just for the sake o f knowledge but for more immediate, practical
concerns o f the state. As J.L. Heilbron has claimed, “This instrumentalism was a key
ingredient o f the quantifying spirit after 1760. Everywhere we see an increased emphasis
on the practical uses o f number and system.”45 Heilbron, unfortunately sees this trend
only in governmental and institutional centers o f research. The Marine Society’s
dedication to systematic data collection, recording, and analysis, on the other hand
confirms Larry Stewart’s contention that scientific principles went beyond the walls o f
learned institutions and created new centers o f scientific authority in eighteenth centuiy
Britain. Speaking o f Restoration London, Stewart argues “By the early eighteenth
century, the market-place for natural philosophy implied the unification o f the world o f
trade with that o f Sprat, Defoe, and Newton

Long-standing utilitarian objectives

ensured that mathematical or experimental learning would not be the sole preserve o f
academicians.”46 Furthermore, as those ideas went beyond learned circles, new sources
o f authority such as the Marine Society developed accordingly. “Social authority would
increasingly be founded on the doctrine o f utility. The community o f experimenters, the
instrument makers, and self-styled engineers. . . , and the devotees o f the public lectures,
constructed a broad bottom for natural philosophy.”47

45J. L. Heilbron, “Introductory Essay,” in The Quantifying Spirit in the 18* Century, ed. Tore FrSngsmyr,
J. L. Heilbron, and Robin E. Rider (Berkeley, 1990), 3.
46 Larry Stewart, “Other Centres of Calculation, or, Where the Royal Society Didn’t Count: Commerce,
Coffee-Houses and Natural Philosophy in Early Modem London,” British Journalfor the History o f
Science, 32 (1999), 134 and 139.
47 Larry Stewart, The Rise o fPublic Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian
Britain, 1660-1750 (Cambridge, 1992), 384.
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One could easily add Marine Society navigators in colonial Boston to that
population. The spread o f ideas from the academy to the larger public should not be seen
as a European phenomenon alone. In Boston’s shipping community with a need for
greater navigational knowledge, the Marine Society developed methods similar to those
embraced by European rulers and ruled alike to systematically expand the information
available to Boston captains.

The Marine Society developed new administrative methods to produce
navigational information. As sharing observations was the first step in dramatically
increasing public knowledge o f the coasts, the Society required all members to submit
their observations to an annually elected committee ft)r evaluation and review. The clerk
then recorded the observations in a central book that all members could consult.
Unfortunately, this book has not survived but consistent referral to its management and
maintenance, such as in September 1759, February 1761, and November 1775 suggests
that records were kept In addition, the Society voted the prominent members who had
been elected previously to wait on the governor to form a committee to digest incoming
data. The Society also disciplined members foiling to make observations. In April 1755,
the Committee o f Observations were required to report at every monthly meeting whether
they received observation from lately arrived members and present their information to
the whole.48 Members appear to have complied for a time but for no clear reason—
perhaps laziness—they needed to be reminded o f their obligations. In November 1758,

48 BMS Records, April 1,1755.
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the society voted to fine members six pence for every month they had been on their
voyage for failure to provide information.49
In September 1759, the Marine Society attempted to fill its public mandate for
navigational data for the first time. Member Daniel McCarthy submitted for the
Society’s review a set o f observations for Georges Banks, which the society accepted,
recording them in the book o f observations, and voting that the “observations be printed
in each o f the papers o f public news as a public benefit and at the expense o f the society’s
money.”50 Executing such intentions, however, proved more difficult. The same week
that the Society voted McCarthy’s observations to be published, Boston’s newspapers
overflowed with news celebrating British victories in Europe, Crown Point, New York,
and on the high seas. Subsequent weeks further buried the Society’s desired directions
with accounts o f the fell o f Quebec, the last bastion o f French Power in Canada.51
Despite this setback, the society determined to fulfil its mandate to publish
navigational information. In February 1763, the Society hired John Leach as clerk to
manage incoming data. For the previous seven years, Leach earned a significant living as

a mathematics, navigation, and barrel guaging teacher for Boston residents. Leach most
likely came to the Marine Society’s attention through sixteen members whose children
attended Leach’s schooL52 When the members voted on his admission, they required that
Leach would deliver good, processed data from their observations. They required that

49 BMS Records, Nov., 1758.
50 BMS Records, Sept. 4,1759.
51 See The Boston Evening Post, The Boston News-Letter and Post Boy, and The Boston Gazette, Sept Nov., 1759.
52“Index ofNames,” John Leach Account Book, 1754-1760, H. R Edes Collection; John Gilman to Mary
Gilman, Nov. 4,1754, A. Gilman Collection (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston Mass.).
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“he shall from time to time, as the society shall have occasion, record what remarks that
shall be delivered to him by said society for that purpose, also to make all plans & views
fair & clear in the Book, as from time to time shall be requested.”53 In addition, the
Society exempted Leach from most o f the monthly dues, and in exchange for the two
dollar entrance charge, hired him to draw up a “plan o f the Isles o f Sable now in the Book
o f Records.”54

Boston’s growing trade with the rest o f the British Empire created a set o f
conditions compelling Boston masters to organize. As Boston’s increasing reliance upon
the imperial carrying trade opened new opportunities for mercantile success, such
opportunities also carried significant dangers. Eighteenth century Atlantic seafaring
remained a dangerous occupation where natural disasters and political conflict on the
high seas exacerbated economic uncertainties, leaving masters and their families
precariously exposed to an unpredictable future. Furthermore, where Britain had a long
tradition o f offering support for its maritime population, such supports were not extended
to the colonies. Consequently, the combination o f increased seafaring within the Empire
and the dearth o f imperial support structures created a compelling incentive for Boston
masters to organize into an organization that could best suit its members’ needs.
British institutions shaped, but did not dictate, the Marine Society’s ultimate
organization. In designing their mutual aid society, members o f the Marine Society
borrowed from long-venerated and recent British institutions that addressed the needs o f
Britain’s seafaring population Yet such adaptations were not blind aping—in addition to

53 BMS Records, February 3,1761.
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copying seamen’s compensatory schemes and Trinity House’s role in maintaining local
port facilities, the Marine Society also embraced the need for navigational information
for the New England coast that would help reduce the possibilities o f shipwreck.
Consequently, while British in inception and in design, the Marine Society emerged in
the 1750s as a unique combination o f mutual aid and navigational research geared
towards stabilizing members’ lives, improving the safety o f trade, and streamlining that
trade within the Empire.
The combination o f mutual aid and navigational research may sound odd to
modem readers. Shaped by the professionalization o f the sciences and their breakdown
into increasingly smaller disciplines, modem understandings o f the scientific world have
little room for such a clear combination o f social concerns and scientific work. As w ill
be discussed in the next chapter, however, research goals and organizations were far
more flexible in the eighteenth century, and certainly in the eighteenth century American
context, and the goals o f mutual aid and increased knowledge o f the coasts were easily
accommodated therein.

54 BMS Records, February 3,1761.
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CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY IN NEW ENGLAND NAVIGATION AND
SURVEYING

As the Boston Marine Society collected and presented navigational data to the
community, they sought to use their work to access the patronage networks r unning
between New England and London. As early as 1754, members o f the Marine Society
showed an interest in informing London centers o f research about their interests and their
work. Beginning in March, the society sought to tap into London patronage by sending a
list o f candidates to the Admiralty for the significant roles o f port surveyors for Boston.1
In cases when cargo arrived damaged, surveyors evaluated the cause, determining who
was accountable. Merchandise poorly packaged would put the seller at fault and leaky
vessels would leave the owner (or possibly the captain) responsible. More often,
however, ship captains could be held liable for poorly stowed merchandise or
merchandise damaged due to poor ship handling. If found accountable for damaged
goods, captains and especially those partially invested in the cargo, faced financial
hardship.
The Marine Society’s list o f possible surveyors performed three functions. Even
though the King approved the Society’s charter in April 1754, the letter officially
informed the Admiralty that the Society existed and was willing to help manage the port

1BMS Records, April 15,1754.
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o f Boston.2 Secondly, it represented an attempt by the Society to use their members’
status as senior captains to place their own people in key positions where members could
better anticipate and affect litigation and financial responsibilities. And as Admiralty
appointed port surveyors, the Boston Marine Society would establish direct links to
London centers o f patronage, that would, in turn, give the Marine Society greater
influence and prestige in Boston.
These high aspirations came to nothing for the Admiralty never replied to the
Society’s offer. With war in 1754, the admiralty had more important concerns to address,
and Marine Society members faced significant challenges themselves as many members
fell captive to French naval and privateering ships. Consequently, their efforts for
recognition from London waned until after 1763. With peace, however, the Boston
Marine Society seized new opportunities to make significant connections with London
agents.
The French and Indian War had radically changed the environment in which the
Marine Society sought support for their work. In London, the war showed several highranking British officers and colonial agents the importance o f accurate knowledge o f
British colonial possessions for defense, control, and commercial development.
Beginning in the early 1760s, a series o f London agents began systematic land and
coastal surveys under the auspices o f the Board o f Trade, but the Admiralty lacked
interest. Setting up well funded operations, the Board o f Trade sent Samuel Holland to
begin surveying Saint John’s Island (now Prince Edward Island) and Nova Scotia, and his

2 BMS Records, April 15,1754.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
counterpart for the southern department, William DeBrahm, began surveying Georgia
and Florida around 1764.
The Admiralty, however, was late to see the importance o f accurate surveys o f
American possessions. North Atlantic commanders Captain Richard Spry, and then his
successor, British Commodore Alexander, Lord Colville, both vigorously lobbied the
Admiralty for support for coastal surveys after the French and Indian War. With the
French removed from Canada, however, the Lords o f the Admiralty saw little reason to
spend government funds on surveys that had little or no strategic value. Only with
reluctance did the Admiralty allow Colville some funds that allowed J. F. W. DesBarres,
an army officer trained in surveying techniques, to begin a systematic survey o f the Nova
Scotian and N ew England coastlines. Even then, and despite the obvious benefits to be
gained from this work, the Admiralty repeatedly choked-off funding throughout the tenyear project, often forcing DesBarres to exhaust his own personal resources for the
project.3
For the Marine Society, London’s new interest in coastal surveying in the 1760s
meant that well-connected agents interested in similar subjects would be working close at
hand. Hoping proximity could lead to opportunities and valuable personal ties, the
Marine Society attempted to make connections with British representatives operating in
their area. In January, 1763, the Marine Society encouraged member Hector M cNeill to
use his prior introduction to Colville, then based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, to secure
Admiralty funds for a chart o f the Bay o f Fundy.4 Like Cyprian Southack before him,

J G. N. D. Evans, Uncommon Obdurate: The Several Public Careers o fJ. F. W. DesBarres (Toronto,
1969), 9-26.
4 This chart does not seem to have survived.
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M cNeill had drafted his own personal chart o f those waters while captaining a trading
ship in the late 1740s and 1750s. In 1755, he had used this chart to convey General
Monckton’s forces against the French at Beaussejour. The general found the chart so
useful that he asked McNeill for a copy o f it, and encouraged him to publish it. Later that
year, however, M cNeill fell captive to Indians, and lost the opportunity to pursue the
project.5
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exactness” o f his chart based on his years o f sea time in the region. “[I]n the course o f so
long experience [I] was enabl’d to make an exact draught o f the coast Extend’g to the
North’d and East’d from Cape Cod to the most distant part o f the Bay o f Funday [s/c].”
For McNeill, such a project had a greater historical significance than merely increasing
knowledge o f the coasts.
There is no error of however little consequence that’s in our power to Remedy—
but what I think also a duty incumbant on us and due Posterity; when therefore
‘tis considered that no man, has yet so much as lay’d the foundation, o f a True
and Exact chart o f this Coast—I am ambitious o f the opportunity and willing to
make the first Esay [and am] content to Risque the success o f my undertakings
upon being able to prove the Truth and Exactness o f it.6

Given the struggles Colville experienced in securing funding for DesBarres’
work, M cNeill’s gambit touched a sore nerve. In February, Colville sent a curt note
explaining that while he saw the idea “a laudable undertaking,” he was also “not

5 Hector McNeill to Lord Colville, Jan. 17,1763, Boston Marine Society Collection (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston Mass.).
6 Hector McNeill to Lord Colville, Jan. 17,1763, Boston Marine Society Collection.
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authorized to put the government to any expense on that account; therefore cannot
promise to assist y o u . . .”7
Snubbed by Colville, the Marine Society turned its attention to DesBarres
himse lf In June, 1764, members unanimously agreed to “Vote the compliments o f this

society to J F William [szc] DesBarres, Esqr His Majesty’s Engineer at Halifax [and] to
assist him with all the knowledge o f the coast that we know.”8 Two months later, when
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prominent members to write a more personal letter to DesBarres extending their services.
To sweeten the deal, the society exercised one o f their little used by-laws, and voted
DesBarres one o f their first honorary members. As with the Admiralty in 1754, however,
DesBarres never replied: not to the offer o f aid, nor to the honorary membership.
DesBarres was w ell known as a stubborn, proud and compulsive worker, and this may
explain some o f his silence. Whatever the explanation, however, neither the Admiralty,
Colville, nor DesBarres held any interest in the overtures o f a group o f colonial captains
in Boston, regardless o f their experience.
Three times the Boston Marine Society attempted to make their interest, talents,
and resources available to London agents, and in all three attempts, British surveyors and
officers curtly declined their offers or ignored them altogether. Several reasons explain
why the society foiled to, or was prevented from, tapping into patronage networks
centered in London. Most significant was the structure o f British-American relationships
immediately following the French and Indian War. Recent scholarship into questions o f

7 Lord Colville to Hector McNeill, Feb. 27,1765, Hector McNeill Papers (Massachusetts Historical
Society, Boston, Mass.).
8 BMS Records, June 5,1764.
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trans-Atlantic identity suggests that while Americans were feeling more proud about
being members o f the British Empire, and proud that their society was beginning to more
fully replicate the refinement, elevation and taste o f the mother country, British
sentiments did not follow su it9 As Richard Bushman has pointed out, the structure o f
British patronage did not translate w ell into colonial American society. “From an
eighteenth-century perspective, the most notable fact about provincial Massachusetts
r
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upper levels o f government were clearly aligned with political agents in London, below
the level o f royal appointees, “the ties o f superior to inferior were frail and thin. Too
large a population o f Massachusetts families owned land and too few held offices or
received substantial favors from their social superiors for unpopular measures coming
from the top to be respected at the bottom o f society.”10 For the Marine Society, the
limited routes to political patronage formed significant obstacles to the recognition they
sought.
Other colonial researchers freed similar barriers to London recognition. Within
the halls o f the academies and learned societies in eighteenth century Britain, most
Americans participated as data gatherers only, with analysis and interpretation retained in
London.11 As work by George Daniels, Brooke Hindle, Dirk Struik, I. B. Cohen and

9 For works dealing with larger questions of social and cultural development, see Richard Bushman, The
Refinement c f America: Persons, Houses, Cities (New York, 1992); T. H. Breen, “An Empire of Goods:
The Anglicizadon of Colonial America, 1690-1776,” in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social
Development, Fourth Edition, ed. Stanley N. Katz, John M Murrin, and Douglas Greenberg (New York,
1993), 367-397; and John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession o f George III
(Cambridge, 1976).
10

Richard Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, 1985), p. 246.

11 See George F. Frick, “The Royal Society in America,” and A Hunter Dupree, “The National Pattern of
American Learned Societies, 1769-1863,” in, The Pursuit o fKnowledge in the Early American Republic:
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Harry W oolf demonstrate, Americans with close ties to the British investigators—John
Winthrop, Peter CoHinson, David Rittenhouse, and Alexander Garden, to name only a
few—contributed more observations than analysis to British scientific energies in the
eighteenth century.12 Few Americans, and only those interested in natural history,
botany, or astronomical observations, received the honor to have a communication
published by the Royal Society or to have their work supported by prominent members
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Unlike colonial French science with a centralized bureaucracy for maps and
charts, the responsibility for surveying Britain and her colonies fell upon several
agencies.14 Trinity House, for example, still retained a mandate from Henry VIII and
James II directing them to survey the shores and to keep that information secret for
national defense. In spite o f this restriction, English and Dutch mapmakers in the late
seventeenth century enjoyed great commercial success. First relying upon copied Dutch
charts and “waggoners” during the middle seventeenth century, British mariners later
could select from a variety o f English manuscript and published sources, all o f which

American Scientific and Learned Societiesfrom Colonial Times to the Civil War, ed. Alexandra Oleson,
and Sanborn C. Brown (Baltimore, 1976), 70-83 and 21-32.
12See George H. Daniels, Science in American Society: A Social History (New York, 1971); Brooke Hindle
The Pursuit o f Science in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789 (Chapel Hill, 1956); Dirk Struik, Yankee
Science in the Making (Boston, 1948); I. B. Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the
Political Thought o fJefferson, Franklin, Adams, and Madison (New York, 1995); and Harry Woolfj The
Transits o f Venus: A Study o fEighteenth Century Science (Princeton, 1959) for a sampling of this type of
analysis.
13Daniels, Science in American Society, 3-4,51-52,63, and 128. See also Andrea Rusnock
“Correspondence networks and the Royal Society, 1700-1750,” The British Journalfo r the History o f
Science, 32 (1999), 155-169; Raymond P. Steams, “Colonial Fellows ofthe Royal Society of London,
1661-1788,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 3 (1946), 208-268.
14James E. McClellan III, Colonialism and Science: Saint Domingue and the Old Regime (Baltimore,
1992), 117-127.
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plotted out in detail approaches to English coastlines and harbors.15 The Admiralty and
the Royal Society also shared interests in promoting surveys o f British coastlines. The
Royal Society, under Edmund Hailey, undertook expeditions designed to improve
surveying techniques at the same time as the Admiralty funded, with very mixed results,
individuals like Grenville Collins who surveyed home waters.
Britain’s decentralized approach to surveying home waters only highlighted
enterprising efforts by individuals in the colonies who took on surveys with little
institutional help. Southack, for example, received royal acknowledgement for his
surveying work in 1694 and in 1710, and stood as one o f the few solid efforts at a coastal
survey in N ew England until 1764. Despite royal acclaim, however, Southack’s work
was not lauded by later cartographers. John Green, for example, accused Southack o f
never using any instruments other than log and compass, nor ever taking a latitude.
William Douglass, a respected Boston surveyor in the 1750s, called Southack’s New

England Coasting Pilot a chart o f “continued error” and “random performance” that
“ought to be publickly advertised as such and destroy’d wherever it is found among sea
charts.” 16 With Southack’s work in disfavor, and with no coherent scheme for funding
coastal surveys in Britain, let alone the colonies, it was almost impossible for the Marine
Society to secure support from London for navigational research.
Eventually the Marine Society found local colonial officials more interested in
their talents than British imperial officials. At first, local colonial officials gave the

15Thomas R. Smith, “Manuscript and Printed Sea Charts in Seventeenth Century London: The Case of die
Thames School,” in The Compleat Plattmaker: Essays on Chart, Map, and Globe Malang in England in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Norman Thrower (Berkeley, 1978), 45-100.
16Clara Egli LeGear, “The New England Coasting Pilot of Cyprian Southack,” Imago Mundi, 11 (1954),
137-144. William Douglass, Summary, historical and political .. .ofthe British Settlement in North
America (Boston, 1749), 362, as in LeGear, p. 141.
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Marine Society similar responses as their London colleagues. In January 1765, a
committee o f four, along with the lawyer Jonathan Gridley who was elected a member to
aid the society in legal matters, unsuccessfully petitioned the Massachusetts General
Court for the permission to build a lighthouse on Nantucket Island.17 Undeterred, the
society furthered its own research goals in December1766 when Job Prince offered to the
society the use o f his vessel “to go on survey” for two months free o f charge. The society
accepted the offer and agreed to send her in May 1767.^
In 1768, the society received the official patronage it had sought since its
incorporation the previous decade. Plans for construction o f a new lighthouse at
Plymouth, provided the opportunity. The Massachusetts General Court approached the
Society in July to survey the harbor. In addition, the survey would revise and correct the
brief instructions given in The English Pilot: The Fourth Book from 1698. When the
General Court approached the Marine Society, the members o f the society recognized the
importance o f this request. In exchange for this recognition by colonial government, the
society voted to cover the costs o f the survey should the General Court fail.19 At first the
society appointed Job Prince, Moses Bennett, Thomas Allen and William Vemon to the
lead in the project, but the committee changed to Bennett, William Rhodes, Thomas
Allen and Nathaniel Green by the time the work was done.

17 BMS Records, Jan. 1,1765.
18 BMS Records, Dec. 2,1766. While the society accepted the offer and thanked Prince for his gift, there is
no record of what they actually surveyed. It is possible that the Marine Society used Prince’s vessel for
their Plymouth Survey of the following year, yet the expenses incurred suggest that a boat was hired for
that purpose in 1768. See below.
19 BMS Records, July 5,1768. As it turned out, the colonial government did indeed fail to cover the
expenses of the survey. The Marine Society haggled with the government without results for
reimbursement for funds laid out for the survey up until the Revolution.
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Bennett’s survey o f Plymouth represented a marked improvement over the brief
overview provided by The Fourth Book, which only offered masters a short paragraph
describing Plymouth and some o f its dangers to ships (see Appendix A). The dated
publication also situated Plymouth as lying “Seven Leagues exactly West from the Point
o f Cape Cod,” identifying the harbor entrance as “known by a round Hammock o f Land,
lying on the North-side, called the Gurnet, and on the South-side a high double Land,
_______
t _____ j
vu0 x
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In addition to fixing Plymouth’s position relative to the new lighthouse, Bennett
and his research team went further. They identified rocks and shoals presenting dangers,
and offered more detailed information on bearings and courses for other harbors nearby.
The most significant improvements appeared in the directions for sailing through the sand
flats to Plymouth itself. The Fourth Book stated that “you must sail by the Gumet-Land,
which is the Chanel-side, for the Bay from the Monument-Land three-quarters over is
exceeding bad, Shoal, and Quick-sand, dry in divers places; but nearest the Gurnet is a
fair sailing Channel.”21 Bennett, however, offered more precise directions that were
more useful to a sailing master navigating a ship.
When you bring Saquash Head to bear W by N, you may then steer up W by S,
and if you are bound for Plymouth, you must keep that Course for a large red
Cliff on the Main, which is a veiy good Mark to carry you clear o f Dick’s Flat;
then you must steer more Southerly for Hatch Point, or run up untill you are
abreast o f Saquash Head, giving it a Quarter mile Distance; then steer W by S Vi
S. which will clear you of Dick’s Flat, and carry you directly for Reach Point,
keeping within 15 or 20 Yards of the Sandy Point, steering away to the South
ward, keeping that Distance untill you have shut in the Lights, where you may
anchor in 3 or 4 Fathoms, but the Channel is very narrow, having nothing but a

20 The English Pilot: The Fourth Book (London, 1698), 20.
21 The Fourth Book, 20.
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Flat all the Way to Plymouth, except for this small Channel which runs close by
this Neck o f Land, you will have 4 and 5 Fathoms close to this point22

Bennett’s directions also gave directions for vessels bound for Plymouth’s Cowyard or to
the town, and for vessels approaching from the northward, such as from Boston.
Bennett’s work differed from The Fourth Book’s description not just in questions
o f detail, but also in practical use for masters navigating ships. From a navigator’s
perspective, Bennett removed a step in the navigating process. In most vessels, the
master often doubled as navigator, translating his calculations and estimations into
courses for the helmsman to steer. While the helmsman steered by a compass
permanently fixed to the deck near the wheel or tiller, the master estimated distances
from the vessel’s speed, ascertained by throwing a chip-log over the side and counting
the time needed for a known length o f line to run out
Using The Fourth Book, navigators had to translate the coastline as it was
described into courses, distances run, and distances o ff the land, hoping that their
estimations from the directions and their own soundings would keep them safe. Bennett,
on the other hand, described a clear path to follow. If the navigator picked up the path as
first described by Bennett, say from Saquash Head bearing W by N , he could then know
ahead o f time what courses he needed to steer and distances to keep. Navigators still
needed to keep the ship clear o f dangers. Yet Bennett’s survey simplified the process by
which an image o f a coastline, either in words or in drawings, could be translated into a
vessel safely coming to anchor in a harbor.

22 Directionsfo r Sailing in an out o f Plymouth Harbor; Taken by Moses Bennett, William Rhodes, Thomas
Allen, and Nathaniel Green. . . .In July, 1768 (1768; Boston, 1785).
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Like Southack, and in spite o f the later condemnation that fell upon his work,
Bennett and his team followed older traditions in surveying Plymouth that had been used
by merchant captains and pilots for at least two hundred years.23 These traditions placed
functionality—safely conducting a vessel into port— over comprehensiveness—providing
a comprehensive picture o f the entire ocean floor and coastline. While no manuscript
charts produced by Boston Marine Society members from this time remain, Nicholas
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information that Marine Society members would need 50 years later (Figure l).24
As Shapley’s work demonstrates, charts produced by working captains
emphasized taking data—in this case depth soundings—only around points that might
impede a ship’s progress. Other areas, o ff the ship’s course track or known to have
sufficient water for safe passage, were left alone. The few soundings they did take were
taken along the shore and around areas such as rocks and promontories that were likely to
threaten their ship’s progress. Latitudes, easily determined even in the late seventeenth
century, appeared only rarely. For a coasting craft, working along a coast long familiar to
an experienced captain, such numerical information carried less importance than his own
knowledge.
In their Plymouth survey, Bennett and his Marine Society colleagues likely

23 Had Southack limited his surveys to just shipping lanes and areas of navigational importance, perhaps he
would not have received such criticism. Yet in expanding to present not just a functional chart, but rather a
comprehensive chart, Southack opened himself and his work up to the derision Douglass and Green heaped
upon him.
24 One ofthe reasons why no Marine Society manuscript charts exist is that they were used for hard service
at sea, an environment hostile to the preservation manuscript materials. For a discussion of the challenges
to the survival of manuscript charts, see Thomas R. Smith, “Manuscript and Printed Sea Charts,” 76-77.
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Figure 1: Nicholas Shapley, “Cape Fear River,” 1662.

Nicholas Shapley, “Cape Fear River,” (1662), John Carter Brown Library. Note the positions of
soundings close to shore and surrounding Cape Fear, areas where masters would be most
concerned with depths. Offshore areas, where it was safer to assume sufficient water depths
received less attention. Courtesy ofthe John Carter Brown Library at Brown University.

adapted a method called the running traverse to collect their data (Figure 2). This method
allowed navigators to record data quickly and efficiently, as William Bourne described in

A Regimentfor the Sea in 1577:
In running along the coast, when you see the appearance of any land one before
another, set them with your compasses, and looke how they beare from you, by
what point of the compasse and so shall you know justly, howe the one lande
doth beare or lye from the other. And by this you may correct your plats, by

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
doing this, as often as you see you may know die distance in like manner
betweene them, if you know your ships way and this when you first see any two
places together as two headlands or two landes, having set diem with your
compasse and knowing howe the one beareth from the other, then, for that you
will not come nearer unto them.25

This method relied upon the vocational practices, skills, and instruments
commonly used in day to day ship operation. It was also well suited to record data during
a commercial voyage where the safe and speedy delivery o f cargo from one port to the
next, and not the exploration o f the coasts, remained the main goal o f the ship. As the
ship itself had to be navigated as precisely as possible, captains used their cruise track as
a baseline for their other observations. To get data, masters did not have to stop their
voyage, but rather made observations while underway in the course o f the normal ship’s
run. Masters and navigators recorded the positions o f rocks, promontories and other
features by comparing the compass bearing o f the object in question to the ship’s cruise
track as it cruised along the coast Nor did captains need to learn more complicated
mathematical skills or theoretical training than they currently used to navigate. The
running traverse required no special instruments beyond a ship’s compass nor special
training beyond that required for conventional navigation. This method also addressed,
or at least put to rest, questions o f reliability and accuracy by relying upon the observer’s
reputation as a navigator and captain within his community. The accuracy o f information
collected by a respected captain was backed up by his personal reputation: A wellrespected captain produced more reliable results, while less known masters were likely to
have their results questioned or ignored altogether. Without any other means to ascertain

25 William Bourne, A Regimentfo r the Sea (London, 1577), as in A R W. Robinson, Marine Cartography
in Britain (Leicester, 1962), 47.
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Figure 2: The Running Traverse.
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Source: Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain. Landmarks were fixed by comparing the line
of position of the headland to the known ship’s position along a course track. For example, the
position of the landmark at point A was determined by taking the compass bearing of the mark
from the ship at points 1 and 2. These lines of position were then compared to the ships dead
reckoning fix to determine the position of the mark itself To further verify positions, compass
bearing of other landmarks B, C, D, E, were taken while at anchor to establish the position of each
in relation each other, and to points 2 and 3 along die vessels course track.

accuracy, a navigator’s social standing sufficed as some means to evaluate navigational
data. Without time for dedicated surveys, the complex training required for scholarly
methods, and the resources for expensive instrumentation, merchant captains used the
running traverse to produce reasonably accurate results.
In relying upon older methods adopted from ship-board practices, Bennett and his
colleagues differed from trained British surveyors working in North America at the same
time. DesBarres and his research team, for example, were trained in a mathematically
complex and theoretically founded “academic” approach o f coastal surveying that relied
heavily upon cutting edge instrumentation. In contrast with the Marine Society’s
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vocational method that was only concerned with safe navigation o f ships, DesBarres and
his team sought accurate and comprehensive representations o f the entire coastline,
accurately reproducing shapes on a page that existed in nature. Rather than describing
how to avoid dangers to shipping, they wanted to identify all potential dangers, havens
and unique features.
Almost all o f the advances in surveying theory, methodology and instrumentation
took place in a Britain only just beginning to address systematic coastal surveys. Before
the second half o f the eighteenth century, and for a considerable time after that, coastal
surveys were undertaken by interested enthusiasts, and produced only questionable
results. Only seventy years earlier, Greenville Collins published Great Britain’s

Coasting Pilot (1688)—the first systematic coastal survey taken in British home waters.
Despite his use o f such scholarly treatises as John Love’s Geodesia, or the Art of

Surveying (1688), the work faced scathing condemnation from Robert Hooke o f the
Royal Society and Samuel Pepys in the Admiralty.26
In the course o f the eighteenth century, methods improved through the attention
given surveying by renowned astronomers and independently-funded enthusiasts. In
1701, Edmund Hailey used mathematical theories o f resection developed by John Collins
to improve surveying techniques. In a letter to Sir Robert Southwell, he recommended
that
In order to this Survey of a Sea Coast and to lay down truly the shoals and
dangers near it, if the land be accessible the best way will be to take with all
possible care the true positions o f as many remarkable objects such as Steeples,
Mills, Rocks, Cliffs, Promentorys, or such like as you find most conspicuous
along the Coast, that is their true bearings from one another in respect of the true
North and South; which is best done by measuring the angle with any proper
26 Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain, 53-55.
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instrument., from the rising or setting sun, allowing his amplitude and according
to the exactness o f these angles will your survey be more or less true. I prefer
this method o f taking these angles by the Sunn rather than by the Compass or
magneticall needle, because o f the smalness o f the radius o f the Magneticall
Chart (Le. [compass] card) and the authenticity o f the variation on the Land, the
needle being affected with the neighborhood o f Iron Oars and Mineralls.
This done you may readily plott down all those objects on the Land, by
any view o f them from a vessell riding at Anchor off at Sea; for if you take their
true position from your Shipp, by the help o f the rising or setting Sunn as before,
the intersections o f those lines with those o f the positions ofthe objects to one
another, will give you the places and proportionall distances of the sd Objects
one from another, to which afterwards a scale may be adapted, as shall be taught
by and by.27

Hailey made the convergence o f mathematical theory and field-work
sound deceptively simple: his method required tremendous resources in time,
money and instrumentation, and required that surveyors establish observation
points on shore. This method promised the most accurate image o f a coast The
trade-off however, was it required complex mathematical calculations and
instruments that few outside the academy possessed. Consequently, while more
precise, Hailey’s method was o f little use to colonials who lacked the
instrumentation, the specific mathematical skills, and the sources o f funding that
such an exhaustive—but accurate—survey required.
Forty years later, in 1742, Murdoch Mackenzie modified this complex
system in his own survey o f the Orkney Islands. Rather than basing all
measurements on individual observations, each relying upon the accuracy o f prior
ones, Mackenzie instead based his “Orometric” method on a well-defined base
line that he measured over a frozen lake using a magnetic compass. From this

27 Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain, p. 55.
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Figure 3: Hailey’s Surveying Methods.
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Source: Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain. Hailey’s method required multiple observation
stations, each using complex instruments to take amplitudes that accurately determined the true
bearings of landmarks. While more accurate than die running traverse, these methods were time
consuming, required costly equipment, and could not effectively cover more than a very small
area.

baseline, he then used a theodolite and a plane-table to take bearings on markers placed
on prominent headlands, promontories, and distinct geographical features. A theodolite
was an instrument used to measure vertical and horizontal angles simultaneously. A
plane table fixed prominent features by comparing their relative angles from a variety o f
vantagepoints. With the shape o f the land determined, he then took bearings for bays,
headlands and landmarks on the coast that he fixed with rays. A rented shallow draft
boat stood in and out from the shore taking soundings and defined features based on
previously fixed headlands, and recorded tides and tidal streams.28

^Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain, 61-62.
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This method removed multiplying errors: a slight error early in Hailey’s method
would be carried through, and possibly exaggerated, into all subsequent measurements.
In Mackenzie’s own words,
By this way o f surveying a coast, when the foundation is carefully laid, the errors
which all the fore-mentioned methods are liable to, are in a great measure
guarded against: for the error or inaccuracy o f any one distance or angles is not
communicated to the rest, but confined to that distance or angle alone, or perhaps
to an adjacent side or two besides, which are not o f great consequence in the
draught, nor affect the positions o f other ch arts.. .Though by this method, an
extensive survey may be carried out with m ore accuracy than by any o f those
before mentioned, yet it has seldom been put into practice.29

Figure 4: Mackenzie’s Orometric Method.

L
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Source: Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain. Mackenzie combined the accuracy of Hailey’s
work with the speed of the running traverse by accurately measuring a single baseline, and from
there, triangulate die positions of landmarks and coastal features. This way, he was able to cover
more area without sacrificing accuracy.

Mackenzie’s methods formed the base for DesBarres’ work along the N ew
England and Nova Scotian coastline, and also became the method by which DesBarres

29 Murdoch Mackenzie, Treatise on Maritim [sic] Surveying (1774), xxi, as in Robinson, 63.
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trained his assistants.30 Aided by interested naval officers, DesBarres had the
governmental and personal resources o f time, money and instrumentation to train
newcomers in the surveying principles laid down by Mackenzie. Despite the advances in
the field, however, even DesBarres resorted to older, more hands-on methods when
triangulation methods proved unusable or unreliable. Where DesBarres had great
difficulty in measuring a distance along shore using visual means, he
n
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stretched and rubbed it taught, and with an iron chain, measured 100 fathoms o f
it, with marks at every 10 fathoms. Just before the change o f the tide, on a calm
day, I fixed one end of this 100 fathom line to a station on Point Bulkely and,
with the other end. . .made its end last with a grapnell, and let it run on the
ground.31

It was far from clear that newer, more academically informed methods improving
hydrographic surveying would come to replace older methods as used by Southack and
the Marine Society.
In feet, it is fer from clear that Hailey’s and MacKenzie’s methods offered much
to colonial surveyors at all. Vocational and academic methods differed in two crucial
aspects: time and money. Accuracy in surveying translated immediately into higher costs
stemming from longer periods in the field and longer periods processing the data in the
drawing room. Despite his compulsive drive, DesBarres and his team o f assistants, at
times numbering twenty or more, took ten years to survey and publish charts for Nova
Scotia and New England. While it is difficult to estimate the cost o f DesBarres’ final
work, The Atlantic Neptune, Lewis Morris’ survey o f the Welsh coast provides some

j0 G. N. D. Evans, Uncommon Obdurate: The Several Public Careers o fJ. F. W. DesBarres (Toronto,
1969), 15.
31 DesBarres to Colville, 27 May 1765, as reprinted in G. N. D. Evans, “Hydrography: A Note on
Eighteenth Century Methods,” Mariners Mirror, 52 (1966), 247-250.
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context It cost the admiralty £444 17s 6d twenty years earlier.32 In contrast, vocational
methods, while less accurate, could suffice, with little or no financial impact. Beginning
in July, 1768, Bennett and his Marine Society colleagues completed their surveys o f
Plymouth Harbor by December with a total cost o f £13 15s 3d.
Differences between the Marine Society’s vocational approach to surveying and
the more academic school represent two competing visions o f the value and intent o f
surveying. Bennett’s survey emphasized speed, vocational utility and local use.
DesBarres focused on theoretical soundness, accuracy, and catered to London viewers
more concerned with the precision o f the survey than its applicatioa Furthermore,
DesBarres and his team produced some o f the best work that formal surveying and
training had produced up to that point. Rather than relying upon older vocational
traditions o f surveying, DesBarres came to his project from academic roots that placed
complex theory, mathematics and cutting edge instrumentation at the heart o f accuracy
and data validation. Not satisfied with functional goals o f safe navigation, DesBarres
sought to record a comprehensive image o f the coast. Furthermore, the validity o f his
work rested not on his experience as a navigator, but rather on his experience as a
surveyor. The trade-off however, was time and financial cost.33

32 Because DesBarres and Holland worked together on the Neptune, one with Admiralty support, and one
with support from the Board of Trade, it is difficult to determine the final costs. DesBarres’ biographer
Evans characterized the accounting side of the Atlantic Neptune as “tangled.” See Evans, Uncommon
Obdurate, 12. Robinson, Marine Cartography in Britain, 77. The actual breakdown is as follows:
Five men’s salaries at £20 per annum
£100 0
0
A mate
£30
0
0
Provisions etc. for seven
£102 7
6
Yearly repairs to ye vessel at 30sh. a ton
£30
0
0
Surveyor’s salary at 1Osh. a day
£182 10
0
£444 17sh. 6d.
33 Bennett’s work reveals important parallels between British and American surveying, and British
experiences in India. As Kapil Raj and C. A. Bayly have pointed out, British attempts at surveying their
other colonies in India relied heavily upon local guides and informants, who, throughout the eighteenth
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The Plymouth Harbor survey helped the Marine Society assume a position o f
authority over navigational publications in New England. Performed under government
request, the survey allowed the Marine Society to demonstrate to other mariners that they
enjoyed the support o f the Massachusetts General Court in producing navigational work.
The importance o f the Marine Society’s survey is borne out by the feet that the Plymouth
directions were re-published at least once more, in 1785. More importantly, however, it
announced to those interested in American navigation that there was a group in New
England as interested, or perhaps more so, in promoting navigational research as learned
societies and governmental agencies in Britain.
Bernard Romans acknowledged the Marine Society’s scientific authority when he
submitted, A Concise Natural History o f East and West Florida (New York, 1774) for
their review and evaluation (Appendices C and D). Beginning as an assistant to William
DeBrahms’ surveys in Georgia and Florida in the 1760s and 1770s, Romans left Board o f
Trade service for N ew York in the 1770s to publish his study o f the southern peninsula34
By late 1773, Romans was in Boston. On January 3,1774 he published a lengthy

century, operated parallel knowledge and information systems that British agents sometimes suppressed
and sometimes exploited for their own purposes. When British agents used them, often the reputation of
the indigenous informant or assistant formed one of the few foundations c h i which to evaluate their
reliability. Bennett’s methods indicate that in North America, too, parallel knowledge systems operated
that used different means to produce locally valuable natural knowledge. Like knowledge systems in India,
the quality of the data produced depended upon die reputation of the observer. Yet, unlike in India after
1780, British surveyors refused to tap into these sources. As Matthew Edney points out, the British used
science to differentiate themselves not only from the colonials, but from lower class British subjects as
well. Kapil Raj, “Colonial Encounters and the Forging of New Knowledge and National Identities: Great
Britain and India, 1760-1850,” Osiris, 15 (2000), 119-134; C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information:
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge, 1996), ch. 2; Matthew
Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction o fBritish India, 1765-1843 (Chicago, 1997),
33 and 84.
1Walter Ristow, American Maps andMapmakers (Detroit, 1985), 57.
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advertisement describing his work and calling for subscribers.35 To help his sales, he
provided the Boston Marine Society with a copy for their review and evaluation. The
next day, the society reviewed the work and its accompanying charts, Maps of East and

West Florida (N ew York, 1781), and voted their support and appointed a committee to
publish their endorsement.36 In their public recommendation, published in the

Massachusetts Gazette & the Boston Weekly News-Letter on January 6, the committee
found that Romans had “by great Labour and Expence, made actual surveys o f the
[Florida] Coast,” which would be o f “very great Utility (when published) to Navigators
and Commerce.” Consequently, the society recommended the work “to every Friend o f
America.” As a further endorsement “The Laws o f our Corporation do retain all our
Monies for charitable U se only, or we would do more than recommend.”37
The Marine Society’s exuberant support for the work came from Romans’
attention to practical details that would aid navigators sailing along the Florida coast.
Although an academically trained professional surveyor, Romans paid close attention to
the vocational needs o f his chart’s users. Like Marine Society members making their
own charts, Romans focussed his time and resources near areas o f the greatest concern
for navigators such as shoals, coastlines, harbor entrances, and approaches to the main
stream o f the M ississippi leading to plantations and M obile Bay (Figure 6). He also
provided sketches and line drawings o f river mouths and towns, that like sailing ratters
from two centuries before, allowed easier identification o f prominent features from the
deck (Figure 7).

35 Massachusetts Gazette & the Boston Weekly News-Letter, Jan. 3 to Jan. 10,1774.
36BMS Records, Jan. 4, 1774.
37Massachusetts Gazette & the Boston Weekly News-Letter, Jan. 6,1774.
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Romans also added new, unique information that had rarely appeared on
American charts before. He meticulously recorded the quality and character o f the ocean

bottom at every sounding station to help navigators using a tallow-tipped lead line. In
addition, his charts indicated the distance offshore where he could first see the low lying
land from his schooner’s masthead, information that would greatly aid a vessel making
landfall in those shallow waters (Figure 5). Romans also took details o f the varying

colors and clarity' o f the water, types o f sponges and grasses observed off-shore, and
predominant wind strengths and directions. Further highlighting Romans’ attention to
commercial utility, he also identified an illicit trade running between Native Americans
living near the Mobile River and the Spaniards, that, like his chart, might help guide
captains to safe and profitable markets.
While the Marine Society claimed it could offer no financial backing because o f
its bylaws, the organization must have found some way to “do more than recommend.”
The Boston Marine Society, as a group, and several members as individuals, joined other
marine societies from New York (to whom Romans dedicated his chart o f West Florida),
Salem, and Newburyport, and subscribed to Romans’ project. In subscribing, they joined
some o f the most prominent royal appointees and leaders in American science and
politics. These included two royal governors, one major general with several junior army
and navy officers, representatives o f Yale and Harvard colleges, Surveyor General o f the
Northern Department Samuel Holland, British agents working for the Engineers Office in
America, Boston customs officials, Fellow o f the Royal Society o f London John Ellis,
and Mathew Clarkson representing the Library Company o f Philadelphia. Consequently
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Figure 5: Detail of Pensacola Bay Area, Bernard Romans, Maps o f East and West Florida.
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Bernard Romans, Maps o fEast and West Florida (New York, 1781). Note the line indicated at
point “a”, where Romans indicated die first sighting of land from the masthead of a small
schooner. Note also the numerous descriptions of bottom conditions indicated at point “b”.

Figure 6: Detail o f Mobile Bay Area, Bernard Romans, Maps o f East and West Florida.
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Bernard Romans, Maps o fEast and West Florida (New York, 1781). Note the number of bottom
soundings at point “a” illustrating Romans’ more focussed attention on die entrance to Mobile Bay.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73

Figure 7: Detail of Coastal Profiles or Rutters, Bernard Romans, Maps ofEast and West Florida.

Bernard Romans, Maps o f East and West Florida (New York, 1781). Romans included coastal profiles to
aid mariners in pinpointing their position along die shore.

when Romans’ work finally appeared in 1774, the Marine Society’s name appeared
among some o f the most prominent leaders in American science and politics, and firmly
acknowledged the organization as a significant force in American navigational science.

The society’s first major project revealed a competing set o f standards by which
New England’s coasts were surveyed. Bennett’s survey relied upon vocational traditions
that placed field-work and functionality over academic training and comprehensiveness.
Relying solely upon the training and instrumentation needed for the everyday operation
o f a vessel at sea, the vocational methods embraced by the Marine Society by-passed the
limitations imposed by the colonies’ lack o f research centers and centers o f higher
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learning. Instead. BMS members used the tools they had at their disposal to provide

natural knowledge in the form o f sailing directions and coastal surveys that researchers in
Britain were unlikely to provide. A s M cNeill claimed in his appeal to Colville in 1763,
BMS members saw themselves as better able to provide knowledge o f the New England
coasts for their colleagues. Without the theoretical background required to accurately fix
geographic positions on the globe, Marine Society members viewed experience, rather
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sailing directions. Consequently, N ew England masters developed their own, parallel
surveying discipline at the same time as academically-informed marine surveying
developed in Britain in the eighteenth century. In doing so, they created a parallel set o f
vocational methods accessible to colonial surveyors and captains, and best suited to
Boston’s intellectual and instrumental resources.

In contrast to Bennett’s survey o f Plymouth, London representatives working
along the New England coast in the 1760s carried distinct imperial perspectives that
shaped their cartographic productions. These two traditions converged in Plymouth Bay
in the 1760s. At roughly the same time as Bennett surveyed Plymouth Harbor for the
Boston Marine Society, Charles Blaskowitz made his own survey o f the Cape Cod Bay
port while working for J. F. W. DesBarres. The comparison between Bennett’s 1768
survey o f Plymouth and Blaskowitz’ chart surveyed roughly contemporaneously best
highlights the tension between the local, functional surveys undertaken by Bennett, and
the imperial biases carried into DesBarres’ work.
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Side by side, the two works stand more complementary than comparable. For
example, Bennett’s directions begin with a bearing from Saquash Head, reference to “a
large red C liff on the main,” and call for a course that w ill keep the vessel clear o f Dick’s
Flats. Blaskowitz, however, never identified Saquash Head. Nor did he identify Dick’s
Flats, presumably subsuming them into the sand flats to the southeast o f the channel he
called Brown’s Islands. Blaskowitz does identify a c liff on the mainland, “Doten’s
Clift,” but there is no reference to its color. As a shipmaster with the directions and the
chart continued in towards Plymouth, more inconsistencies emerge. Bennett refers to a
series o f points that mark the principal headlands to be avoided in approaching the town.
Hatch Point, Reach Point, Sandy Point all play important roles as landmarks in Bennett’s
directions.

Figure 8: Detail, J. F. W. DesBarres, [Chart of Plymouth Bay, surveyed by Charles Blaskowitz].

Note Blaskowitz’ omission of a label for Saquash Head, Hatch Point, Reach Point and
Sandy Point
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On Blaskowitz’ chart, however, none o f these features are labeled. Only Long Beach, the
sand spit separating the southern tongue o f Plymouth Bay from the rest o f Cape Cod Bay,
bears a name.
When compared to Bennett’s survey, stark differences appear that highlight the
different perspectives carried by the two surveying teams. For DesBarres, marine
surveying was a means by which imperial agents could better assess and catalog the
resources o f colonial areas for from London. As Matthew Edney, Deepak Kumar, Kapil
Raj, and a host o f other scholars investigating colonialism and science have shown,
systematic surveys on a uniform scale were part and parcel o f the process o f empire
building.38 Edney, in particular, has shown that surveying using a standard, global
graticule o f latitude and longitude allowed British imperial surveys to be compared across
space, which, in turn helped not only exploit the resources o f empire, but also gave
imperial officials concrete evidence that such an empire actually existed.39 With this
information on paper, decision-makers back in London could better exploit resources
contained within their territorial holdings, and better project imperial expansion.
Bennett’s work represents a distinct perspective from that o f Holland and DesBarres. For
the Marine Society team, the primary goal o f the Plymouth survey was to facilitate
captains’ safe passage into Plymouth Harbor. Bennett worked in a local framework by
referencing commonly known and acknowledged headlands that privileged local
knowledge over imperial comparability.

38 Edney, Mapping an Empire-, Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1857-1905 (Delhi, 1997); Kapil Raj,
“Colonial Encounters,” 119-134.
39 Edney, Mapping an Empire, 24-25.
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DesBarres’ concern for the imperial over the local carried into other aspects o f his
chart production. For example, DesBarres took pains to collect information that would be
useful to naval forces operating for long periods o f time in American waters. In his chart
o f Portsmouth and his chart o f Plymouth, DesBarres clearly identified orchards, hills,
farm fields and fresh water creeks—all information a commander would need to guide
foraging crews to replenish ships. The city o f Portsmouth, in contrast, is drawn poorly,
the town barely discernible from the fond surrounding it. Towns, while important centers
for securing crew and purchasing supplies, sat lower on a naval captain’s priority list.
While DesBarres included information that appealed to Royal Navy supply
officers, he ignored—that is left blank—spaces in the interior where local mariners might
see as centers o f colonial activity. For example, DesBarres only filled in geographical
detail relevant to the immediate coastal areas, leaving important information about inland
waterways, such as N ew Hampshire’s Great Bay, o ff his charts entirely. In addition,
timber yards, ship-yards, and other concerns that fueled the local economy and drove
local shipping were ignored. Such blank spaces, or in Harley’s words “silences,” “act to
legitimize and neutralize arbitrary actions in the consciousness o f their originators. In
other words, the lack o f qualitative differentiation in m aps. . . serves to dehumanize the
landscape.”40

40Harley, The New Nature o f Maps, 98-99.
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F igure 9: Detail, DesBarres, J. F. W. [survey by James Grant and Samuel Holland], [Piscataqua
Harbour].
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In at least one case, DesBarres consciously changed the shape o f the coastline to
suit imperial needs, thus pitting local needs against imperial desires. In his chart o f the
coast o f Maine from Frenchman Bay to Mosquito Harbor, DesBarres failed to indicate
Northeast Harbor, the best harbor in the region, or anything that might resemble a harbor
along the southern coast o f Mount Desert island.41 DesBarres’ omission was almost
certainly intentional, as the rest o f the island’s features, including its topography, coves,
and hazardous rocks, were laid out in DesBarres’ characteristic detail, and in more detail
than the rest o f land areas on the chart. DesBarres most likely left this strategically
important harbor out o f consideration for military reasons. In this case, imperial concerns
outweighed the need for accurate local charts for free commerce.

Figure 10: Detail o f Mount Desert Island, DesBarres, [Coast o f Maine from Frenchman Bay to
Mosquito Harbor].

41 See J. F. W. DesBarres, [Coast of Maine from Frenchman Bay to Mosquito Harbor], (London, 1776).
For comparisons with the current shape of the coast, see U.S. Coast Survey, Frenchman and Blue Hill Beys
and Approaches, Chart no. 13312,20th edition (October 31,1992).
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Figure 11: Detail of Mount Desert Island south coast, U.S. Coast Survey, Frenchman and Blue
H ill Bays and Approaches.
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Between 1768 and 1775, the Marine Society established themselves as authorities
in Boston’s navigational research world by meeting local needs for navigational research.
The Society based their authority upon older, functional methods o f surveying that
optimized area and accuracy while minimizing co st These methods were rooted in the
routines o f ship management, and relied upon instruments and skills commonly used by
mariners. During this period, the Marine Society used these methods to 1511 needs for
cartographic work in a colonial setting that was far from metropolitan centers o f learning
and theoretical investigation. Rather than waiting for formally educated surveyors to turn
their attention to the New England coasts, the Marine Society adapted the resources at
their disposal to the meet immediate needs for navigational information. When British
representatives did arrive, they carried a different set o f criteria on which to focus their
cartographic work. In addition to more theoretically sound methods, skills, and
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instrumentation, London surveyors also carried an imperial agenda that focussed upon
interests that differed from those held by the local community. On the eve o f the
Revolution, two parallel traditions operated along N ew England’s coasts and yielded
differing results. After 1775, however, international politics radically changed the world
in which the Marine Society operated, and created new opportunities for the Society to
extend their influence in Boston’s maritime community.
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CHAPTER IH

THE MARINE SOCIETY IN BOSTON AND NATIONAL POLITICS, 1763-1798

Between 1763 and 1775, the Boston Marine Society found itself at the center o f
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argued, Boston merchants and the goods they carried played important roles during the
1760s and 1770s in political opposition to Parliamentary revenue acts, extensions o f
Admiralty authority into Boston civic life, and the constitutional conflicts over colonials’
roles within the British empire.1 Not surprisingly, Boston Marine Society members, both
as merchants ordering these goods and as captains shipping them, found themselves and
their society at the center o f the political conflict as it played out in Boston.
Initially, the Marine Society appeared as the unified body their bylaws required.
In December, 1760, for example, nine members signed a petition—as individuals—
against Admiralty decrees expanding the government’s power to search and seize ships

1The best accounts of this process are John W. Tyler’s Smuggler and Patriots: Boston Merchants and the
Advent o fthe American Revolution (Boston, 1986), and Arthur Meier Schlessinger’s The Colonial
Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York, 1939). See also Charles McLean
Andrews, The Boston Merchants and the Non-Importation Movement (1916-1917; New York, 1968),
Benjamin Woods Labaree, The Boston Tea Party (New York, 1964), Gary Nash, The Urban Crucible: The
Northern Seaports and the Origins o f the American Revolution (Boston, 1979, 1986). For die role of
consumer goods in the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s, see T. H. Breen, “An Empire of Goods: The
Anglicization of Colonial America, 1690-1776,” in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social
Development, Fourth Edition, ed. Stanley N. Katz, John M. Murrin, and Douglas Greenberg (New York,
1993); and John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession o f George III (Cambridge,
1976), 367-397. For the role of the Royal Navy in the conflict, see Neil R. Stout, The Royal Navy in
America: A Study o fEnforcement ofBritish Colonial Policy in the Era ofthe American Revolution
(Annapolis, MD, 1973), and Carl Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admircdty Courts and the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill, 1960). For a clear analysis of larger imperial issues during the imperial crisis, see Eliga
Gould, Persistence o fEmpire: British Political Cidture in the Age ofthe American Revolution (Chapel Hill,
2000).
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suspected o f smuggling.2 BMS member and customs official Benjamin Hallowell was
even reputed to have called himse lf an enemy to the Vice Admiralty courts seeking to
enforce customs regulations, and accused those bodies o f being a public nuisance.3 Yet
Hallowell and other members began to change their tune as the tensions over the Sugar
Act, the Stamp Act, and the Townsend Duties politicized Boston’s merchant houses and
merchant captains, and forced more and more BMS members to take sides. Between the
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for the Encouragement o f Trade and Commerce (BSETC), an organization seeking to
organize Boston’s merchant community in an attempt to defend Boston’s notoriously lax
customs collector Benjamin Barons from Crown charges o f negligence.4 In one o f the
largest outbursts o f revolutionary activity experienced in Boston in 1766, Hallowell
watched his house suffer damage at the hands o f Stamp Act rioters in 1766—rioters
possibly incited by fellow BMS members in the BSETC.5
While the rest o f the BMS was notably quiet during the Stamp Act riots, the
advent o f the non-importation agreements in the late 1760s polarized the society and
forced BMS members to publicly stake positions contrary to fellow members’ views.
The commercial nature o f non-importation planted Boston’s merchants and captains
squarely in the center o f opposition activity. Consequently, BMS members found
themselves forced to stand on convictions, causing a rift within the society. In the first

2 [Petition against Admiralty Decree], December 26,1760, vol. 44, p. 447, Massachusetts State Archives.
3 Deposition of Charles Paxton, February 18,1761, as quoted in Tyler, p. 37.
4 Ezekiel Price Papers, pp. 78-81 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston Mass.), and Tyler, pp. 253-277.
5 Benjamin Hallowell, [Claim for damages inflicted on house from mob violence], Dec. 8,1766, vol. 26,
pp. 242,249 (Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Mass.). For a more thorough examination of the
BSETC, see Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots, chapters 1 through 3, and Andrews, Boston Merchants.
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two weeks o f March, 1768, Boston merchants retaliated against the Townsend duties by
signing a public document, boycotting English goods until their grievances could be

addressed. Along with dozens o f other Boston merchants, seven Marine Society
members signed the document and cancelled their orders for English merchandise.6 For
the first time, however, two Marine Society members, John Taylor and Jonathan
Simpson, publicly opposed their fellow members and refused to sign the document.
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undermine the entire efficacy o f the gesture—and promised great profits to those who
dared stand out as sole importers o f highly demanded English goods.
In July 1769, about a dozen Boston citizens joined into the non-importation cause.
With such popular support for the movement in place, leaders o f the Non-importation
movement visited other merchants to ensure compliance. In August 1769, this body
included Henderson Inches— now a selectman for Boston—and Samuel Dashwood, both
o f whom resorted to physical violence and threats on non-supporters’ life and property to
keep a solid front.7
While Inches, Dashwood, and other BMS members sided with Whigs opposing
Parliamentary revenue acts and the enforcement o f customs duties, other BMS members
sided with the Crown and the government. Joseph Dommett, for example, received a
recommendation from Thomas Hutchinson for a position in the customs service in 1769,
and sailed for London to secure the job.8 John Andrews protested the Solemn League

6 Ann Dashwood, presumably related to BMS member Samuel Dashwood, also signed, bringing the total in
favor up to eight
7 Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots, 135-151.
* Massachusetts Archives, vol. 27, pp. 255,256, and 264.
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and Covenenant in 1775 in the Massachusetts Gazette in July 1774.9 Others, however,
showed their support for the Royal government in less public ways. John Bryant and
Robert Jarvis, for example, both carried letters for beleaguered Governor Thomas
Hutchinson.
By 1775, a few prominent members o f the BMS had developed considerable
reputations as radicals not only in Boston, but in London as w ell In April, an
anonymous London writer included several BMS members in an attack on Boston Whigs.
The author characterized William Davis as “o f small importance & great conceit”; John
Bradford as “a Brave & Valiant sea commander only a little bashful which is well known
to the underwriters in London”; and John Pulling as “Bully o f the Mohawk Tribe,”
suggesting some involvement with the Boston Tea Party. The author also singled out Job
Prince as “Remarkable for his pretended hospitality to strangers”; and indicted Caleb
Hopkins as “The northern politician and talks on both sides o f the Question
occasionally.” Edward Davis finished the list, characterized as “a Tatler and minds
every Body’s business but his own.”10
In 1773, Boston residents, dressed as “Indians,” stormed aboard the Beaver and
the Dartmouth, dumping British tea into the harbor. That event forced growing tensions
to a breaking point. In response, Parliament passed the punitive Boston Port Act that
closed the port until the tea was paid for. The act also brought Regulars into Boston, and
through the winter o f 1774 and into the spring o f 1775, both sides dug in their heels.
Finally, in April, British Regulars and radical Whig “Patriots” pushed the conflict to open

9 Massachusetts Gazette, July 7,1774.
10 “Tory Account of Boston Whigs,” April 18,1775, Ms-L. (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston,
Mass.).
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warfare. After retreating from Concord, British forces remained besieged in Boston from
April, 1775 to March o f the following year. As tensions grew between Boston and
London, the BMS remained tom between members actively supporting anti-government
protests and those wishing for more moderate, or even pro-govemment actions.11
For some members who may have tried to remain neutral, the divisiveness o f civil
war made such efforts impossible. Moderates freed suspicion from British and self-styled
“Patriot” authorities alike, suffered public humiliation, and in John Leach's case, lost
personal property and freed charges o f treason. Because o f the very knowledge that the
Society had sought to promulgate one year earlier, Leach found him self targeted. A
mathematics teacher, petty merchant and clerk for the Marine Society, he was beset by
Regulars in June:
At 3 this afternoon a few steps from my house, I was seized upon by Major Cane
of the Regulars, accompanied by one Loring who is lately made a Sherriff, they
obliged me to return to my House, where M ajor Cane demanded my keys o f my
desks and searched all my drawings, writings, &c. and told me I had a great deal
to answer for[.] I replyed it was very well, I stood ready at a minutes warning to
answer any accusation; I had a drawn hanger, I could have took hold of in a
moment, and cut them both down, I had both courage & inclination to do it, tho’
they had each their swords by their sides[.] but I suddenly reflected that I could
not escape, as the whole town was a prison, God wonderfully restrained m e. . .12

British officers suspected Leach o f using his cartographic skills to supply the
besieging Americans with drawings o f British fortifications. Although the trial itself was
a farce—the lead witness against Leach kept forgetting his name and the charges were
dropped—he suffered materially for his associations. British Regulars destroyed his
school, seized his papers, and pulled apart his wharf, leaving Leach only his optical

11 See Labaree, Boston Tea Party for more detailed study of these events.
12John Leach, “Journal Kept in Boston Jail, 1775”, June 29,1775, John Leach Collection, (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston, Mass.).
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instruments and surveying tools to salvage. The Patriot cause committed similar abuses.
William Cheever, Edward Davis, Samuel Bullfinch, and Job Prince, despite some o f their
associations with the Sons o f Liberty were listed as persons “inimical to the interest o f
the united colonies,” and watched by the committee for public safety for good behavior.13
When fighting broke out in April 1775, the Marine Society ceased their monthly
meetings, and the society’s books were smuggled out o f the city for protection.
Furthermore, each member had to choose sides. Some members kept to their radical
beliefs and took up arms against the crown. Fourteen others accepted commissions as
continental naval or privateer officers, while others fought the Crown through
administrative roles as prize agents, or on governmental boards supplying the war effort
When the society reconvened in November 1775, the group remained split. O f
the six members at the meeting, BMS Master Job Prince and Samuel Dashwood actively
defended the “patriot” cause. Former master Robert Jarvis, Deputy Master William D.
Cheever and Samuel Bullfinch identified with pro-Crown sentiments. Caught between
the two sides, and without a quorum, the society adjourned stating that they could not do
anything in good faith.14

The British retreat in March, however, ended the tense stalemate, and purged the
society o f Loyalist sympathizers. Once the colonists had installed artillery brought from
Fort Ticonderoga on the heights overlooking the city, British garrison commanders
removed their army to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Former masters Robert Jarvis, Benjamin

u “Airest Warrant for Cheever et al,” April 5,1776, Cheever-Davis Collection, (Massachusetts Historical
Society, Boston, Mass.). For Cheever’s association with the Sons of Liberty, see “An Alphabetical List of
the Sons of Liberty who dined at the Liberty Tree, Dorchester, August 14,1769,” Proceedings o fthe
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1869-1870 (Boston, 1871), 140-142.
14BMS Records, Nov. 7,1775.
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Hallowell, and William Coffin fled with the British Regulars, along with half a dozen
others. In 1778, four more members were officially banished from the commonwealth by
statewide act.15 Some suspected loyalists chose to stay, but no longer enjoyed the status
they once had within the society or the community. John White, John Hill, and William
Cheever all had to post bonds for good behavior before the Committee o f Sequestration
between February 1777 and March 1778.16
In November 1776, when the Society’ met for the second time since Lexington and
Concord, radical Whigs clearly held control. Job Prince and John Pullings, already
known to London as Whig activists, joined with Whig supporters William Mackay and
Hector McNeill—who would soon command the frigate Boston—and several other
members to resume the society’s regular meetings. Without Loyalist members, however,
the radical Whig leadership was now free to have the society take an active political role
in the war. Beginning in November 1777, the society repeatedly voted radical W higs
Henderson Inches and Job Prince as treasurers. A s treasurer, Inches directed the society
to lend money to the war and the new government in the following March. Despite the
uncertainty o f state and Continental securities, and with rampant inflation, the society lent
out on State or Continental security all but £50 o f the paper money in hand.17 By putting
their paper money into securities from the new government, the society made a clear
statement o f support for the new government by risking their funds in uncertain
government paper. Furthermore, by November 1780, the society was confident enough

15 Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots, 253-277.
16“An Account for the money rec’d for die Committee [of] Sequestrations, February, 1111 to March 17,
1778,” Cheever-Davis Collection, (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.).
17BMS Records, March 3,1778.
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in American independence that they hired a lawyer to help them extend their charter.18 In
addition, the Society also used membership to reward individuals with distinguished
naval service against British forces. Through the course o f the war, membership
expanded not only to those recommended for their navigational abilities, but also to
honor those with naval and privateering service for their new-found country. O f the
twenty-three members that had military service inducted before or during the war, nine
were inducted during the war itself.1^
The political crises o f the 1760s and 1770s fundamentally changed the way the
Marine Society related to the larger Boston community. With merchants and captains at
the heart o f non-importation agreements and public protests over taxation, the Marine
Society found its apolitical stance impossible to maintain. After almost a year o f division
within the society, the BMS loyalists fled in March 1776, allowing those remaining to
actively pursue in the war against Britain.

The American Revolution changed the relationship o f science to government
throughout the Anglo-American world. For Americans, the war inspired scientifically
inclined gentlemen to seize the ideals o f virtuous republican citizenship, and use their
interests to carve a place for themselves in the new republic.20 John Gascoigne, Richard
Harry Drayton, and Miller and Reill have shown how in Britain the war between 1775

18BMS Minutes, Nov. 7,1780.
19 William A. Baker, The Boston Marine Society in the American Warfo r Independence (Boston, 1976), vxi. Published with William A. Baker, A History o fthe Boston Marine Society, 1742-1981(Boston, 1982).
20 Brooke Hindle, The Pursuit o fScience in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789 (Chapel Hill, 1956); I.
Bernard Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the Political Thought o f Jefferson, Franklin,
Adams, and Madison (New York, 1995); George H Daniels, Science in American Society: A Social History
(New York, 1971); John C Greene, Science in the Age o fJefferson (Ames, Iowa, 1986).
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and 1783 highlighted a need for improved administrative effectiveness in the British
Empire. In the Royal Society, the American War marked a watershed after which
administrative changes and reforms “helped to provide the institutional matrix within
winch scientific considerations at last began to impinge on the concerns o f the British
State.”21 This affected Joseph Banks and other prominent figures, too.
The changed relationship between science and government was as clear in the
navigational realm as anywhere else. After 1783, the BMS realized significant political
authority: for the first time in thirty years, they seemed poised to get access to political
power, and perhaps to governmental patronage. Through the political debates o f the
1780s, stemming from Boston’s post-war recession in the maritime trades and political
disputes over debt legislation, the Marine Society found a niche where they could present
themselves as “fathers o f the maritime people” and to try to stabilize Boston’s poltical
situation. These efforts soon attracted the attention o f Federal officials, thus opening a
route to the patronage the society had long sought.22
In America, while national leaders urged Americans to apply their talents to the
security o f the union, Americans interested in scientific research applied classical
republican theory to the role o f science in the new republic. As Gordon Wood, Joyce
Appleby and J. G. A. Pocock have argued, classical republican political ideals called for
citizens to subordinate their individual interests to the good o f the whole.23 Only through

21John Gascoigne, Science in the Service o fEmpire, (Cambridge, 1998), 21-22. See also Richard Harry
Drayton, Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement ’o fthe World (New
Haven, 2000X67-81.
22 Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier o fthe Early American
Republic (New York, 1995), ch. 6.
23 Gordon Wood, The Creation o fthe American Republic (New York, 1969X Joyce Appleby, Capitalism
and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision o fthe 1790s (New York, 1984), J. G. A Pocock, The
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the civic virtue that called for citizens to restrain personal desires for gain, and channel
their energies to improve the lot o f the whole, could republican liberty remain intact.
Britain, republican theorists lamented, suffered from an endemic pursuit o f self-interest,
through which power—that great enemy to the delicate flower o f liberty—had been able
to blind subjects to the erosion o f their rights as freebom Englishmen that their lassitude
had allowed. Yet republican virtue required more than just self-sacrifice. As the republic
now drew sovereignty from flic people, the very same people needed to apply their
individual skills to meet the needs o f the larger community. Thus virtue was more than
simply a denial o f self-interest: it represented the transformation o f that self-interest into
disinterested public duty and civic service. In a land blessed with new-found liberty,
individuals would be rewarded as the community as a whole improved through individual
self-denial and collective community service.24
The call for civic service was not limited to political and economic concerns
alone. The new republic’s needs for learning and science appealed to the few learned
societies that existed in the colonies at the end o f the Revolution. As historians Brooke
Hindle, John C. Greene, I. B. Cohen, and George Daniels have shown, the same
sentiment for public service and civic duty that filled the political world, also animated
the American scientific world.25 Nowhere is this better seen than in the opening remarks
o f the first volume o f the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences’ Memoirs (Boston,

Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton,
1975), 462-505.
24 Wood, Creation, chapter H, especially 45-82.
25 Brooke Hindle, The Pursuit c f Science in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789 (Chapel Hill, 1956), ch. 12;
George H. Daniels, Science in American Society: A Social History (New York, 1971), ch. 6. I. B. Cohen
reverses this equation and examines the intellectual history of how scientific thought shaped this republican
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1785). In this first publication o f the Boston society formed in 1781, contributing authors
called upon citizens to apply their skills to solve pressing technical concerns o f the
union—in the same spirit that ordinary citizens selflessly applied their talents for the
common good. For indeed, science held immediate benefits for the new nation:
The labors o f the Astronomer are much needed, and will be peculiarly useful—
particularly those observations and calculations, which will serve to perfect the
geography o f the country, and improve navigation, as has been before intimated.
Hereby, the boundaries between one State and another in the Union, may be
accurately determined, and disputes prevented or settled: the latitudes and
longitudes o f our sea-ports and head lands ascertained, and our intercourse with
foreign nations facilitated.26

Phillips Payson, in offering some astronomical observations, saw science as
playing a integral part in stabilizing a shaky union between states with competing
boundary disputes, and unlocking American potential:

The extensive territories of the United States of America, are a foundation in
nature for a vast empire—The geography of its interior parts, though o f great
importance, is, at present, but little better than conjectural: To perfect which, and
fix the interesting boundaries and lines, the best, and indeed the only proper
method is, that of astronomical observations, which, it is probable, the Supreme
Council o f America will soon adopt, now the glorious revolution is so happily
completed. To promote such observations.. .highly merits the attention of the
Academy: For though they should not at first be made with such accuracy as
modem astronomy can boast of, they will prove great helps for future
improvements.27

The AAAS recognized that science was not as fully developed in America as in
European countries. Scientific competition with the Old World was not at the heart o f the

sentiment See I. B. Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the Political Thought o f
Jefferson, Franklin, Adams and Madison (New York, 1995).
26Memoirs o fthe American Academy o f Arts and Sciences, 1 (1785), xi, hereafter cited as AAAS Memoirs.
27 Phillips Payson, “Some Select Astronomical Observations made at Chelsea...,” AAAS Memoirs, 1
(1785), 124.
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society’s agenda. “(Tjt w ill not, at present, be expected, that this Academy should vie
with fam iliar institutions in old countries, where they have peculiar advantages for such
prosecutions.”28 Rather, the immediate needs o f the country required the AAAS to look
to domestic concerns for their most useful application. Though admittedly the “least
entertaining o f any in the collection,” articles on astronomy and surveying “principally
exhibit such observations and deductions, as are subservient to the cause o f geography
and navigation, the improvement o f which is o f great importance to this country.”20
The AAAS made a similar call to a virtuous scientific community. “It is the part
o f every patriot-philosopher to pursue every hint—to cultivate every inquiry, which may
eventually lead to the security and welfare o f his fellow citizens, the extension o f their
commerce, and the improvement o f those arts, which adorn and embellish life.”30
The AAAS clearly linked science to the political needs o f the em erging American
nation. American scientific authors claimed a distinct role for their work in aiding the
expansion o f the American State and in stabilizing the union. As they were expected to
place the economic and political good o f the community before their own self interests,
republican scientists saw the benefits o f their work at first going to improve the well
being o f their fellow citizens, and indirectly, themselves. Whether this was a romantic
ideal or the actual motivation behind publishers in the early 1780s is not important The
important issues were that the Revolution shifted the social place o f science within the

28 AAAS Memoirs, 1 (1785), viiL
29 AAAS Memoirs, viii.
30 AAAS Memoirs, viiL
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republic. Science and research needed to play important roles in establishing the new
republic and in aiding its people to live better lives.
The marriage between science and domestic politics continued through the 1780s
as individual states began to take more active roles in promoting science. The AAAS’s

Memoirs clearly showed the institutional desire to apply science to public concerns.
Nicolas Pike turned his individual energies to similar goals in his 1788 publication, A
iv o r v u m « K ^ G t/ ty t a c - o ^ & c //* u j s i t u r u n c i i C f r \^G /fiyG < ycU j G i m e \ ^ u u , C i i S G j m c u / u t c u o t t u e ^ .

A teacher and mathematician, Pike secured state support to present a study o f natural
sciences specifically catered to American citizens. With the United States free from
European control, Pike felt that the natural sciences, in this case mathematics, should
reflect the liberty o f republican government. In his eyes, political independence offered
scientifically minded Americans an opportunity to cast o ff previous modes o f thinking
imposed upon them by generation after generation o f inflexible European tradition.
It may, perhaps, by some be thought needless, when Authors are so multiplied, to
attempt publishing any thing further on Arithmetic, as it may be imagined that
there can be nothing more than the repetition of a Subject already exhausted...
.but as the United States are now an independent Nation, it was judged that a
system might be calculated more suitable to our Meridian, than those heretofore
published.31

Pike was not alone in these sentiments, and his contemporaries saw the work as having
more than just national utility. Communicating with Pike about his soon to be published
treatise, Joseph Wheelock extended the value o f Pike’s work to all o f humanity:
“America is released from the chains o f European politics—Let it be independent in
genius and the efforts o f art. I shall wait for this satisfaction o f seeing your piece with the

Pike, A New and Complete System, preface.
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belief o f its future utility to mankind. . .”32 Massachusetts governor, James Bowdoin,
also saw the work as reflecting w ell upon American virtue.
So valuable a work, declared such by good judges who have examined it, will be
an honour to the States, for whose use it is intended, and in particular to the
ingenious gentleman, who composed it I heartily wish there may be an
extensive demand for it, that the public, and the author, may be reciprocally
benefited.33

Bowdoin had other reasons for appreciating the work: Pike asked the governor if he
would accept the dedication o f the work, an offer Bowdoin, o f course, accepted.34
Bowdoin also helped spin’ demand by granting state financial support to the work. On
Pike’s petition, the Massachusetts General Court exempted A New and Complete System
from all excise duties.35
This trend lasted into the 1790s, when John Churchm an continued to bring
classical republican ideals into his works.36 When in 1790 Churchman engaged the
problem o f longitude, he also revealed a dedication to republican science. Breaking with
European traditions, Churchman claimed that titles performed limited roles in America:
Titles are considered as being of several kinds: 1st, Such as are merely epithetical;
2nd, the usual names of office; 3d, appendages. &c. In a republican government,
it is hoped that none in the following list will be offended at the omission of the

32 Joseph Wheelock to Nicolas Pike, Feb. 23,1786, Nicolas Pike Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society,
Boston, Mass.).
33 James Bowdoin to Nicolas Pike, Jan. 17,1788. MHS, Nicolas Pike Papers.
34 James Bowdoin responded to Pike’s request: “The person, to whom you propose to dedicate it, if I rightly
conjecture whom you intend, would esteem such a dedication an honour done him: which, hough he
cannot make pretensions to it, must afford him no small satisfaction, as it would indicate the opinion of a
gentleman, whose abilities and character he highly esteems.” James Bowdoin to Nicolas Pike, Jan. 17,
1788, Nicolas Pike Papers.
35 Pike, A New and Complete System, i.
36 The author would like to thank Kevin Gumieny for his discussion of Churchman’s work and visions of
America.
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former, especially as the personage to whom the Magnetic Atlas is addressed has
generally no other title than that o f President o f the United States.37

Instead, Churchman printed his subscriber’s names with unique characters, relegating the
various titles to a few code symbols that would not distract from individuals’ names.
Churchman’s pursuit o f egalitarian simplicity extended to his method for
determining longitude as w e ll As a surveyor, Churchman recognized the importance o f
accurate measures o f longitude in clarifying boundary' disputes between states and among
individuals. Consequently, a simple and reliable method could be applied to frontier
situations to settle boundary disputes. Rather than relying upon the complex mathematics
o f Nevil M askelyne’s lunar distance method, and instead o f incurring the expense o f
Harrision’s chronometer, Churchman sought longitude through a simpler method using
magnetic variation.38 He was not alone in seeking longitude from magnetic variation.
Like fifteen others who submitted magnetic variation solutions to the Board o f Longitude
after 1737, Churchman believed magnetic variation could indicate longitudinal location
on the globe.39 Churchman postulated that two independent poles migrated around the
earth—one in the south, and one in the north. The plane defined by these two poles
represented the 0° variation “magnetic meridian.” As the observer moved further from
this line, variation increased in a systematic fashion. Consequently, Churchman believed,

37 John Churchman, An Explanation o fthe Magnetic Atlas or Variation Chart___ (Philadelphia, 1790), vi.
38 For questions about the accuracy of Harrison’s chronometer, see entry for Jan. 27,1795, “Log of the ship
Britannia to the Pacific, 1792-1795,” LOG 1792B, (Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.).
39 For a more complete discussion of the cultural importance of magnetism in eighteenth century Britain,
see Patricia Fara, Sympathetic Attractions: Magnetic Practices, Beliefs, and Symbolism in EighteenthCentury England (Princeton, 1996).
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variation and the resultant “magnetic meridians” could be plotted and compared to
latitude to determine longitude.40
Churchman was certainly not the first researcher to utilize this approach.
Although it was fundamentally flawed, Churchman believed that his method represented
a simple and universal means o f determining longitude. Instead o f complex mathematics
or expensive equipment, Churchman’s method required only a “magnetic atlas”
predicting fixture magnetic meridians, a relatively inexpensive compass, and either a
back-staff or a Davis quadrant. His method, had it worked, would have made the
determination o f longitude simple, quick and easily understandable for a moderately
educated individual operating in the backcountry. Consequently, his method reflected his
beliefs in the role o f science in the American republic— that it should be open and easily
accessible, free from the traditional hierarchies o f the Old World.
For the AAAS, Pike and Churchman—just to name a few individuals actively
applying science to the American political world—science carried unique political
implications. The AAAS perceived the importance o f pursuing and applying natural
knowledge to the needs o f an unsteady and problem-stricken young nation. Pike’s work,
geared specifically for an emerging commercial nation, carried with it a new
egalitarianism and represented a sharp break with past European social and intellectual
hierarchies. Churchman also embraced this leveling vision o f science by reducing titles
designed to highlight the individual’s importance to society to a mere standardized code.
His work on longitude fixrther reflected his interests in making science useful to all
citizens, and not just a few specially trained elite gentlemen. In all cases, researchers

40 John Churchman, An Explanation o f the Magnetic Atlas or Variation Chart

(Philadelphia, 1790).
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wove new political needs and ideals into their investigations into nature, and they took
pains to be clear that science was part o f the nation-building experiment.

As a group interested in the promotion o f navigational science, the BMS also
followed this trend. Though less vocal than traditional centers o f scientific learning, the
BMS applied their expertise to the needs o f their community with the same fusion o f
classical republican citizenship and scientific interest. Immediately after the war, the
BMS applied their resources to civic needs, embraced civic responsibilities and promoted
community economic recovery. Society funds management, charitable works, and
maritime improvements extended their work beyond just navigational science promotion.
The BMS’s work in navigational science held political, as w ell as navigational
implications. Driven by a desire to play a greater role in shaping the community, and
fueled by classical republican ideals o f self-sacrifice for the common good, the BMS’s
expansion into the civic aspects o f navigation made political statements about new
leaders and the new nature o f leadership.
The BMS first expanded into Boston’s long under-developed and confused pilot
organization. Since 1716, when Boston Light was first erected, lighthouse keepers also
operated as harbor pilots. When not tending the lights, keepers kept a boat with which
they approached inbound vessels to offer their services to guide them up channel to the
town. From 1716 to 1733, this arrangement operated moderately well. In 1733,
however, Boston Light keeper and harbor pilot Robert Ball complained to the General
Court that unofficial pilots stole away too much o f his business while he was tending the
light, and consequently asked that he alone be named official pilot. The Court agreed,
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but required that he maintain two pilot boats, clearly labeled as such, and stationed at the
light.41 The 1733 Act, however, did not solve all the state’s pilotage problems. A new
Massachusetts law in 1783 reforming state pilotage cited the need for an expanded pilot
system that went beyond Boston. Highlighting the importance o f the service, the General
Court claimed for itself the sole authority for licensing pilots for Boston. The 1783 Act
also named pilots for north shore ports such as Salem and Newburyport, Cape Cod ports,
Nantucket, Martha’s Vineyard, and south shore ports. Furthermore, the Act called for
state certification o f all branch pilots, suggesting that illicit pilotage remained a problem
throughout the eighteenth century.42
General Court management o f pilots apparently sat poorly with Boston’s maritime
community, and as their efforts in 1783 show, the BMS felt that pilot management and
certification played too significant a role in Boston’s port comm unity to be left in the
hands o f politicians. In June the BMS offered their advice “in the Choice o f pilots & care
o f the lights similar to that already presented, with this difference, that we will give our
time for one year gratis.”43 Prospective pilots would face examination by the Marine
Society before they could be recommended to the state for branch positions.
Furthermore, the society would hear and adjudicate complaints against harbor pilots, and
would recommend changes in the service as necessary.44
The BMS also embraced changes that would allow them to better aid the town’s
merchants as well as its mariners. As an organization that received hard currency ft>r

41 American Pilots’ Association, State Pilotage in America: Historical Outline with European Backgrounds
(Washington DC, 1960), 6-7.
42 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, An Actfo r Regulating Pilotage__ (Boston, 1783).
43 BMS Minutes, June 3,1783.
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dues and fines, the BMS was one o f the few groups that possessed specie in a city starved
for hard currency. Changes in bylaws in 1785 allowed Marine Society funds to help
Boston’s economic recovery during the post-war recession. Pre-1785 regulations
allowed society funds to be invested only on bonds or on mortgages solidly backed by
land valuations. In January, the body modified its laws allowing that “all monies o f the
Society shall either be laid out in shares o f the Massachusetts Bank, or let at interest upon
bond with collateral security o f land free o f encumbrances lying in the Town o f Boston
and the soil independent o f the buildings thereon to be equal in value to the sum
advanced.”45 By investing their currency in a bank, the BMS freed up desperately needed
hard currency that could go to commercial investments. Such investments, in turn would
launch voyages and spur the port’s maritime trade, opening opportunities for maritime
workers and attendant tradesmen.
In embracing both pilot management and the freeing up o f capital reserves for the
support o f the banking industry, the BMS applied their resources to the needs o f Boston’s
maritime community. The society’s pre-war status as a group actively interested in
promoting the well-being o f mariners, masters, and merchants alike allowed them to aid
in port administration in the aftermath o f the Revolution.

While the BMS responded to the state’s economic crises by taking on port
administrative tasks and offering up investment capital, western farmers and debtors
responded to post-war crises in more violent ways. Pressured by debt for consumer

44 The Marine Society still retains the responsibility of evaluating prospective harbor pilots for
Massachusetts, the wily non-governmental agency in America to hold such a position.
45 BMS Minutes, Jan. 5,1785.
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goods that flooded Massachusetts following the Revolution, western farmers began in
1785 and 1786 resisting legal actions taken by coastal merchants suing for payment on
back accounts. Facing imprisonment or foreclosure on their farms, western yeoman
farmers called for tender laws and paper currency that would make repayment easier. In
response, however, the General Court under pressure from merchants not wanting to see
the value o f their credits diminished, refused such relief to formers. By late 1786,
formers went beyond petitioning and took up arms against a government they saw as
distant, grasping, and unresponsive to its citizens’ needs.46
From late 1786 into 1787, Massachusetts fought a small internal conflict that
pitted western formers against more commercialized coastal towns and pitted agrarian
interests against seaboard commercial ones. Taking up symbols from the Revolution o f a
decade before, Shaysites directly challenged the rule o f the mercantile elite in Boston,
presenting them in the same light as the Crown in the 1770s 47 As western militias
refused to suppress Shaysite insurgents, merchants and retailers in eastern districts put up
funds for an army under the commanded o f Benjamin Lincoln to quell the rebellion. As
Shaysite bands closed courts, harassed local retailers, and directly challenged the General
Court throughout 1787, Lincoln and his semi-privately funded army chased rebels down
until dispersing them at Springfield, and then at Petersham, in February, 1787. While
Shaysites continued to harass government officials and retailers through the winter and

46 For a concise discussion of Shays’ Rebellion situated within an English Marxist tradition, see David P.
Szatmary, Shays ’Rebellion: The Making o f an Agrarian Insurgency, (Amherst, MA, 1980). For more
recent interpretations, see Robert Gross, ed., In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial o f an Agrarian Rebellion
(Charlottesville, Virginia, 1993).
47 Szatmary, 92-98.
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into the spring, cooperation between Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, and
Connecticut governments eventually extinguished the rebellion by summer, 1787.
Shays’ Rebellion was an attack upon merchant rule in Boston and a call to
Revolutionary traditions o f rebellion. A s government policies and stringent debt laws led
to the seizure o f farms, protestors resurrected an image o f the free and independent
farmer as a symbol o f American liberties with which to justify their opposition. To many
in western Massachusetts, the debt crisis represented the efforts o f a non-productive,
quasi-elitist commercial segment o f society to steal away the hard earned property
accumulated through productive agricultural work that fed the whole commonweahL
Eastern commercial and landed interests, who on the other hand “rarely. . .felt
comfortably in command [as they] anxiously observed the spreading populist tide,”
feared lost property, anarchy, and chaos should Shays win.48 Given the harshness o f the
post-war depression, Shaysite sentiments might also find fertile ground in coastal areas
facing the combined effects o f economic recession, pressures to pay back debts to British
creditors, the collapse o f the French trade, and tensions with the former ally over access
to coastal fisheries.49
In response to Shays’ challenge o f Boston’s mercantile elite, the BMS began
making public processions and appearances with increasing confidence as care-takers for
the town’s maritime interests. Beginning in 1786, the BMS made its most regular public
appearance through annual “feasts” that coincided with their annual meetings. In these

48 Stephen E. Patterson, “The Federalist Reaction to Shays Rebellion,” in Gross, In Debt to Shays, 104.
49 Stephen E. Patterson, “The Federalist Reaction to Shays Rebellion,” in Gross, In Debt to Shays, 108-113.
While Patterson sees the economic frustration as fuelling a nascent Federalist appeal, such economic
hardships were likely to have affected Boston’s maritime workers in different ways.
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annual dinners, the BMS elected officers and inducted new members. In the past, these
affairs had taken place in the private meeting rooms that the society rented in local
coffeehouses. In November, 1786, however, the society voted that three members form a
committee “to manage the [BMS public dinner] and that they publish the proceedings o f
this annual Meeting, with a list o f the new members also the standing vote o f the society
relative to the communications o f observations on coasts and Bays.” The committee was
instructed to “invite such gentlemen to the Feast as they may think proper.”50
In 1787, the Marine Society also expanded its charitable work beyond members
and their families. Approached by Rev. John Clarke, Dr. John Warren, and Dr. Aaron
Dexter o f the Humane Society o f the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts, the Marine
Society agreed to help guide the Humane Society’s efforts in building three shelters for
shipwrecked mariners in more remote areas surrounding Boston harbor. These shelters
promised some protection for shipwrecked mariners until help could arrive. In
responding to the request, the Marine Society stated, “[B]eing in a degree the
Representatives o f the Maritime part o f the community[, we] feel a very warm sense o f
the benevolent design o f the Humane Society & return their most cordial thanks for their
truly human[e] attention to so exposed & valuable part o f the citizens o f this state as the
seamen are [sic] most certainly are.”51
In addition to public feasts and expanded charitable work, the BMS also united
with local civic leaders to demonstrate the stability o f the current rule. For three years
beginning in 1788, the Society invited prominent clergy to their annual dinners, including

50 BMS Minutes, Nov. 7, 1786.
51 BMS Minutes, Jan. 2,1787.
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such prominent figures as Reverend Joseph Eckley, Jeremy Belknap, and Jonathan
Clarke. In 1790, invitations went out to Reverend Oliver Everett, Reverend Samuel
West, and again to Jonathan Clarke. By inviting clergy, the BMS sought to emphasize
their apolitical public service by uniting with other non-political leaders, who in theory
rose above worldly concerns to guide the community in spiritual matters. The invitations
to clergy ceased suddenly in 1791, but through the next fifteen years, the Society’s annual
public dinners symbolically united their stewardship o f port affairs with other community
oriented service organizations.
Several key features emerge from the Society’s shift into the public light. First,
and most obvious, was their intention to publish their proceedings. As the society
embraced more port functions through the 1780s, the Society’s publication o f their work
demonstrated their interest, authority, and efforts in maritime affairs, and highlighted
local captains skilled and experienced enough to be granted membership in the
prestigious organization. Secondly, in voting on navigational observations in public, the
BMS rested their authority upon their continual work with vocational science. Unlike
politicians, whom many saw by the mid-1780s as corrupt and self-serving, the BMS’s
standing stemmed from their interests in promoting the collective good through
navigational science. Thus, their authority rested outside politics, granting them the
appearance o f truly looking out for the common interest as good Republicans without
self-serving ambitions. Third, the BMS tied their work to others’ interests in the town by
inviting prominent gentlemen who they thought fit to share their prestige. Such
invitations linked their interests intimately with Boston leadership and highlighted the
BMS’s interests in civic service and public duty. Finally, coastal shelters also
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demonstrated a public effort by Boston community leaders to care for mariners engaged
in trade. Consequently, such efforts reveal a concerted attempt to publicly demonstrate a
government responsive to the needs o f a maritime working community. As part o f this
effort, the BMS sided itself with the religious and civic leaders o f the town to diffuse any
potential unrest among unemployed mariners suffering through a deep commercial
depression.
The BMS’s responses revealed the group’s perception o f their role within the
community. During a post-Revolutionary period where new leaders and new
governments emerged, the BMS used their navigational work to help bolster their
position as “fathers o f the maritime people.” Like genteel politicians o f the time, the
BMS held onto beliefs that disinterestedness and natural talents set some individuals
above others and above petty faction, and allowed them to govern with the interests o f the
whole community in mind.
Such patriarchal ideas o f social authority date from before the Revolution, when
gentility, noblesse oblige, and elite status clearly marked those who ruled from those who
were ruled. Yet, as Alfred Young, Robert Gross, and Alan Taylor have explained, the
Revolution challenged this system. Young argues that the Revolution empowered
common men from humble means to see themselves as equals to their hitherto social
betters.52 Taylor argues that politics in the Early Republic forced paternalist elites to find
new ways to make traditional forms o f paternalist authority relevant in a new, egalitarian
republic. Faced by upstart nouveaux riches who used new-found wealth to buy into
traditional positions o f authority, or by ungentlemanly politicians presenting themselves

52 Alfred Young, “George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742-1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of
the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 38 (1981), 561-623.
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as “friends o f the people,” would-be leaders in the early Republic could no longer simply
rely upon social inferiors willingly deferring to their social betters as natural leaders. As
Taylor wrote, maintaining gentility, and hence an older form o f social authority, “was
such a chronic and demanding preoccupation precisely because there was sufficient
social mobility both to produce a steady stream o f nouveaux riches and to threaten the old
elite with genteel poverty.”53
The BMS’s justification for authority over Boston's maritime affairs rested on its,
charitable works and public service. By demonstrating their benevolence, they, like other
individuals seeking to fill power vacuums left by the Revolution, sought to claim a
greater role over the port’s affairs than they had enjoyed before the war. In addition, their
public demonstrations also highlighted the benevolent and responsive government that
Massachusetts’s residents currently enjoyed. In the face o f Shays’ agrarian challenge,
the BMS sought to show that the status quo was responsive to the needs o f the port’s
maritime workers. While in many ways the BMS was preaching to the converted, their
actions also reflected a fear that the challenges presented by western agrarians might find
resonance among an economically distressed port workforce with a tradition o f
revolutionary activity. Depending not only upon merchants, but also upon maritime
workers, it was in the BM S’s best interests to present to the people an organization
seeking to look out for the common good o f all mariners and port residents. While never
publicly denouncing Shaysite rebels, members presented themselves as concerned

53 Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier o fthe Early American
Republic (New York, 1995), 143. For the failure of Cooper in establishing himself as a “farther of the
people,” and on die successes o f “friends o f the people,” see also pp. 256-281.
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members o f a maritime community who were responsive to the needs o f a port city fallen
upon hard economic times.
The BMS also defended the many benefits Boston’s government secured for the
maritime workers and the maritime community. The Society’s actions also resemble the
unity and idealism characteristic o f classical republican citizenship, as well as an attempt
to legitimate newly established authority. Rather than supporting one side o f the conflict
over the other, the BMS sought to rally support for the system o f overseas trade and
commerce that they believed offered the best path for inclusive prosperity, well-being,
and stability.

After Shays’ rebellion, the Society continued their public demonstrations o f
authority into the 1790s. As public dinners celebrated the society’s leadership within the
town, the BMS’s funeral processions further demonstrated a deceased member’s service
to the community. In such processions, the tables were turned, with the town expected to
show their thanks for distinguished service. In July 1790, for example, the Society voted
to attend the funeral o f the deceased treasurer, Nathaniel Patten. More than just attending
a gravesite service, however, the Society agreed to attend in procession, “from his late
dwelling house in Roxbury, & that carriages be provided for the members at the expense
o f the society.”54 While other members did not receive such lavish attention—Patten had
been a member since 1752 and died holding the office o f treasurer—members’ deaths
allowed the Society and the town to publicly mourn one who had served their
community. James Bowdoin’s funeral in November 1790 also gave the Society an

54 BMS Minutes, July 6,1790.
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opportunity to show their civic dedication to the town, as the Society assembled to pay
due respects to the deceased former governor.55 The Marine Society placed great
importance upon funeral processions, for paying final respects, but also in showing a
unified face in their service to the community. Furthermore, funeral processions were not

optional, and as had been the case from the 1750s, members failing to attend faced fines,
censure and other disciplinary measures. For example, in 1770, the Society voted that
members failing to attend a brother's funeral were to be fined £10 (old tender) for the
absence. As public dinners allowed the Society to pledge themselves to the town,
funerals allowed the town to pay public respects to those who had served.
President George Washington’s visit to the northeast in 1789 marked a high point
for the BMS public presence in civic events. With towns and cities from New York to
Portsmouth, New Hampshire preparing lavish celebrations for the visiting general and
first president, the visit allowed each town to present in a ritualized form the most
important leaders. In these preparations, Boston was no different than other cities. In
October 1789, the presidential tour received a formal welcome from the inhabitants o f
Boston. Led by a military contingent commanded by Col. John Bradford, light infantry,
fusiliers, artillery, and martial music led the parade through Boston’s streets. The civilian
authorities followed, with local selectmen, the Town Clerk, deputy sheriffs, sheriffs, the
Council, the Lieutenant Governor and finally the Marshall o f Massachusetts District
building the suspense for crowds waiting to see Washington. On “an elegant white horse,
attended by Major Jackson, and Mr. Lee, his secretaries,” Washington followed the
massed civilian and military officials. Behind Washington marched Vice President John

55 Columbian Centinel, Nov. 10,1790.
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Adams, Governor Bowdoin, and various town officers, rounding out the civil service
segment o f the procession. After the political officials came representatives o f the town’s
various trades. Signifying their importance to the whole community, merchants and
traders carried a flag with a device o f “a quay with a ship coming in, and another loading.
Motto— Generous Commerce binds the nations by a golden chain.”
The Boston Marine Society followed the merchants and traders, signifying their
status just beneath the wealthiest members o f the community. Led by member Samuel
Dunn, the body marched before the town’s other master mariners, a position symbolizing
the BMS’s status as self-styled representatives o f the maritime interest o f the town. The
Society’s flag carried a symbolic device— “a ship passing the Light-House, and a boat
going to her”—that highlighted the importance o f navigational improvement to the
organization’s success. Behind the Marine Society marched revenue officers, naval
officers, “preceded by Dr. Eustis” o f the Humane Society, and the “Artisans, Tradesmen
and Manufacturers, alphabetically arranged.”56
The Society’s position represented the m ingling o f science, commerce and
politics that the BMS had attained by the late 1780s. As it had since the 1750s, safe
navigation stood at the heart o f the BMS’s identity, a concern symbolized by the ship
entering Boston Harbor and warmly greeted by a pilot to safely finish the voyage. At the
same time, such interests also allowed the society to march in a public demonstration o f
social organization and hierarchy. Historians David Waldstreicher, Susan Davis and
Simon P. Newman have argued that such parades reified the political and social structure

56 The Massachusetts Centinel, Oct 28,1789.
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o f the community for all to see.57 In Washington’s visit, the BMS stood as intermediaries
between mariners on one hand, and merchants, civil servants, and government officials
on the other. Rather than being geared toward partisan politics, the Marine Society’s
public events in the 1780s and 1790s represented the stability, effectiveness, and ability
o f the town’s merchant and maritime leadership. Like that o f many other gentlemen
politicians o f the time, the Society’s civic mindedness was designed not only to help the
city, but also to demonstrate their concern for the collective good. In this sense, they
illustrated the role that vocational science could play within the new republic. As other
men o f science and formal scientific societies adapted their skills to the new nation, the
BMS applied the vocational and the scientific side o f their work to not only help make
Boston’s mariners safer, but also to restore the port’s trade and aid its maritime families.
Rather than engaging in formal politics, the BMS’s civic duties, and public
processions indicated their desire to stabilize the rule o f the mercantile elite during a
period o f post-revolutionary economic hardship. The Marine Society’s work to restore
trade, regulate pilots, ease the plight o f the maritime unemployed, and aid in the
construction o f shelters for the shipwrecked between 1783 and 1789 formed a contrasting
image to that presented by western Massachusetts farmers protesting mercantile elite rule
during the Shays’ rebellion between 1786 and 1787.

The BMS’s combination o f vocational science and politics went beyond the local
and state arenas. Following Shays’ Rebellion, debates over the ratification o f the Federal

57 See Susan G. Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia
(Philadelphia, 1986); David Waldstreicher, In the Midst ofPerpetual Fetes: The Making o fAmerican
Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill, 1997); Simon P. Newman, Parades and the Politics o f the Street:
Festive Culture in the Early Republic (Philadelphia, 1997).
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Constitution again split the commonwealth and the city o f Boston in 1788 and 1789.
Like their response to Shays’ Rebellion, the BMS lent its natural authority as father o f the
maritime people to legitimate a new Federal government during the late 1780s and early
1790s. While not formally political, the BMS’s public service carried political
implications that blended science and politics in such a way as to support Federalists and
Federalist policies. In exchange, the BMS called upon their contacts within the Federal
government to support and promote maritime improvements designed to ensure the safety
and well-being o f Boston’s mariners. Beginning with technical information, but later
expanding to lighthouses, marine hospitals, and coastal surveys, the BMS used their
experience, expertise, and local prestige as navigators and mariners to help promote
Federally funded navigational improvements and secure Federal support for other BMS
concerns. A s the BMS and Federalist officers worked together, both parties
demonstrated to an uncertain population that a centralized and distant Federal
government was capable o f ruling in accordance with local concerns with respect to local
conditions. Furthermore, a strong, centralized Federal government brought more
resources to bear on local maritime developments than previous local support systems.
Consequently, maritime developments, fueled by Federal power but directed by the BMS,
demonstrated the benign nature o f the new government’s rule, and undermined
Revolutionary era fears o f a grasping, distant regime that might threaten newly won
liberty.
Political debates surrounding the ratification o f the Federal Constitution in 1787
and 1788 politicized navigation and navigational science, and inserted both into a wider
debate over the nature o f power, the structure o f the American political economy, and
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how new centers o f authority would establish legitimacy and extend their powers. The
complexity o f the issues that surrounded navigation and maritime improvements during
this period requires extensive discussion and highlights how navigation fit within
competing visions o f the American political and economic future.
While the Marine Society worked to prop up Boston’s shipping industry and step
in to fill administrative voids left after independence, national politics suffered from
confusion and inactivity under the Articles o f Confederation. Developed under duress
during the Revolution, the Confederation Congresses managed to govern in the face o f
the war. With peace however, and the removal o f a common enemy, Congress foiled to
provide adequate national leadership.58 After four years o f centralized confusion and
inaction, a convention o f delegates met in Philadelphia in May o f 1787 to revise the
Articles o f Confederation to make the national government more effective. In
September, 1787, the convention presented to the nation not a revised Articles o f
Confederation, but an entirely new Federal Constitution that granted a central
government much wider powers than Congress had previously enjoyed. Such an
apparent coup-de-etat polarized American politics and set the stage for contentious
ratification conventions that met state by state in the Fall o f 1787. At the heart o f these
debates sat new divisions in American society over the strength and nature o f the
American national government.59

58 For an in depth discussion of the failings of the Articles of Confederation government, see Wood,
Creation, ch. 10.
59 George Athan Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican Statesman, (New York, 1976),
68 .
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In the past, some historians have assumed that the strong pro-trade faction among
supporters o f the Federal Constitution translated into ironclad support for the document
among seaport towns, with opposition emanating from inland agrarian com m unities.60
The specifics o f ratification, however, suggest that port communities, especially Boston,
were not solidly behind Federalist plans, at least on a popular level Furthermore,
Federalist supporters o f the new constitution were aware that Massachusetts would play
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early developments in the convention itself suggested that the state would not be easily
won over. In September, delegate Elbridge Gerry o f Marblehead, Massachusetts refused
to sign the document, publicly announcing his opposition. Gerry feared that the strong
centralized government the document created would split Massachusetts and lead to civil
war. On one side, Gerry saw a party “devoted to Democracy, the w orst. . . o f all political
evils.” On the other, he saw a landed elite “as violent in the opposite extreme.”62
Inspired by Gerry, Massachusetts Antifederalists, mostly from western lands, saw the
new centralized government that emerged from the Philadelphia Convention as a
reincarnation o f the British tyranny in America.63

60 See Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation o fthe Constitution o fthe United States (New York,
1941), Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History o fMassachusetts, 1783-1860 (1921; Boston, 1961),
Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans o fMassachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic (Cambridge,
Mass., 1964), and to some extent, Alan Taylor,, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary
Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill, 1990).
61 Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics o f the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago, 1964), 187200.
62 Gerry, as quoted in Billias, Elbridge Gerry, 199-200. Samuel Banister Harding, The Contest Over the
Ratification o f the Federal Constitution in the State o fMassachusetts (Cambridge, Mass., 1896), 19.
63 Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics o fthe Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago, 1964), ch. 3.
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Boston was home to a strong Antifederalist contingent Writing in Boston, the
opponents o f the new constitution attacked the document on the same grounds as Boston
attacked crown rule in the 1770s. One writer calling himself “Jan de Wit” argued that the
new government was aristocratic at its core, “calculated to find employment for men o f
ambition, and to furnish means o f sporting with the sacred principles o f human nature.”64
“A Republican Federalist” argued that the document “established a precedent.. .for
building on its ruins a ccm pleal system o f despotism,” and would establish propertied
wealth as the foundation for representation and suffrage.65
Ratification procedures in Boston further revealed divisions within the
community over the document. Geiry him self remained quiet, at least until October 18th,
1787 when his letter o f opposition was published to significant attention.66 Within the
city, such important leaders as Samuel Adams, James Warren, Nathan Dane, James
Winthrop, Benjamin Austin, and Samuel Osgood all sided against it. Most significantly,
Governor John Hancock, while chair o f the ratification convention, remained silent.67 In
January 1788, when the delegates assembled to deliberate, Antifederalists dominated the
group with a majority o f around 40. Through the deliberations, Samuel Adams and
Hancock, both locally popular among Boston’s maritime community, emerged as key
swing delegates, and ultimately emerged publicly supporting the document after political

64 American Herald, Nov. 19,1787, as in Harding, Ratification, 27.
65 Massachusetts Centinel, Jan. 12, 1788, as in Harding, Ratification, 30.
66 Harding, Ratification, 18-19.
67 Main, Antifederalists, 200-201.
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arm-twisting and enticing promises o f future political support68 In the end, the document
passed, though, according to historian Jackson Turner Main, “It seems clear that a
majority, though not a large one, o f the citizens o f Massachusetts opposed the
Constitution when it was ratified, and it is probable that a majority continued to oppose
it.”69

Recent investigations by Doron Ben-Atar and Barbara Oberg suggest that
Federalist rule, even after ratification, was not as uncontested as had been previously
believed. Rather than an uncontested and fully legitimate government, Ben-Atar and
Oberg argue that, “The success o f the experiment in nation making depended upon the
Federalists’ abilities to bind the loyalty o f former British subjects to the idea o f the nation
and to its governing elite.”70 To accomplish this, Federalists had to respond to the
political realities o f post-Revolutionary America: “The Federalists interpreted the
Revolutionary mandate to mean the creation o f a representative government responsive
to, yet independent oft the popular will. They were nationalists who respected local
autonomy. They were aristocrats competing in a new political world for the votes o f
ordinary individuals.”71 Rogers M. Smith argues that Federalists were also “acutely
aware that their fledgling government faced stiff challenges from every direction. Many
Americans doubted that the new national institutions were any good, much less deserving
o f their highest loyalties. Communal attachments were overwhelmingly local, extending

68 Harding, Ratification, 96-97. For a more complete narrative of the political maneuverings around
Massachusetts’ ratification of the Constitution, see Main, Antifederalists, 204-208, from which die
preceding narrative is derived. See also Harding, Ratification, 83-89.
69 Main, Antifederalists, 201-209.
70 Doron Ben-Atar and Barbara B. Oberg, eds., The Federalists Reconsidered (Charlottesville, 1998), 4.
71 Ben-Atar and Oberg, Federalists, 8.
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at most to state or regional identities.”72 Consequently, it is clear that while the
Federalists won the ratification in Massachusetts, national Federalist leaders could not
simply ignore local Boston concerns and impose a distant will upon the town’s
constituencies. Politically, commercially and economically, the port town was too
important, and had proved too contested, to assume that it would follow Federalist leads.
Alter ratification, the port town continued active resistance to Federalist policies
and candidates. As late as January, 1789, Antifcdcralists continued to control the
Massachusetts House o f Representatives.73 Even after losing the House, continued
depression in the maritime trades helped Antifederalists gain increased support from
Boston’s maritime community, and allowed Senator Benjamin Austin to use this crisis to
attack Federalists and their policies.74 As coastal towns from Nantucket to Gloucester
petitioned the General Court for relief in 1790, Austin authored a report calling for
Congressional action to improve the nation’s maritime trades. Fearing European
retribution in other trading markets, however, other Massachusetts delegates supported
weak Federal legislation that did next to nothing to help Massachusetts’ fishermen. As
William Welch claims, “the Federalists o f Massachusetts were holding the fishermen o f
the commonwealth hostage to the more important demands o f a mercantile elite.”75
Largely spurred on by Austin and the collapse in the maritime trades, Antifederalists
continued to exercise significant clout among Boston residents as late as 1792. While
they could do nothing about Federal legislation, Boston’s working community united to

72 Rogers M. Smith, “Constructing American National Identity. Strategies of the Federalists,” in The
Federalists Reconsidered, ed. Doron Ben-Atar, and Barbara B. Oberg (Charlottesville, 1998), 21.
73 Main, Antifederalists, 208-209.
74 William Welch, “The Virtuous Republic of Benjamin Austin, Jr.,” Locus, 8 (1995), 32.
75 Welch, “Virtuous Republic,” 32-34.
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oppose Federalists in other areas. In a town meeting discussing a reform o f Boston’s
police force, for example, John Quincy Adams reported that Austin “with the utmost
degree o f vehemence and absurdity,” and using a long speech that was to Adams a
“farrago o f nonsense and folly,” managed successfully to oppose the acts that the
Federalists were supporting. “Seven hundred men, who looked as if they had been
collected from all the Jails on the continent, with Ben Austin like another Jack Cade at
their head outvoted by their numbers all the combined weight o f Wealth, Abilities, and
Integrity o f the Town

From the whole Event I have derived a confirmation o f my

contempt for democracy as a Government.”76
The strength o f Massachusetts Antifederalists posed challenges to new Federalist
officers, such as Secretary o f the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who were seeking to
stabilize and legitimate the new government. As Austin and other Antifederalists worked
to develop solid opposition to Federalist policies, Ham ilton began to use his position as
Secretary o f the Treasury to sway the state to the Federalist camp. He first began shoring
up Federalist support in Massachusetts by doling out Federal positions in the state to
Federalist place-men. According to Carl E. Prince, “Among the primary dispensers o f
[Federalist] ideology were the [customs] collectors and, in the larger ports, the naval
officers and surveyors o f customs.”77 These officers, many reporting to Hamilton’s close
ally and Port Collector for Boston, Benjamin Lincoln, “anchored the local Federalist
parties in a dozen o f the commonwealth’s most populous towns and cities. Using their
influence and positions with a full measure o f commitment, these cadremen formed the

76 John Quincy Adams, as quoted in Welch, “Virtuous Republic,” 34.
77 Carl E. Prince, The Federalists and the Origins o fthe U. S. Civil Service, (New York, 1977), 23.
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backbone o f the Federalist establishment in the harbor towns.”78 For Hamilton, and his
concerns for Massachusetts’ support after the ratification, the customs service and the
other numerous positions falling under the Secretary o f the Treasury’s influence
represented a fountain o f patronage to be doled out for political support and information.
Hamilton soon realized other avenues to shore up political support for the
Federalist administration in the contentious state. In 1789 Elbridge Gerry, returning to
Congress after losing the ratification battles in Boston, proposed a bill calling for Federal
assumption o f lighthouses, buoys and public piers—issues that coastal communities had
long held as important local affairs. The bill, passed in August, called for Federal
assumption o f all lighthouses, beacons, and public piers from local control In exchange
for ceding the land on which the light stations stood, Gerry’s bill provided for Federal
payment o f maintenance, upkeep and staffing for a one-year period, with the option for
renewal.79
Because o f their utility, lighthouses and beacons were politically popular among
residents in coastal towns. For example, in July 1791, William Bentley o f Salem
recorded “Yesterday the intended Beacon at Baker’s Island was raised by a large and
jovial party o f our Mariners. It is to be forty feet in height. Every exertion o f this nature
is to be considered as favorable to the public happiness, & as a source o f our good hopes

78 Prince, Federalists, 22.
79 John Lauritz Larson had noted that this was the last national-scale internal improvement bill to sail
through Congress. Subsequent bills faced stiff resistance before the 1820s, as many improvements were
seen as fonts of political and financial patronage, largely as a result of this bill’s subsequent history. See
John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement. National Public Works and the promise o fPopular
Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill, 2001), 45-55.
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for the improvement o f our navigation.”80 Yet lighthouses had long posed a problem for
Massachusetts communities. Since 1713, when local Boston residents petitioned the
General Court for a lighthouse at the mouth o f Massachusetts Bay, lighthouse
maintenance and support were a haphazard and local affair.81 While receiving some
public funds for construction, lights were often staffed and maintained through duties
levied on vessels entering the harbor, their upkeep depending on the amount o f traffic
entering the port and not on a regular schedule o f support.82 Furthermore lighthouse
keepers were often distracted by other occupations such as cattle grazing or pilot services,
and faced sporadic government payment o f expenses.83 Despite the haphazard nature o f
support, the need and public benefit o f lighthouses spurred numerous stations on the coast
through the eighteenth century. Massachusetts’ residents constructed lighthouses on
Nantucket in 1746, in Plymouth in 1768, and o ff Cape Ann in 1771.84 In Newburyport,
local merchants and the Newburyport Marine Society joined forces in 1783 and
developed rules and signals for beacons marking the mouth o f the Merrimack River that

80 William Bentley, Diary o f William Bentley, comp. Alice G. Waters (4 vols., Gloucester, Mass., 1962),
281.
81 The practice o f petitioning colonial governments for lighthouse construction was not limited to
Massachusetts. In both New York and New Hampshire, local residents appealed to Crown governors for
lighthouse construction. In New Hampshire, die Portsmouth Marine Society actively appealed to the Royal
government for support for the Portsmouth light that was erected in 1771. See Francis Ross Holland,
America’s Lighthouses: Their Illustrated History Since 1716 (Brattleboro, VT, 1972), 15; Ronald Quilici,
“The Portsmouth Marine Society: Social Diversity in a Colonial Maritime Community,’’ Historical New
Hampshire, 30 (1975), 101-112; and Dennis Noble, Lighthouses & Keepers: The U.S. Lighthouse Service
and Its Legacy (Annapolis, 1997), 5-7.
82 See Holland, America’s Lighthouses', Noble, Lighthouses & Keepers, and Malcolm Willoughby,
Lighthouses o f New England (Boston, 1929) for die local nature of lighthouse support.
83 The intermittent, yet consistent petitions of Robert Ball for bade pay and cost reimbursements represent
the haphazard attention given to lighthouse maintenance during the colonial period. See Robert Ball’s
petitions to Massachusetts General Court, vol. 64,26-28,54,197,202-203,239,340; vol. 66,14-15,254255 (Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Mass.).
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Holland, America’s Lighthouses, 16. Willoughby, Lighthouses o fNew England, 153-156.
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informed masters o f safe times to cross the river bar, and merchants which types o f
vessels were entering the harbor.85 Yet new light stations suffered from the same
haphazard support system as Boston’s light, and consequently, were less reliable than
would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the local nature o f lighthouse construction left
unmarked the most dangerous areas that threatened shipping but stood far from a local
population center —areas such as Cape Cod and Nantucket Shoals—despite their
importance to shipping.86 As a result, while local harbors were building light stations,
areas that needed them most received no attention.
With lighthouses in such a state, Federal control over these important stations
offered Hamilton great political benefits. They allowed Hamilton to expand support for
the government by doling out Federal patronage through lighthouse maintenance and
supply contracts to local Federalist supporters. In Massachusetts, with six o f the nation’s
ten lighthouses, such patronage was not inconsequential87 Lighthouses also allowed
Hamilton to promote his economic plans. Federally supported lighthouses reduced
hazards to foreign and local shipping, thereby promoting foreign commerce with
American ports.
While Federal assumption o f lighthouses promised great boons to the Secretary
and his political allies, the move did not lack dangers. In a state already tom by a hotly
contested ratification debate and continued Antifederalist opposition on a local level,
Federal assumption o f lighthouses radically changed local traditions and sources o f

85 William H. Bayley and Oliver O. Jones, History ofthe Marine Society o fNewburyport, Massachusetts
([Newburyport, Mass.], 1906), 36-38.
86 Noble, Lighthouses & Keepers, 5.
87 Harold C. Syrett, ed., Papers o fAlexander Hamilton, (27 vols., New York, 1961-1967),VI, 43.
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patronage in port towns. Lighthouses had been traditionally staffed by local residents
familiar with the waters and shipping traffic o f their respective ports, and as New
Hampshire’s case revealed, some were not eager to hand over such facilities to Federal
controL Lighthouse-keeping positions and contracts, therefore, represented important
sources o f patronage to local governments.
In addition, ceding even a small portion o f local land to Federal control set a
dangerous precedent regarding local property and Federal authority. In a hesitant New
Hampshire, for example, the state legislature only ceded the Portsmouth lighthouse land
to Federal control on condition that the state could reclaim the land should the Federal
government fail in its navigational duties, and that all state writs, warrants and executions
retain jurisdiction on the ceded land.88 As a result, to many Antifederalists, land cessions
might appear as the thin edge o f a wedge by which the Federal government wrested away
local power, authority, and property.
Consequently, while promising great returns, Hamilton had to tread lightly in
extending Federal control to local lighthouses. In January, 1790, Ham ilton recommended
that all the current light house keepers be retained.89 Contracts for lighthouse oil and
supplies, however, were too important to simply leave to local controL
As however it is the intention o f the Legislature, that the expenditures for these
establishments, should be conducted on the spot, it seems advisable for this and
other reasons, which will occur, that in the distant States, there should be some
other persons than the immediate Superintendents o f the Light house connected
with them in the business. As a temporary arrangement for this purpose, the
Secretary wou’d propose that the Superintendents. . . In Massachusetts [be put
under the supervision] o f the Collector o f Boston.90
88 Albert Stillman Batchellor and Henry Harrison Metcalfe, Law,s o fNew Hampshire Including Public and
Private Acts, Resolves, Votes, etc, (10 vols., Manchester, New Hampshire, 1904-1922), V, 685-686.
89 Syrett, ed, Hamilton Papers, VI, 45.
90 Syrett ed, Hamilton Papers, VL, 43-49.
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While respecting traditional local patronage, Hamilton also ensured that lighthouse
assumption carried benefits to new supporters.
In this political tension between Federal and local patronage, the BMS emerged as
a group through which Hamilton could extend Federal power without arousing local
animosity. Wary o f arousing Antifederalist fear o f a grasping central government, it was
the politically astute Benjamin Lincoln who approached the Boston Marine Society in
1789 for information to help the transition o f lighthouses to Federal controL A retired
generaL Lincoln emerged from the ratification conflict as a Federalist with a moderate
bent For his support for Federalist policies, Hamilton named him to the post o f Collector
for the Port o f Boston in 1789. But the customs officer had also proven able to work
between arch-Federalists, such as Stephen Higginson and Jonathan Jackson, and popular
leaders such as John Hancock, Theodore Sedgwick, and John Adams. Politically subtle
and loyal, Lincoln came to be an important source o f information for Hamilton about
political conditions in Massachusetts.91
When Lincoln received Hamilton’s circular letter in October, 1789 requesting that
his officers collect information about repairs o f lighthouses, beacons and buoys in their
jurisdictions, he immediately consulted with the Boston Marine Society as the
organization most immediately familiar with the Boston’s port. In early November,
Lincoln presented the letter to the membership o f the Boston Marine Society. The

91 Prince, Federalists, 27.
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Society formed a committee to respond to Hamilton’s queries, and “give him such
information, as shall conduce to the public benefit.”92
Lincoln’s initial approach to the Marine Society laid the foundation for a series o f
other consultations between 1789 and 1798. In October, 1790, the BMS held a special
meeting to respond to Lincoln’s request for recommended dimensions for a revenue
cutter then under construction in Newburyport93 The next month, the Society voted
Lincoln membership.94 During this period, Lincoln’s membership and informal contact
with the Society helped maintain the relationship between government and the BMS. In
December, 1796, when the federal government finally agreed to build a light on Cape
Cod, Lincoln approached the BMS again asking their expertise regarding the station’s
design and placement. The following August, the BMS formed a committee to advise
Lincoln on buoy placement and construction. In September, 1797, Lincoln asked BMS
advice in establishing the light pattern for the new light, and in October, the society
formed a committee to aid fellow member and revenue cutter commander John Foster
Williams to develop sailing directions for the new lighthouse. The BMS then published
the directions in January, 1798. As early as December, 1796, Lincoln had worked closely
enough with the Marine society to report to Ham ilton that, “more information is I think to
be collected from [the Boston Marine Society] in this business [o f lighthouse design] than
from any other source.”95

92 BMS Minutes, Nov. 3,1789.
93 BMS Minutes, Oct. 12, 1790.
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BMS minutes, Nov. 2, 1790.

95 Benjamin Lincoln to Alexander Hamilton, Dec. 7,1796, letterbook, B. Lincoln Papers (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston, Mass.).
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Such support, however, did not come free, and almost as soon as Lincoln began
consulting with the BMS, the BMS used their connections to the new Federal government
to push for more marine development projects. The very first communication from the
Marine Society to Hamilton carried with it a request for Federal responses to local
concerns. In their November 16th, 1789 response to Hamilton’s October 5* Treasury
Circular, the BMS informed the secretary that, “A very respectable Body o f the
Merchants o f this Metropolis [have] thought proper to communicate to us, the Members
o f the Boston Marine Society, a Copy o f their proposed application to the President o f the
United States on the subject o f the Pilotage o f this Bay and Harbour.”96 Without any
subservience or deference, the BMS informed Hamilton, “We find ourselves compell’d
by M otives o f Publick Duty to observe to you Sir, that a Reform is necessary in the
Pilotage, &c. o f the Harbour.”97
While Hamilton’s response has not been found, the Society began coupling their
responses to requests for information with further demands from Federal authorities 98 In
their special meeting in October, 1790, for example, the BMS not only recommended
dimensions for revenue cutters as per Lincoln’s request, but also formed a committee to
develop plans for the situating, housing, and funding o f a marine hospital for sick and
disabled mariners.99 Two weeks later, at the same time as voting Benjamin Lincoln as an
honorary member, the Society drafted a petition to Congress for Federal support for

96 Syrett, ed, Hamilton Papers, V, 517,518 note 1. For information about Hamilton’s interests see
Treasury circular Oct. 5,1789.
97 Syrett, ed, Hamilton Papers, V, 517-518.
98 Syrett, ed, Hamilton Papers, V, 568.
99 BMS Minutes, Oct. 12,1790.
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marine hospitals. In January, 1791, the Society sent its petition to Congress, where it was
referred to Hamilton for consideration.
The BMS petition for marine hospitals offered Hamilton another opportunity to
bolster American overseas trade while showing the responsive nature o f Federal power.
For Hamilton, marine hospitals represented a key element in maintaining healthy
mariners for the American merchant service and, in times o f war, naval service. “The
establishment o f one or more Hospitals in the United States is a measure desirable on
various accounts. The interests o f humanity are concerned in it, from its tendency to
protect from want and misery, a very useful, and, for the most part, very needy class o f
the Community.”100 Furthermore, Federal support for marine hospitals may help entice
trained mariners away from other nations’ merchant services. “The interests o f
navigation and trade are also concerned in it, from the protection and relief, which it is
calculated to afford to the same class; conducing to attract seamen to the country.”101
Marine Hospitals also afforded Hamilton a chance to show Federal benevolence to local
communities in responding to their immediate needs and concerns. Hamilton saw
hospitals as fulfilling some o f the social problems facing high risk maritime labor: “The
benefit o f the fund ought to extend, not only to disabled and decrepid [szc] seamen, but to
the widows and children o f those who may have been killed or drowned, in the course o f
the service as seamen.”102 In addition, the hospitals could also offer continued aid to its
former patients: “It will probably be found expedient, besides the reception and

100Syrett, ed., Hamilton Papers, XI, 295.
101 Syrett, ed., Hamilton Papers, XL, 295.
102 Syrett, ed., Hamilton Papers, XI, 295.
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accommodation o f the parties entitled, at any hospital which may be instituted to
authorizing the granting pensions, in aid o f those who may be in condition, partly to
procure a subsistence from their own labor. There may be cases, in which this mode o f
relief may be more accommodating to the individuals, and, at the same time, more
econom ical”103 But the Marine Society did not get all that it wanted from their petition
to Congress about Marine Hospitals. In 1791, when they first formed a committee to
select a site, the committee had chosen a site in Charlestown, Massachusetts. Hamilton,
however, wanting such a font o f patronage closer to his own location, argued for the first
hospital to be situated in Washington, then in Virginia.104
The delayed response to their request for a marine hospital which sat in Congress
until 1798, taught the Marine Society that Hamilton’s advocacy was not enough to get
their wishes met by the new government. While they waited for Hamilton to present their
petition to Congress, the BM S began pressing for more marine improvements, calling
upon more political contacts than the Secretary o f the Treasury alone. Drawing upon
their long-standing relationship with the Massachusetts executive dating back to the
1760s, the society asked the Governor for aid in petitioning Congress for a lighthouse on
Cape Cod in February, 1792. In pressing for the governor’s support, the BMS also joined
forces with the Humane Society o f the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts and other
marine societies in the area. On February 4th, 1792, the Marine Society at Salem
contacted the Newburyport Marine Society to see if they would help pressure government

103 Syrett, ed., Hamilton Papers, XL, 295.
104The case for marine hospitals sat in Congress until 1798, when the Federal government endorsed
establishing hospitals for mariners. Although Hamilton originally argued for their situation in Washington,
Congress in 1798 sanctioned the establishment of one hospital in Charlestown, Mass., as the BMS had
recommended in 1791.
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for a Cape Cod lighthouse.105 On the 15th, the joint communique arrived at the Boston
Marine Society, just over a week after the BMS presented their case to the governor.106
The need for a light on Cape Cod was clear to mariners operating in N ew England
waters. Jutting 90 miles into the ocean, surrounded by shoal waters, and washed by
strong currents, Cape Cod had long proved hazardous to N ew England shipping.
Furthermore, sailing directions and charts called for vessels sailing around the Cape to
come inshore to Sankaiy Head on Nantucket Island to avoid the shoals and currenis o f
Georges Banks.107 Sailing between Nantucket to the west and Georges Banks to the east,
however, required vessels to thread the needle o f the shoal waters and currents around
Monomoy and Cape Race. A light on Cape Cod would make such a passage safer by
giving vessels a reference point from which to judge their relative bearings to the Cape,
Nantucket and Georges Banks.
The problem with a light on Cape Cod had long been how to support the station.
Without major populations centers wealthy enough to fund the construction o f a
lighthouse in the area, the outer Cape stood unmarked, and was likely to remain so
without government funding.
Despite the strong grassroots support for the light station, however, the BMS saw
little progress made by 1795. Furthermore, with Hamilton leaving the Treasury in 1795,
the Marine Society lost one o f their more powerful contacts in the Federal government.
To put the issue back onto the Congressional table, the BMS re-appointed a committee to

105“Salem Marine Society Instituted 1766,” Feb. 4,1792, vol. 1, Marine Society at Salem Papers (Peabody
Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.).
106

BMS Minutes, Feb. 7 and Feb. 15, 1792.

107 Paul Pinkham, A Chart o f George’s Bank Including Cape Cod, Nantucket and the Shoals lying on their
Coasts, Surveyed by Capt. Paul Pinkham (Newhaven [s/c], Conn., 1797).
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Figure 12: Paul Pinkham, A Chart o fGeorge’s Bank, 1797.

Courtesy of the Peabody Essex Musuem, Salem, Massachusetts.
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petition Congress directly for a Cape Cod light station in November, 1795. The BMS
also contacted the Humane Society and called up support from the Chamber o f
Commerce in their renewed campaign. In December, the Newburyport Marine Society
also weighed in and asked BMS support with their own petition to Congress for the
lighthouse.108 In January, 1796 the Marine Society at Salem added their voice to the
outcry and presented their own petition.109

Again, the BMS, along with Newburyport and Salem Marine Societies, felt
frustrated with Congressional indifference to their requests. In February, 1796,
Newburyport’s Marine Society continued to pressure Congress, this time through their
district representatives.110 In July, the BMS went over the governor’s head, submitting
their petition to Congress directly, and formed a committee in November to prod
Congress for action on the issue.111 Finally, after six years o f pressure, Congress agreed
to construct Cape Cod Light, situating the station on the Highlands o f Truro marking
some o f the more treacherous shoal waters in the area. C apt John Foster Williams o f the
US Revenue Service, as a member o f the Marine Society, accepted the aid o f a committee
o f his brother members to draw up sailing directions for the new light station as the
society had done in Plymouth 30 years earlier. In 1798, Cape Cod Light was lit for the
first time.

108 William H. Bayley and Oliver O. Jones, History ofthe Marine Society o f Newburyport, Massachusetts
([Newburyport, Mass.], 1906), p. 75.
109Marine Society at Salem Papers, Jan. 28,1796, vol. 1 (Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.).
110Bayley and Jones, Newburyport Marine Society, 75.
111 BMS Minutes, July 2, and Nov. [sic], 1796.
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Throughout the campaign for Cape Cod Light, the Boston Marine Society
continued to demand other developmental aid from the Federal government. Before
Hamilton’s departure from the Treasury in 1795, the BMS requested that Hamilton place
buoys at Harding’s Rocks and at a few other locations along the N ew England
coastline.112 Yet after Cape Cod Light was lit, the BMS hoped to press the advantage o f
their recent victory by securing Federal funds for another binning navigational concern in
the area. Since long before the early eighteenth century, when Cyprian Southack tried to
present a chart o f Cape Cod and Nantucket Shoals, mariners had been wary o f the
shallows jutting southward from Cape Cod. While Cape Cod Light helped mariners
sailing around the eastern shore o f the Cape, few aids existed to help vessels coming
north from New York or points south. In many ways, those shoals represented some o f
the most dangerous areas along the coast, and surveyors had long tried to get accurate
charts o f the region. Paul Pinkham and Edmund March Blunt tried in 1797 and 1798, but
the BMS found their chart a poor tool for navigation and refused to sanction the work.
Hoping to follow up on the victory over Cape Cod Light, the Boston Marine
Society voted to petition Congress to fond a coastal survey o f Nantucket Shoals. As in
the past, they drew upon the close working relationship that had developed with honorary
member Benjamin Lincoln, and they contacted other marine societies for further grass
roots support for the work. Naming Lincoln to the committee, they began drafting their
memorial in February 1798. This time, however, the BMS stood down from the
campaign. In March, the society ordered the committee drafting their petition to suspend
all proceedings, and the issue was never raised again.

112 BMS Minutes, Aug. 7,1792.
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Throughout the 1790s, Hamilton and the BMS cooperated for their own agendas,
resulting in significant navigational improvements and political voctories. For the BMS,
cooperation with H amilton and Lincoln allowed them access to the resources and
authority needed to address pressing navigational concerns in the Boston area. For
Hamilton and Lincoln, such cooperation allowed the new Federalist regime to allay
Antifederalist fears still circulating after ratification. In working through the BMS to
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Federal authority was to be exercised in limited and restrained fashions, and not simply to
emerge as another distant center o f power curbing newly won liberties. This working
relationship was a full partnership in that both sides entered negotiations holding
important cards. Federalists could not afford to alienate the Marine Society for fear o f
political and developmental costs: the Marine Society could not afford to alienate
Federalist agents in Boston for fear o f losing the opportunity to further their interests in
maritime developments. This helped Hamilton allay Antifederalist fears and help secure
Federalist allegiance in the key port city o f Boston.
By the late 1790s, the Boston Marine Society had fully integrated their maritime
improvement efforts within the political world. Working closely with Federalist
representatives, collaborating on projects that brought prestige to the Society and political
support for the government, and continuing a tradition o f civic service through maritime
research, the BMS had attained considerable political, and well as scientific authority in
Boston shortly before the end o f the eighteenth century. Signifying their confidence in
the political realm, the BMS ventured into foreign affairs in 1798, when the assembled
members voted to advise President John Adams on the tensions the United States were
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experiencing with France in the Caribbean. In a brief to President John Adams, BMS
president Thomas Dennie argued for a firm stand against French aggression in Europe
and in the Caribbean: “when we find this nation. . .artfully aiming at the utter subversion
o f the political, religious and social institutions o f all governments.. . they become
enemies o f all mankind, and ought to be opposed by every country.” Postulating that
“wooden walls, are confessedly, our best defense,” Dennie extended the services o f the
society in this, the diplomatic policy he advocated. “Many o f this society have been
engaged in maritime warfare; and when their country again calls they trust, that under
your pilotage, they shall not be found wanting.”113
In responding to the Society’s paper, Adams revealed the importance that the
Marine Society had played in the preceding years o f Federalist government. After
discussing the constitutional explanations for the French Revolution, an affair that
Adams, like most Federalists at the time, said “has ever been incomprehensible to me,”
he laid out the options he saw for the United States.
If the French, therefore, will become the Enemies o f all mankind, by forcing all
nations to follow their example, in the subversion o f all the Political, Religious
and social institutions which time, Experience and Freedom have sanctioned,
they ought to be opposed by every Country, that has any pretensions to principle,
Spirit, or Patriotism.1,4

The Marine Society, furthermore, had and would continue to play an important role in
future American responses to French “depredations.” “Floating batteries and wooden
walls have been my favorite System o f warfare and defence for this Country, for three
and twenty years,” wrote President Adams to the Society in 1798, “I have had little

1,3 BMS Minutes, Sept. 4,1798.
1
1
4

John Adams to the Boston Marine Society, Sept. 7,1798,as in Baker, Boston Marine Society, 313.
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success in making proselytes.— At the present moment, however, Americans in general,
Cultivators as well as merchants and mariners, begin to look at that source o f security and
protection; and your assistance w ill have great influence and effect, in extending the
opinion in theory and in introducing and establishing the practice.”115 By 1798, the BMS
had become a key advisor not only to navigational concerns, but as Adams indicated, an
important source o f support in Federalist plans for naval expansion and international
affarrs.
The BMS’s experiences with at first state and then Federal agents reveal that
science and commerce in the early republic was actively involved in the political
challenges that faced the rest o f the community. Like other virtuous republican scientific
groups in America, the Boston Marine Society applied its talents, skills and resources to
the needs o f their new nation. At first, these needs were managerial, charitable, and
technical concerns. Yet as the political crises o f the 1780s and 1790s threatened the
shaky republic, the BMS found itself extending its scientific work into the political realm
as a stabilizing force. In applying their authority to stabilizing Massachusetts politics
during Shays’ Rebellion, the BMS attracted the attention o f Federal officers in town, who
later called upon their influence to help stabilize the new Federal government.
The relationship was not a one-way street, however, and as the BMS consulted
more with the Federal establishment, they also used their position to further their own
interests in promoting navigational improvements. Successes at erecting lighthouses,
improving navigational aids, and securing Federal support for marine hospitals brought
greater prestige and authority to the Marine Society—authority which they then
reinvested into their relationship with the Federal government. Consequently, between

115 John Adams to the Boston Marine Society, Sept. 7,1798,as in Baker, Boston Marine Society, 313.
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1790 and 1798, the BMS’s scientific work allowed the society to achieve considerable
influence in political affairs.
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CHAPTER IV

THE APEX OF VOCATIONAL SCIENCE, 1789-1800

While the Marine Society applied their resources and influence to politics, they
also moved to solidify their authority over Boston’s nautical research and publication
market. Taking advantage o f post-war uncertainty concerning nautical authority, the
BMS emerged during the late 1780s as the organization controlling nautical research in
Boston. Such authority, however, was not uncontested. In exercising their authority, the
BMS ran into individuals, such as cartographer Matthew Clark and publisher Edmund
March Blunt, who challenged the BMS’s vocational foundation to judge charts and
sailing directions. Consequently, no sooner had the BMS established themselves as the
authoritative center o f navigational research in the new nation, than others began
challenging that foundation.
The challenges that the BMS faced at this highpoint o f their scientific authority
stemmed from practical issues as well. As others challenged the BMS’s abilities to judge
cartographic publications, BMS members such as Job Prince, Joseph Ingraham, and
James Magee enjoyed only limited success in adapting vocational methods to the more
challenging tasks o f navigating routes beyond the Capes and into the Pacific. By 1800,
the demands o f private commercial seafaring and national scientific exploration proved to
be incompatible. Pressures to return profits displaced the BMS’s desires to bring back
valuable navigational data.
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Ultimately, the apex o f the BMS’s role as a center o f scientific authority in
navigation was short lived. Methodological challenges at home worked with challenges
in adapting to new trading routes to undermine BM S authority in the navigational
research world. While the BMS still held political influence as navigational research
consultants in 1800, the foundations o f that authority had weakened precipitously.

When Bartholomew Burges submitted A Short Account o f the Solar System
(Boston, 1789) to the Boston Marine Society for review, he had already sought work in
the Boston area for several years. In 1786, the ambitious and self-assured Burges applied
to Christopher Champlain for work as a supercargo or factor in the India trade recently
pioneered by newly independent American merchants. In the opening o f his letter to
Champlain, Burges confidently stated his pedigree:
Gentlemen,
Recommended by Lord Clive to the court of directors in London for an
Establishment in the Honorable East India Company Service abroad, I went in
the Northington to Fort William in Bengali . . . 1

A s if such credentials were not enough, however, Burges put his accomplishments
in more stark terms: “remained in the country for 7 or 8 years in which time I acquired a
fortune o f 70,000 pounds sterling

5,2 With experience in the East India Company

before the Revolution, he felt he was a natural choice for the trading interests in Essex
County, Massachusetts. Yet Burges continued to present his skills to prospective

1Batholomew Burges to Christopher Champlain, Aug. 5,1786, George Wetmore Collection
(Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.).
2 Batholomew Burges to Christopher Champlain, Aug. 5,1786, George Wetmore Collection. Emphasized
numbers in original.
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employers with almost ungentlemanly frankness. Calling him self “an Enterprising
Genius,” Burges cited his abilities to speak “Indostan like English and work a Ship in the
Lascar Tongue.”3 Champlain, however, did not appear overly impressed by Burges’ selfassessment. Without any other embellishment, Champlain noted on Burges’ letter o f
application that Burges might be “capable o f a station in an Indiaman,” though what that
station might have been was not indicated.4 Furthermore, Burges never had the
opportunity to demonstrate what his genius might have produced. While Champlain may
have been intrigued with the opportunity to challenge British trading companies in the
lucrative India trade, poor economic conditions in the new United States could not assure
him good markets, and Burges never returned to India.
Instead, the “enterprising genius” applied him self to new markets for nautical
publications opened by Congressional acts seeking to encourage learning and the
practical arts in the United States. Under the Articles o f Confederation government,
Congress held little authority to sponsor research, learned societies, or other centers o f
higher learning such as those that European nations were beginning to establish during
the eighteenth century. Yet the new republic clearly had dire needs for improved
surveying, navigation, and mechanical learning. Consequently, Congressional acts in the
mid-1780s created a market for publications in the arts and sciences that offered
copyrights for science presented to the public.5

3 Batholomew Burges to Christopher Champlain, Aug. 5,1786, George Wetmore Collection.
4 Batholomew Burges to Christopher Champlain, Aug. 5,1786, George Wetmore Collection.
5 For a discussion of early Congressional copyright legislation and their effects on the American printing
industry, see Rollo Silver, The American Printer, 1787-1825 (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1967) 111-113.
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Through this market, Congress encouraged interested individuals to publish work
that would benefit their own purse at the same time as expanding national knowledge. In
one sense, the idea worked: interested and informed researchers, such as mathematician
N icolas Pike, published their research for public utility and personal gain. At the same
time, however, Congressional acts also made the nautical publications market appealing
to entrepreneurs, including a self-styled “Enterprising Genius,” o f questionable abilities.
By the time Burges submitted his treatise on the solar system to the BMS for review, the
BMS had gained enough stature within the community through its previous scientific
research and current public service to assume for itself the role o f critical review,
separating useful knowledge from the hack publications. Furthermore, BMS sanction
emerged in late 1780s Boston as an important validation for the reliability— and hence
commercial success—o f charts, surveys, and other nautical publications produced under
Congressional encouragement.
In 1789, Burges brought forward two works that he hoped would secure
sponsorship, recognition, and thereby his fortunes. The first, A Short Account of the

Solar System (Boston, 1789) he dedicated to the most prominent centers o f formal higher
learning emerging from the Revolution, the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences in
Boston and the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, in the hopes o f gaining
national prestige. In this work, he also took the opportunity to plug his next work to hit
the market, The American Seaman’s Daily Assistant, which, Burges assured readers,
“when completed, will be submitted to the Examination o f Men o f known Abilities for
their Approval—and if approved o f as a Work o f publick Utility, the Patronage o f the
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Publick w ill be solicited.”6 By “Men o f known Abilities” Burges referred to the Boston
Marine Society, and in August 1789, Burges submitted The American Seaman’s Daily

Assistant for that approval.7
The BMS did not receive his work favorably. In a terse response to his request,
the Society denied Burges even a committee to review his publication. Breaking from
previous practice, the BMS cited a lack o f credentials for their decision. “Mr. Burgis
[sic] has produced no recommendations o f his character and scientific abilities which are
necessary before this society can with propriety attend to the applications o f the kind
stated in Mr. Burgis’ [s/c] letter.”8
These comments reveal that, like other European learned societies, the BMS was
willing only to review works produced by gentlemen with established credentials. Just as
members’ technical reputations carried important implications in assessing the quality o f
the data they brought back to the society, ritualistic obeisance played an important role in
ensuring that the submitter would respect the conventions o f the society.9 Such acts
would demonstrate the submitter’s acceptance o f the review committee’s decision,
thereby reaffirming the committee’s authority over the work and in the field.
Consequently, Burges’ omission o f such a courtesy might have been perceived as an
insult, leading the membership to refuse review until Burges had acquiesced in offering
proper homage through credentials.

6 Bartholomew Burges, A Short Account o fthe Solar System.. .(Boston, 1789), 19.
7 BMS Minutes, Aug. 3,1789.
8 BMS Minutes, Aug. 3,1789.
9 Steven Shapin, A Social History o f Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago,
1994), chs. 1,3 and 5.
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Secondly, the BMS also had an axe to grind with the upstart Burges. In another
foray into the nautical publications market, Burges promised would-be purchasers o f his
charts o f the American coast that each chart would be signed and approved by the Marine
Society before being delivered.10 The Marine Society, however, had never agreed to this
provision, and published a statement in local newspapers claiming that Burges had no
authority to make such a claim.11 To make their point loud and clear, the society also
raised the bar for Burges’ other publications.
Chastised by the BMS for his presumptuousness, Burges enlisted his silent
partner, Matthew Clark, to help make amends. In October 1789, Clark submitted charts
o f the coast to the BMS, and in December, the society agreed to review the work. Clark,
challenging the Marine Society’s assessment, and cognizant o f the importance o f Marine
Society approval, brought in the well-respected Boston mathematics teacher, Osgood
Carleton.12 Carleton had long carried significant prestige within Boston as a
mathematician and surveyor. During the French and Indian War and through the
Revolution, Carleton had served British, then American forces as military surveyor and
engineer. After the wars, he established a mathematical school, gave public lectures, and
ran a surveying office for locally prominent land-owners.13 Carleton also represented a
rival source o f authority to BMS reviews. Rather than reviewing surveys and charts from
a vocational foundation, Carleton, with his more formal training, could offer more

10Massachusetts Centinel, Aug. 5, 1789.
11 BMS Minutes, Aug. 3, 1789.
12David Bosse, “Osgood Carleton, Mathematical Practitioner of Boston,” Proceedings o f the
Massachusetts Historical Society, 107(1995), 152.
13 Bosse, “Osgood Carleton,” 147-148, and 152.
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intelligent and well-considered criticisms in support o f Burges’ and Clark’s charts than
the BMS could detract from them.
The Society’s minute books are typically silent on the deliberations between
Clark, Carleton and the BMS. Yet in the end, the two camps compromised. The BMS,
feeing a theoretically trained surveyor and mathematician, had to defer to better training
and judgement, yet they did so without a complete surrender. Rather than sticking to
their original position,

Burges’ and Clark’s charts were unworthy o f

recommendation, they declared in January, 1790, that “they had examined several o f said
charts in company with Mr. Osgood Carleton, Teacher o f Mathematics & find them so far
as they examined to be accurate copies o f good charts.”14 While not an unmitigated
statement o f support, the Society’s findings did allow Burges, Clark, and Carleton’s joint
venture to hit the market with some support from the Marine Society.
The conflict between the BMS and Burges and Clark represents a key point in the
determination o f scientific authority over the Boston nautical publications market.
Burges’ advertising claims illustrate the importance BMS sanction held over nautical
publications in the Boston market in the late 1780s and 1790s. Burges’ submission o f his

American Seaman’s Daily Assistant to the BMS, as opposed to dedicating it to the AAAS
or the APS as he did with A Short Account, reveals that Burges felt that BMS approval
carried more weight in the navigational world for this type o f publication than the word
o f more established learned societies. Furthermore, Burges’ claim that the BMS would
review his charts before delivery represented an attempt to steal acceptability from the
BMS, and reinforced the important role the society held in sanctioning work. BMS

14BMS Minutes, Jan. 5,1790.
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approval tied the reputation o f an organization long associated with local navigation to
publishers’ works, translating into greater sales.
The conflict with Burges, Clark and Carleton also revealed to the BMS that they
needed to consult other authorities in the chart review process if they were to retain any
influence in the Boston nautical publications market. In the first place, the BMS was
forced to recognize the better foundation for chart review that Carleton brought into the
practice. Faced with the challenge o f a trained surveyor, the Marine Society not only
deferred to Carleton’s judgement, financially tied to the project or not, but also enlisted
his services as chart reviewer for all future consultations.15 “The committee further
report that Mr. Osgood Carleton who has undertaken to examine the charts before they
are offered for sale, is a person well acquainted with the mathematics, & capable o f
undertaking the inspection.”16
In addition, the BMS was also forced to accept Carleton’s own standards and
models o f accuracy. Despite the previous rude silences the Society received from
DesBarres in the 1760s, the BMS, under direction from Carleton, was forced to admit the
superior quality o f DesBarres’ charts.
At the desire o f the Publisher o f the Book; and being recommended for that
purpose, by the Boston Marine Society, I have with the strictest scrutiny
examined these charts of the Coast o f America. . . compared them with those o f
Joseph Frederick William DesBarres, Esq., they being considered by the said
society as the best Charts o f the Coast (so far as they extend).'7

15John Leach, clerk to the society before the Revolution, may have known of Carleton through John
Norman, an engraver both he and Carleton worked with in the 1780s. See Bosse, “Osgood Carleton,” 154155.
16 BMS Minutes, Jan. 5,1790.
17Matthew Clark, Charts o f the Coast ofAmericafrom Cape Breton to the Entrance o f the GulfofMexico
(Boston, 1790), ii.
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Osgood Carleton emerged as the real winner in the BMS-Burges controversy.
Called in by the chart’s publishers as their own expert, Carleton found himself accepted,
and then adopted, by the BMS as a reliable and credible chart reviewer in Boston. Such a
position, in essence uniting new forms o f technical expertise with the social prestige o f
the more traditional sources o f authority, allowed Carleton to expand his chart work in
the subsequent years. Partnering with John Norman, Carleton reviewed Norman’s The

American Pilot, published in 1791 and revised in 1792,1794,1798, and 1803. With
William Norman stepping in during in the 1790s, Carleton also played roles in publishing

A Pilotfor the West Indies (1795), The New West-India Pilot (1803), and The New East
India Pilot (1804).18
Carleton’s role in the expanding nautical publications market, however, soon
sidelined the BMS as a center o f critical review, as Carleton never acknowledged his
support from the BMS in any o f the Norman’s works. Advertisements for charts
covering North America, the West Indies, East Indies, the Pacific Northwest, and
Labrador included in the 1803 edition o f The American Pilot, also reveal how fast the
market had expanded. In each o f these publications, including detailed charts o f
Nantucket and Georges Bank, John and William Norman drew upon a wide array o f
authorities for testimonials o f their publication’s accuracy.19 Rather than going to the
BMS, Norman and Carleton looked to surveyors, captains, explorers, and in the case o f
Paul Pinkham o f Nantucket, a lighthouse keeper, to replace the BMS’s imprimatur on his
works.

18David Bosse, “Osgood Carleton,” 152-153.
19John and William Norman, The American Pilot.. .from... Belle-Jsle to Essequibo (Boston, 1803).
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A s late as 1798, the Marine Society still retained enough influence for Edmund
March Blunt, a nautical publisher from Newburyport, Massachusetts to submit his chart,

George’s Bank and Nantucket Shoals for evaluation (see chapter 3, p. 127). Failing to
consult Carleton—whose financial ties to the Normans may have been seen as a conflict
o f interest—the BMS named John Foster Williams to head the review committee, and to
use their own practical and vocational experience to evaluate the work. “The committee.
. .having attentively perused and compared said chart with former charts, and having
taken the best information and advice thereon, as well as from their own individual
experience,” reported first that, the Society questioned the chart’s originality, arguing that
“Mr. Blunt offers no proof o f any actual observations upon George’s Bank, and that if
copied from any former Charts, it must also be subject to their errors.”20 In fact, the
Society review revealed that Blunt copied Paul Pinkham’s chart, which they also
criticized as having not been drawn from actual observations made by Pinkham himself.
The Society’s committee also criticized the chart’s ability to offer information
required by navigators operating in the charted waters. Williams’ committee argued “that
it is necessary to fix the certain situation o f the shoals o f George’s Bank, and the exact
soundings round it within the limits o f the Shoal waters, the affect o f the tides, and the
shifting o f the shoals, if shifting orfixed [emphasis in original].”21 In addition, the
committee felt that the work omitted other information that was generally expected from
reliable charts:
. . .no person in surveying said Bank, or in making actual observations upon it,
would omit to notice the quality of the ground at each sounding, and that it is
essentially necessary to a chart for the governing o f mariners [ ] to fix the
20 BMS Minutes, March 6,1798.
21 BMS Minutes, March 6,1798.
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boundaries & extent of the Bank, the first soundings in coming in and going off
[the bank], and the nature o f adjacent soundings, and that the South Channel
lying between Nantucket and Georges and as far as it extends southward, is
known to have bottom peculiar to itself and different from that o f the Banks on
either side.22

In their final point o f criticism, the Marine Society’s committee revealed that Blunt’s
work challenged the Society’s authority to review charts. In attacking Blunt’s portrayal
o f the shape o f Cape Cod, Williams argued that “Mr. Blunt in his Chart o f Cape Cod has
varied the actual form o f Said Cape, ascertained by a late survey under the direction o f
the Boston Marine Society.. .”23 In condemning Blunt’s chart, the Society saw
themselves as not merely protecting their intellectual turf, but also doing a service to
mankind: “. . .consistently with our duty to our Brethren Mariners, as well as to mankind
in general, w e cannot recommend a chart which appears deficient in any part, and which
may expose their lives & property, from the errors o f a chart not drawn from actual
survey.”24 Ultimately, W illiams’ criticisms condemned the chart as not worth the
public’s attentions. In defiance, however, Blunt went to six other ship captains, who
praised the work, and he published the chart anyway.25
While the BMS’s comments certainly had merit, Blunt’s work did offer more
information than prior charts. Yet the conflict between Blunt and the Marine Society was
not one over accuracy. Both the Marine Society and Blunt relied upon the reputations o f
the captains involved to determine accuracy, a standard that could hardly solve the issue.

22 BMS Minutes, March 6,1798.
23 There is no record in the Marine Society records of this survey.
24 BMS Minutes, March 6,1798.
25 P. J. Guthom, “Eighteenth century Shore and Harbour Charts Printed in America,” The Map Collector
(no. 12, 1980), 29.
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Rather, the conflict was one over who held control over Boston’s nautical publications
market. In many ways, throughout the 1780s and the 1790s, the BMS was establishing
themselves as, in Roy MacLeod’s terms, a new “metropolis” for nautical research in a
politically independent United States. For MacLeod, metropolitan science marked the
organization o f British science in the later eighteenth century. Projects were defined by
the Royal Society, which also performed the theoretical analysis and publicly presented
their fmdirigs- MacLeod argues that science defined and pursued by learned societies and
individuals inhabited a central core in London, Edinburgh, or in the Oxbridge-London
triangle.26 According to him, this centralized, European “monarchical” metropolitan
science pursued the expansion o f maritime trade, the discovery o f raw materials, and the
opening o f new markets.
The BMS’s work in the 1780s and 1790s, represents a colonial version o f this
modeL27 They, too, were trying to direct maritime research and development through
their cooperation with the state and Federal governments. Their research concerns were
intimately tied to the expansion o f American trade and markets, and, as seen in their
deliberations with Burges, Clarke, and Blunt, they also worked to retain evaluative
authority over new nautical publications. Consequently, the Marine Society was at least
attempting to create a new research metropolis for American nautical publications in an
effort to make American nautical science independent o f European centers and to shoreup their influence in Boston.

26 Roy MacLeod,, “On Visiting the ‘Moving Metropolis’: Reflections on the Architecture of Imperial
Science,” in Scientific Colonialism: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, ed. Nathan Reingold (Washington DC,
1987), 229-230.
27 MacLeod, “Moving Metropolis,” 230.
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In the next two years, the Marine Society reviewed more work produced by
Boston area researchers. Not surprisingly, the Marine Society praised John Foster
Williams’ draft o f Cape Cod Harbor, now known as Cape Cod Bay, thanking him for “his
exertions in accuracy in executing it and for his handsome & marked attention to this
society in the dedication.”28
By 1800, when John Churchman submitted his Magnetic Atlas to the Marine
Society for review, the BMS did not feel comfortable enough to issue either a firm
endorsement or a scathing indictment as they had done with other navigational works in
the past Others had taken interest in Churchman’s theories before he contacted the
Marine Society. In his 1790 edition o f An Explanation o f the Magnetic Atlas, Churchman
included a long list o f names o f patrons from both the N ew World and the Old interested
in his work. On the other hand, Churchman also hedged his bets, and included letters o f
recommendation from several prestigious Old World scientific leaders commenting on
the utility o f his ideas, including Joseph Banks and Charles Blagden o f the Royal Society
o f London, and Sir Hyde Parker o f the Board o f Longitude.29
Whether from the Old World or the New, none o f Churchman’s correspondents
had much faith in his ideas, replying to his entreaties with encouragement, but not
endorsement. For example, Thomas Jefferson, to whom Churchman wrote to present his
ideas to the Royal Academy o f Sciences in France, reported that the Academy could not
“formally” decide the merits o f Churchman’s methods, but they did enter his ideas into

28

BMS Minutes, Feb. 5, 1799.

29 John Churchman, An Explanation o f the Magnetic Atlas or Variation Chart___ (Philadelphia, 1790),vi.
For recommendations from European societies, see pp. 73-76.
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their journal to preserve his claim. They also entertained doubts as to Churchman’s
ability to determine accurately variation at a given place and questioned whether
instrumentation could be developed with the fine gradations Churchman’s methods
required. Most others thanked him for his work, and encouraged him to continue his
inquiries.
By 1800, Churchman revised his Magnetic Atlas to a third edition and had it
republished, seeking newer reviewers for endorsements. Newer contacts, however,
maintained the reticence o f Churchman’s older correspondents. Moving away from the

most prestigious scientific societies in London and Paris, Churchman pitched his ideas to
less renowned learned societies in Lisbon and Berlin, and to societies in Boston, such as
the Boston Marine Society and the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences. In the
Berlin academy, a review committee saw Churchman’s work less as a solution in itself,
but more as a point o f departure for other work. In responding to Churchman’s
correspondence, the committee reported that
It is known that the two magnetic points had a motion, but Mr. Churchman is the
first who, to my knowledge, has declared to determine this movement, and to
assign their periodical times. This step is bold, without doubt; but it is good that
it is made; it will serve to awaken the attention of Geometricians and
Astronomers. They may examine and discuss the theory o f Mr. Churchman;
compare it with new observations; and attempts to modify his hypothesis, till
they may approach to exactness, as near as can be hoped in sciences physicomathematical.30

In Boston, the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences more blandly replied
I have the pleasure to assure you, that the Society is pleased with your
application to the subject, and highly approves your very laudable design o f
improving magnetic observations. Convinced o f the importance o f ascertaining,
with accuracy, the magnetic variations in different parts of the globe, the

j0 John Churchman, Magnetic Atlas or Variation Charts (New York, 1800), 73.
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Academy wishes you success in your proposed voyage; and that it may
contribute towards perfecting a discovery highly useful to mankind.31

The Marine Society also hedged its bets with Churchman’s 1800 submission o f
the Magnetic Atlas. Rather than condemn or condone the work based solely on their own
opinions, as they had done with Burges, Blunt, and Clarke in the past, the Marine Society
refrained from being the sole source o f authority for reviewing Churchman’s work. The
committee reviewing the work relied not only on their own skills, but also enlisted the aid
o f others, as they had done with Carleton throughout the decade, and limited their
comments to the practical issues on which they had most confidence in their own
abilities. In reporting to the membership, the BMS review committee stated that they had
“taken the matter into consideration and with the best advice they can get, find it a work
o f great merit

” Yet the society refrained from issuing any further recommendation or

criticism, instead opting for more practical evaluations before final conclusions could be
made. Ultimately, the society felt that “the utility o f [Churchman’s methods] must
depend upon actual observations and experience. The Society wishing to encourage as
much as in their power every improvement in navigation that can direct the mariner in his
course and promote his safety, would recommend to their brethren to try Mr.
Churchman’s method, and at the expiration o f their voyages, communicate the result and
success o f their observations.”32
Like other learned societies, the BMS had doubts about Churchman’s ideas. But
unlike previous reviews, the BMS refrained from evaluating the work solely on their own
skills alone. Their review o f Churchman’s work was actually the last time the Society

31 Churchman, Magnetic Atlas, 76.
32 BMS Minutes, Jan. 6,1801.
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convened a committee to review nautical publication. It is clear that through the conflicts
in the 1780s and 1790s, the BMS had come to recognize limitations in their ability to
review certain scientific works. It is obvious that some o f these publications were simply
beyond their expertise. As trained cartographers and surveyors produced more works, the
Marine Society had less o f a role in evaluating new productions. Still respected
sufficiently for researchers such as Churchman to submit work for their approval, the
Society came to see that their role in the production o f navigational information was not
as secure as it had been ten years previously. This became clear when, in 1801, William
T. Class submitted his “New American Seaman’s Daily Assistant” for review.33 A
decade earlier, the Marine Society, as self-styled representatives o f the seafaring element
o f the community, would have accepted the charge. In 1801, however, the Marine
society politely refrained from presenting their opinion o f Class’s publication. In
declining, the Marine Society voted “that the society approve o f his exertions for our
seafaring brethren, but as the work which he intends to publish w ill require a great deal o f
time in the examination, and as it must finally rest on its own merits, they must decline
his request.”34 While the society still encouraged work in the field, the membership
realized that they lacked the expertise to assess its reliability. They left the work to rise
or fell in the market place without Marine Society sanction.
Unwilling to put their support behind works they could not effectively evaluate,
the Marine Society also withdrew from evaluating Matthew C. Graves’ ideas for

33 The contents of this work are unknown. It appears that the work itself was never published: neither
Class’ name nor the work’s title appear in the American Antiquarian Society’s Early American Imprint
Series nor the National Union Catalog.
34 BMS Minutes, March 3,1801.
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determining longitude. Harrison’s chronometer had been established as a reliable means
o f determining longitude three decades earlier, but ships’ chronometers remained too
expensive for most navigators to purchase.35 For many mariners, estimations from dead
reckoning or Maskeleyne’s complicated lunar distance method remained the best
available method for determining a ships’ longitudinal position. Graves’ methods
apparently were no simpler than Harrison’s. The Marine Society declined to review the
essay citing, “that as the truth o f the principles adopted by Capt. Graves depend upon
optical instruments that cannot be procured in this country, the absolute result cannot now
be ascertained, but your committee think the ideas ingenious & deserving
encouragement.”36
In declining to review Graves’ work, the society acknowledged that by the 1790s,
nautical publications coming to market relied upon concepts, skills, and instrumentation
beyond their experience. The BMS’s vocational scientific approaches worked well
enough for the rough publications produced with simple instrumentation and
methodology during the 1780s. As American researchers produced more technically
demanding material, the Society’s utility as a review body waned.
Recognizing their limitations, the Marine Society was nevertheless not
scientifically dormant during the 1790s. Rather, they reviewed works that fell within
their vocational expertise and scientific leanings. In May, 1792, member John Foster
Williams presented to the society a method for extracting fresh water from salt water

j5 For a discussion of early efforts to copy Harison’s designs, see Jonathan Betts “Arnold and Eamshaw:
The Practicable Solution,” in The Questfo r Longitude: Proceedings ofthe Longitude Symposium, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 4-6, 1993, ecL, William J. H Andrewes (Cambridge,
Mass., 1996), 312-328.
36 BMS Minutes, June 7,1803.
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while at sea. Fresh water, more important to human survival than food, represented one
o f the most uncompromising limitations to a vessel’s ability to remain at sea. The
process o f refilling ships’ water casks required vessels to stop in port or locate coastal
sources o f fresh water. In either case, the labor-intensive process o f breaking out casks,
floating them to shore, filling them with water, and then re-stowing the heavy and
ungainly barrels hindered a ship’s progress. Refilling water casks also exposed crews to
dangers in transferring heavy casks from a small tending boat up into the ship’s hold and
could compromise the barrels’ water-tightness. Casks could suffer unseen damage in
loading and unloading, and resealing barrels at sea may not have worked as well as
sealing casks in a cooperage.
Consequently, the practical nature o f W illiams’ research fit well with the Marine
Society’s expertise in managing ships and crews. At the May meeting, Williams
“presented to the society the results o f sundry experiments he had made to extract fresh
water from salt with a plan o f apparatuses made use o f by him for same___ ”37 Williams
ensured that the society would see the practicality o f his methods: “You will observe that
the apparatuses made use o f are such as are generally on board a vessel at sea.”38 Using a
tin sauce-pan, a cabin stove, an iron pot, a barrel, and some old canvas, Williams
constructed a series o f stills that he used to run his experiments. “I put 4 quarts o f salt
water in a tin sauce pan, in the stove in the cabin, in 55 minutes I got from it near a quart
good fresh water; one quart o f water left in the pan, the rest was [lost]. The machine
made use o f was a tin crane, with a barrel or cooler made to it o f the same, containing

37 BMS Minutes, May 1,1792.
jS Columbian Centinel, May 5, 1792.
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about 8 quarts, with a hole in the top and bottom to put the cold water i n . . .”39 Williams,
however modified his instrumentation as he identified short comings. “I found that the
barrel was not large enough to keep the tube cold. I then put 5 gallons o f salt water in an
iron pot, made the pot lid tight by putting some old canvas round it—made a hole in the
middle with a hollow plug to [receive] the crane—I got from it a quart o f good fresh
water in one hour and a half; but finding my cooler was not large enough to keep the
crane cool, I left o ff for a time.”40 The BMS minute book recorded that “[Williams] also
introduced the various kinds o f water thus extracted, some o f which was made into punch
& highly agreeable, as respected tastes and smell, being quite pure

”41

How well the Society could ascertain the purity o f Williams’ water in an alcoholic
punch remains questionable. Unlike Clark’s charts, however, whose accuracy could only
be determined through a thorough knowledge o f surveying that rested beyond the
technical expertise o f the membership, Williams’ research could be evaluated using more
empirical, and less technical, methods. Ship-masters with years o f sea experience could
evaluate water produced from Williams’ ship-still because they had stomached ships’
water with wide ranging degrees o f palatability, and more importantly, had a good idea o f
what crews would agree to drink and what they would n ot Furthermore, Williams’
methods were straightforward and utilized simple devices. With a confidence they
lacked in the Clark chart controversy, the Marine Society voted solidly to affix their
recommendation to Williams’ methods. The meeting passed a motion thanking Williams

39 Columbian Centinel, May 5,1792.
40 Columbian Centinel, May 5,1792.
41 BMS Minutes, May 1,1792.
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for his work, and the membership voted that their approval would be published in the
local shipping papers, the Columbian Centinel and the Massachusetts Magazine, “for the
advantage o f our seafaring brethren”42
The Marine Society also ran “experiments” on a new light-house lamp design by
William Cunnington that, like their review o f Williams’ desalination efforts, reveal their
continued reliance upon vocational methods for scientific evaluation Mimicking a
public science lecture, the Marine Society committee called upon the Boston community
to participate. The committee had the lamp hoisted into the state-house cupola, “first
giving notice in the public newspapers o f our intentions and inviting the attendance o f the
Citizens in this neighborhood and requesting their comments respecting the appearance
o f the light at different times in the evening.”43 In addition, two committee members
took station aboard a revenue cutter anchored between the state-house and Boston light.
Like some other public science displays o f the period, the audience and the “scientists”
were both intimately involved in determining the scientific question at hand.44 “Many
people kindly attested to the brilliancy o f the light and the members o f your committee
had the same idea.” For a more empirical evaluation, however, the committee reported
that “the power and glass o f the light far exceeded the light from the Boston light-house
although that was viewed in its most favourable state while the lantern was clean and the

42 BMS Minutes, May 1,1792.
43 BMS Minutes, Jan. 7, 1800.
44 In this regard, the Boston Marine Society parallels Jan Golinski’s connection between gentility and
chemistry in William Cullen’s work in die later eighteenth century. In both cases, genteel experts served as
intermediaries between the public and the science. Yet unlike Cullen, the BMS saw navigation as a
distinguishing and unique practice, and not part of broadly defined proper education. See Jan Golinski,
Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-1820 (Cambridge, 1992), 31- 37.
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lamps newly trimmed.”45 Not only safer for navigation, Cunnington’s new lamp was
more economical, as “from the experiment they are fully convinced that the System
proposed would. . . reduce very considerably the amount o f oil now consumed.”46 The
committee finally reported that Cunnington’s system should be supported to protect life
and property.
Through their dealings with Burges, Clarke, Carleton, and Blunt, the Marine
r
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lay beyond their experience-based vocational approach to navigational science. In
declining to review works by Class and Graves, the Society tacitly admitted that they
lacked the skills and specialized training needed to form a useful, critical opinion on
research emerging from American researchers. Still respected for their opinions on
nautical affairs, the society limited their review activities to subjects on which they could
offer constructive, applicable commentary informed by long-term sea-service. In
experiments such as Williams’ distillations and Cunnington’s lamp, the Society’s
evaluation were more ‘Vocational” and less “scientific” relying upon pragmatic,
unrefined, and un-quantified assessments o f utility—methods in line with members’
experience on board vessels.

While other forms o f technical knowledge challenged BMS authority in Boston,
the BMS ideal o f collecting scientific data during commercial voyages ran afoul o f
increasing pressures for profits as American trade expanded into the Pacific in the 1780s

45 BMS Minutes, Jan. 7,1800.
46 BMS Minutes, Jan. 7,1800.
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and 1790s. While such trade was small, in terms o f volum e, and even in revenue, when
compared to older trade routes to Europe and the W est Indies, early American voyages to
the Pacific and Indian oceans carried important symbolism for Americans looking to
engage the world as an independent nation. For American ships to enter the Pacific and
challenge British hegemony in the China market represented a commercial coming o f age
that placed Americans on par, overseas at least, with other European powers.47
Marine Society members captained several early important voyages to the Pacific
and Indian oceans. Three o f these voyages, and the experiences o f the members
commanding them, reveal differing ways that vocational science and Pacific exploration

combined poorly. For Job Prince in the Massachusetts, the methodological demands for
sailing “beyond the capes,” showed that vocational methods well-suited for the North
Atlantic were not sufficient for successful voyaging to the East Indies. For Joseph
Ingraham in the Hope, the combination o f Pacific exploration for public good and Pacific
merchant sailing for private gain was an uneasy one at best. Success in the former did
not translate into success in the latter, and ultimately, the notes, observations, and
discoveries he brought back to the Marine Society did not ease Ingraham’s professional
sufferings. Finally, James Magee’s voyage in the Margaret highlights how increased
competition in the Pacific among Boston traders pushed Marine Society captains away

47 For a discussion of die interest the Federal government took in promoting U.S. trade to the Pacific, see
Donald D. Johnson [with Gary Dean Best], The United States in the Pacific: Private Interests and Public
Policies, 1785-1899 (Westport, CT, 1995), 9-14; and Ernest Dodge, Islands and Empires: Western Impact
on the Pacific and East Asia (Minneapolis, 1976), 57. Dodge’s interpretation is problematic. In
contending that American interests in die Pacific were driven by natural history, discovery, and the
exploitation of natural resources, he claims this was not an imperialistic interest. How this is the case is
perplexing, as researchers such as John Gascoigne have shown that most western interest in the Pacific was
imperialistic. For the US, Walter Lafeber has clearly shown that US interest in the Pacific was
commercially imperialistic from the late 18th century onward; Walter LaFaber, The New Empire: An
Interpretation o f American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, New York, 1963), ch. 1. See also John
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from collecting navigational data, and pushed them towards collecting ethnographic
information that would help investors anticipate future desires o f the Native American
sealers in the Pacific Northwest.
Job Prince assumed command o f the Massachusetts in 1790. Inducted into the
Boston Marine Society in 1774, Prince’s father had been one o f the Marine Society’s
earliest members. The ship itself was New England’s version o f the elegant and
profitable East Indiamen, and according to Second Mate Amasa Delano, positions
onboard her were highly prized. The ship, however, suffered a plague o f problems from
the start, not the least o f which were navigational. After an embarrassing departure,
Captain Prince lost track o f the ship’s position enroute to the Azores, causing the ship to
miss its landmark completely. Once around the Cape o f Good Hope, Prince got lost
again as they were approaching Java Head in the East Indies. A s Delano relates:
On the third of August, we found ourselves in latitude 6° 52’ south, that being
nearly the latitude o f Java Head; and by reckoning, in 103° 00’ east of longitude.
We saw no signs of land. This was sufficient to shew that we were to the
westward o f our reckoning, as that latitude and longitude would have nearly or
quite brought us in sight o f Princes’ Island, to the westward o f Java Head. We
tacked ship, head to the southward, and stood as far south as latitude 16° 20’
south, making at least 15° easting before we got back into the latitude o f Java
Head again
48

For Delano, Prince’s lack o f navigational skill was the problem.
All of this time loss happened on account of our not having any chronometer on
board, nor any officer who [k]new any thing about lunar observations. This
shews how important it is for officers to know how to observe their longitude,
and work the observations. It is simple and plain to every capacity when once
understood. Every commander should furnish himself with a good brass sextant,

Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State, and the Uses o f Science in the
Age o f Revolution (Cambridge, 1998).
48 Amasa 'Delano, A Narrative o f the Voyages and Travels.. .Round the World (Boston, 1817), 36-37.
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and so should every chief officer o f any ship bound round Cape Horn, or the
Cape o f Good Hope.49

Ultimately, the Massachusetts was sold to the Dutch in Batavia after she was
found to have been rotting from the inside out. Yet his navigational problems reveal
important assumptions that Prince carried into his trade. As a senior captain in the
Atlantic trades, Prince may not have needed sextants, chronometers, nor the education
required to calculate lunar distances. But for voyages into the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
relying solely upon dead reckoning and latitudinal observations would not suffice.
Consequently, Prince’s poor preparation and poor officer selection revealed the
difficulties masters, familiar with Atlantic trade routes, faced as they rounded the Capes
in the China trade.
The Marine Society’s involvement with Joseph Ingraham reveals just how science
and commerce could not effectively mix when merchants took on the increased
commercial risk o f sending ventures out into the Pacific. Inspired by John Ledyard’s
accounts o f his voyages with Cook to the Pacific, Joseph Ingraham sailed as a mate
aboard the Columbia in 1787 when she ventured to the Pacific to open the American
maritime fur trade.50 Aboard the Columbia, Ingraham shipped out on a voyage o f mixed
goals closely corresponding to the Marine Society’s notions o f combining science and
commerce. First and foremost, the Columbia sailed as a private commercial venture
funded by Boston merchant Joseph Barrel. Along with five other investors, Barrel’s first
concern was that Kendrick turned a profit, or at least bring back information that would

49 Delano, 36-37.
50 Mark D. Kaplanof^ ed., Joseph Ingraham’s Journal o f the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the
Northwest Coast o f North America, 1790-1792 (Barre, Mass., 1971), xiii, hereafter cited as Ingraham,
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help them increase their private fortunes through new trade networks. For Ingraham, as
second mate, the voyage was also one o f discovery that rivaled the British voyages into
the Pacific under Cook. Consequently, when the first mate left the ship after a quarrel
with Kendrick early in the voyage, Ingraham embraced the opportunity as acting first
mate to mix discovery and commercial seafaring.51
As first officer, Ingraham took a leading role in the successful navigation o f the
voyage, a role that did not go unnoticed in Boston’s merchant community. Although his
log o f the first voyage is lost, references to it in his second log indicate that he recorded
extensive notes on navigation, natural history, and early ethnographic data.
Furthermore, the Columbia’s voyage around the world, and consequently the information
with which the Columbia’s new captain, Robert Gray, and Ingraham returned to Boston,
took on national importance. The Columbian Centinel characterized the voyage as one o f
great public pride and national significance:53
Their Country is also under obligation to the intrepid Navigators who have
conducted this voyage—whose urbanity and civility have secured the friendship
of the aboriginals of the country they visited; and whose honour and intrepidity
have commanded the protection and respect o f the European Lords o f Soil, to the
American flag; while that of another nation hath been forbidden to be unfurled on
the coast.54

Journal. For more on Ledyard and his impact upon the New England maritime fur trade, see Ernest Dodge,
New England and the South Seas (Cambridge, 1965), 22-26.
51 Robert Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World Onboard the Ship Columbia-Rediviva and Sloop
Washington,” in The Voyages o f the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793,
Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, ed. Frederic W. Howay, 79 (1941), 7-8.
52 Ingraham, Journal, 11.
53 Barrel himself envisioned the Columbia’s voyage within a national context. In his instructions to
Kendrick, Barrel wrote “The sea letters from Congress and this State you will also show on every proper
occasion; and although we expect you will treat all nations with respect and civility, yet we depend you will
suffer insult and injury from none without showing that spirit which will ever become A FREE AND
INDEPENDENT AMERICAN” (emphasis in original, Howay, Voyages, 112).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
W ithin the public praise for the Columbia’s accomplishments, however, lay the

seeds o f a contradiction. While Ingraham returned with great information about the
Pacfic Northwest, the voyage itself was a private commercial endeavor. Consequently
the public utility o f Columbia’s exploits ran counter to the private, profit driven motives
that compelled Barrel and his associates to fund the venture in the first place. This
contradiction was not lost on another young, but promising, Boston merchant seeking to
set up his own trading house. Thomas Mandasyd Perkins, then supercargo o f the Boston
ship Astrea, met Ingraham when the Columbia arrived in China in 1789.55 By the time
Ingraham returned to Boston in 1790, Perkins had assembled a group o f investors,
including BMS member James Magee, to buy a small ship and take advantage o f the
route pioneered by the Columbia. Within days o f his return, Perkins met again with
Ingraham and offered him command o f the 76-ton brig Hope, an offer Ingraham
accepted.
When the Columbia returned on August 9th, 1790, Ingraham’s navigational work
aboard the Columbia attracted the immediate attention o f the Boston Marine Society.
Following precedents laid down during the Revolution, the BMS rewarded Ingraham’s
national public service with membership in the society, and Ingraham was inducted on
September 7th, 1790— no doubt with the aid o f his new employer James Magee—-just
nine days before he sailed on the Hope.
The society’s records are silent on the Ingraham nomination, although the minutes
only intermittently record who nominated incoming members. Yet it appears that the

54 Columbian Centinel, Aug. 11,1790, as in Howay, Voyages, 145.
55 For more on Perkins’ view of Ingraham’s voyage, see Carl Seaburg, Merchant Prince o f Boston: CoL T.
H. Perkins, 1764-1854 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
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BMS’s interest in Ingraham stemmed not only from Magee’s financial interest in the 28year old captain, but also from his navigational work. Significantly, Robert Gray, captain
first o f the Lady Washington (who sailed as escort to the Columbia) and then o f the

Columbia herself was not inducted into the society, nor does he appear to have been
nominated. Furthermore, Perkins’ favorable impression o f Ingraham, established in
China, most likely stemmed from his abilities as a navigator, as Ingraham as first officer
would not have played a significant role in striking deals while the ship was in pert.
Once the Hope sailed on September 16th, 1790—-just six weeks after arriving
aboard the Columbia—Ingraham took data collection seriously, as BMS requirements
stipulated. Like earlier Marine Society members, Ingraham drew charts and included
information that was easy to use and took great care to record navigational information
on charts that others could later consult. For example, as the Hope cruised down the
South American Atlantic coast, Ingraham oriented the chart with south at the top o f the
page, an orientation that placed South America on the left as it was while a vessel coasted
towards Cape Horn. Ingraham’s charts also emphasized a local, in addition to a global,
orientation. With the same patriotic relish that marked Ingraham’s return in the

Columbia, he brought national politics into his navigational science. Ingraham centered
his charts’ graticules (which measured eastward and westward progress) on Boston as
well as London, placing Ingraham’s home port on an even footing as the Royal

56 Ingraham was not the only crewmember from the Columbia voyages to receive membership in the BMS.
In 17% Robert Haswell was also inducted, but only after several other successful voyages.
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Figure 13: Hope s Track in the South Atlantic.
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Figure 13 (conL): Hope's Track in the South Atlantic.
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Observatory. Sailing to China, Ingraham included in his manuscript charts profiles o f the
island o f Formosa, drawings reminiscent o f medieval sailing ratters and far more useful
to a navigator approaching an island from sea than simply a top down plan. Ingraham’s
cartographic work was not the only area where he showed a dedication to systematic and
critical research. In addition to recording manuscript charts and providing types o f
information and orientations focussed on ease o f ship-board use, Ingraham also consulted
U 1C p U L /liO U C U

I I +o w o + i

U lW iO iU lW

XLVAAA V O i U V l

i i mf mo r c

V liu a i^ d .

Ingraham ’s dedication to navigational science reveals an intensive scholarly

interest in navigation and exploration. More than that o f any other early American
navigator to the Pacific in the 1790s, Ingraham’s journal mimicked the language and
structure o f previous journals o f exploration. Unlike other merchant mariners, Ingraham
cited the accounts o f British explorers in his journal in a comparative and critical manner
that offered those who would follow his journal the references needed for a
comprehensive understanding o f a given navigation challenge. For example, with his
usual modesty, Ingraham recounted
Of the Falkland Islands I was able on my last voyage to give a short description,
relating to Brett’s Harbor in particular, where the Columbia lay a fortnight At
present I shall offer no apology that I do not make any addition to my former
faint attempt as the jealousy o f the Spaniards confined me on board during our
stay. I must, therefore, refer the reader to Commodore Byron’s account of the
isles when he visited them in 1765 (Hawkesworth, vol. i, p.48) or to the more
perfect one o f Mons. De Nerville, who resided three years at Port Soledad, then
called Port Lewis (See Monsr. De Bougainville’s voyage, chap. 4, page 44).57

Ingraham did not merely cite previous voyages, however. With a critical eye to detail
and his own observations, Ingraham critiqued not only the accounts by some o f the most
famous European explorers o f the 18th century, but also their attitudes towards nautical

57 Ingraham, Journal, 26.
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science. With a critical tone characteristic o f 18th century enlightened skepticism,
Ingraham wrote
I was much surprised to observe the remarks o f Mons. Bougainville, that
experienced and celebrated navigator, relative to this bird (page 127 English
edition) which in spite of the great respect due his nautical abilities I can term no
better than idle prejudice. After speaking of some bad weather they had
experienced, he said, ‘During all this time we saw the birds called
quebrantabuessos or albatross and what in all seas of the world is a bad sign,
petrels, which disappear when the weather is fair and smooth.’ Were this really
the case I believe few would attempt a second voyage to sea ..

Y et Ingraham was not merely a naturalist on a vessel, and Ingraham saw data
collection as the key to safer navigation. A s captain o f one o f the first American vessels
to venture into the Pacific, Ingraham saw him self as part o f a larger project that saved
lives through scientific observation and research.
Shipwreck is often the fate of mariners, but more especially those who pass
through unknown seas, which must often be the case with those who
circumnavigate the globe. However they may endeavor for their safety to tread
the steps of others who have preceded them, yet by various unforeseen causes
they will at times fall in with dangerous shoals or lands seldom frequented and
not well known.59

The most important element o f an explorer’s duty, therefore, was to produce accurate
charts. Yet Ingraham was not a captain o f a voyage o f exploration like other Europeans
who sailed in the Pacific before him. Like his Marine Society colleagues in Boston,
Ingraham saw the improvement o f charts as a job that aided everyone, explorers and
commercial mariners alike, and not just a task for a designated survey voyage.60
Consequently, Ingraham kept the Marine Society’s edicts for observations close in mind

58 Ingraham, Journal, 34.
59 Ingraham, Journal, 19.
60 Ingraham, Journal, 153.
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during his voyage. In addition to navigational observations about harbors, and bays, he
also collected information about seawater temperature and bird life. In rounding Cape
Horn, Ingraham recorded
The same afternoon by some accident my thermometer was broken, to m y great
mortification, just as we were about to arrive where memorandums o f its rate
might have afforded pleasure to the curious. Besides it deprived me o f the
pleasure of gratifying some o f my friends by these observations, which I
promised prior to my departure from America.61

Once in the Pacific, Ingraham kept accurate navigational logs, noting course
tracks, birds, marine life, and changes in the make up o f the marine growth on the Hope’s
bottom.62 Sailing north towards the equator in April, 1791, Ingraham noted a number o f
new islands, which, through a detailed discussion o f de Bougainville’s accounts o f
Spanish voyages in the Pacific (specifying the edition and page number o f the English
version consulted) and o f Cook’s accounts o f his voyages, Ingraham determined to be
undiscovered. “As I could not from the most diligent search find the least account o f
these islands, I conceive there could be no impropriety or presumption in naming them
and claiming the discovery as my own.”63 After indicating their positions, Ingraham
proceeded to name them with the same patriotic flourish with which he undertook the
voyage. The group he named the Federal Islands, in honor o f the new government o f the
United States, with individual islands named Adams, Lincoln, Federal, Franklin, Knox
and Hancock.64

61 Ingraham, Journal, 41.
62 Ingraham, Journal, 42.
63 Ingraham, Journal, 63.
64 These islands are the northwest group of the Marquesas Islands. Nukuhiva (Federal Island), Ua Huka
(Washington Island), and Ua Poa (Adams Island) are some of the larger islands.
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Ingraham’s dedication to navigational data collection and analysis—often with
scholarly interest in previous voyages as w ell—reveals that he saw him self in a tradition
o f British naval exploration into the Pacific, beginning with Drake, then followed by
Anson, Wallis and finally Cook. Ingraham looked upon his role as captain o f the Hope as
being to make observations that would allow other American vessels to follow.
Yet Ingraham pursued his work in a different environment from the European
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were specifically scientific, their purposes being either astronomical observation or
exploration, and all shared government sponsorship and used Royal Navy vessels and
personnel.65 The Columbia and the Hope, on the other hand, ventured into the Pacific as
private trading ventures, and lacked the financial resources that allowed a purely
scientific voyage. Consequently, Ingraham carried two mutually exclusive goals into the
Pacific: on one hand, to use his navigation to return a profitable voyage for his owners,
and on the other, to return with public information that would help others compete with
his employers in that same trade.
The tension between the private nature o f his employment, and Ingraham’s public
goals as a navigator and explorer emerged most clearly in matters o f communication back
home. To Ingraham, who also viewed his success in terms o f keeping his crew alive and
happy, letters to and from home were essential means to maintain morale. To Perkins,

65 Glyndwr Williams, “The Endeavor Voyage: A Coincidence of Motives,” in Science and the Exploration
in the Pacific: European Voyages to the Southern Oceans in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Margaret Lincoln
(Rochester, New York, 1998), 3-18. Williams questions whether Cook sailed for astronomical
observations or for the purposes of exploration. In either case, his voyage was intended to be the scientific
and navigational foundation for future commercial expansion and was not expected to turn a profit in and
of itself His suggestion that the Admiralty chose Cook because of his experience with colliers, and not
because of his technical skill, ignores his previous cartographic experience with J. F. W. DesBarres in
North America. A recognition of cartographic skill would further his own argument in favor of the
Endeavor’s sailing as a voyage of discovery.
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however, such information could enable competitors to better challenge Perkins’
potential lock on the Pacific Northwest market. Consequently, Perkins imposed tight
strictures prohibiting the transfer o f commercially sensitive information through letters to
loved ones at home.
Tngraham first encountered these limitations while on board the Columbia in

1788. Ingraham’s colleague, Robert Haswell, reported that Captain Gray took up Captain
William Douglas’s offer to carry letters back to India, and then to the US when the

Columbia met up with British vessels in the Pacific Northwest in 1789. Shortly
thereafter, however, Captain Douglas returned Gray’s letters claiming he was not
touching at India. Robert Haswell, at anchor in Nootka Sound with Ingraham and the

Columbia, was skeptical: “This scheem was w ell [concerted]. . . he was fearful that
through the letters to our connections some information would be communicated relative
to the trade on the Coast that would be o f disadvantage to the interest o f his companey.”66
Ingraham encountered this restriction again aboard the Hope. Even though the

Columbia sailed after the Hope, and would normally out o f consideration carry letters for
her crew from family and loved ones, the Columbia’s owners forbade that service.
Fortunately for Ingraham, Robert Haswell, then aboard the Columbia on her second trip,
freely ignored the order, and carried the letters anyway.67 “For these letters, I am
indebted to Mr. Haswell, who brought them unknown to the owners o f the Columbia.
These gentlemen, filled with envy against all who mean to share with them this valuable

66 Howay, Voyages, 50.
67 Ingraham, Journal, 113.
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trade, gave orders that no letters should be borne out in their ship to anyone on board the
Hope.”68
Ingraham spent the summer o f 1791 trading along the coast o f the Pacific
Northwest, and to his pleasant surprise, collected a remarkably large number o f skins for
trade in China. Expecting financial windfall, Ingraham recorded that by August 15th, he
had already collected 850 skins. Two weeks later, Ingraham wrote: “I had now been
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equal to 1400 sea otters, over 300 sables, and some beavers wolverines, etc. I esteemed
m yself very fortunate indeed.”69 When Ingraham arrived in China, however, he did not
realize his fortune. Believing Americans and Europeans to have sided with the Russians
in a border dispute, Chinese authorities closed Canton to western shipping, pulling the
bottom out o f the skins market, and making American and British traders scramble for
means to unload their useless cargoes. To make matters worse, Ebeneezer Dorr,
Ingraham’s supercargo and business agent, left the ship as soon as the Hope arrived in
China., and returned to Boston to libel Ingraham as a drunk, a whore-monger, and an
ineffective captain. After trusting another captain who had a line on some smuggling
routes, and leaving the rest o f the cargo in storage, Ingraham returned to the Pacific
Northwest with the pressures o f a foiling commercial voyage looming over his head.70
Ingraham’s next season fared worse. James Magee, part owner o f the Hope, came to the
coast aboard the larger and better-stocked Margaret and undercut Ingraham in the Native

68 Ingraham, Journal, 113.
69 Ingraham, Journal, 146.
7
0

See Kaplanoffs introduction to Ingraham’s journal for a more detailed account of Ingraham’s
experiences on the coast
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American trade. At one point, Magee agreed to help Ingraham cut his losses by shipping
a partial cargo o f skins to China, a service that Ingraham could gain freight charges for.
At the last minute, however, Magee changed his mind, and like the previous season,
Ingraham returned to China to face financial disaster.

By the time Ingraham returned home to Boston in 1792, his reputation hung in
tatters. Dorr, arriving a full year before his victim could defend himself^ wielded
condemnations that were merely made more believable when Perkins realized Ingraham
left his firm accountable for almost $50,000 in debts in China. In the face o f such a
financial disaster, very few people cared that Ingraham returned with valuable
navigational information. His accomplishments as a navigator—keeping his ship safe,
losing only one man in three years at sea, discovering the Federal Islands, recording
reliable navigational data, and impressing European explorers such as Bodega y Quadra
and George Vancouver—helped pave a smoother road for other Americans to peacefully
trade along the coast. But this was not enough.
Joseph Ingraham, taking his duties to the Marine Society so seriously, revealed
the contradictions between exploration and vocational science, and the Boston Marine
Society membership found itself caught in the middle. Upon Ingraham’s return in the

Hope, the prestigious Massachusetts Historical Society worked with Ingraham and helped
him publish his discovery o f the Federal Islands. But the Marine Society would not
indulge in the celebrations they had three years earlier. With many o f its members retired
to merchant status after an earlier life at sea, the Marine Society relied upon trade and
profit to govern their seafaring concerns. Consequently, when he returned to the
poisoned social environment that awaited him, Ingraham was judged not on his scientific
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and technical success, but rather on his commercial failures. As Ingraham’s family
suffered financially between 1793 and 1799, the Society voted him no support funds nor
did any member offer him a berth on any vessel. Finally, in 1797, Ingraham wrote Henry
Knox for a commission on the US Frigate Pickering, which after eighteen months Knox
granted. On August 20,1799, the Pickering sailed from Newcastle, Delaware and was
never heard from again.
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vocational science, a contradiction that emerged only as captains attempted to meet the
increased scientific needs o f an independent American merchant fleet and the financial
demands o f commercial sailing. While captains could gather information during their
voyages o f well-traveled routes in the Atlantic, the observations o f specific rocks,
headlands, shoals, or even a fast manuscript chart, required for exploration o f more
unknown areas, consumed time and attention that cut into the need to effectively manage
a ship’s commercial dealings. Furthermore, while British explorers operating under
government auspices were expected to publish their findings to spur commerce, Ingraham
and other American navigators working for private investors faced only increased
commercial competition for doing the same. Ultimately, exploration and commerce were
mutually exclusive: while the former voyages were undertaken to promote public
knowledge o f a region that would help others, commercial exploration was predicated
upon private success. This contradiction was not lost on Ingraham’s contemporaries.
John Adams him self worried that American commercial expansion into the Pacific might
be limited by private interests keeping their information private. In writing to John Jay in
1785, Adams worried that “These facts [of commercial opportunities in the Pacific

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

172
trades] are known to individuals in America, but w ill probably be concealed from the
public at large, lest the speculators and adventurers be too numerous for the profit o f a
few.”71 In commercial voyages, the navigational knowledge gained while trading in
unknown areas had to take secondary position to the private profit pursued in the voyage
itself, and in some cases, represented commercially sensitive information that owners
meant to remain private. Ingraham’s inability to find work in any seafaring venture
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the Hope, and demonstrates that the scientific ability was not sufficient to overcome a
captain’s commercial shortcomings.
The tension between commerce and exploration took on greater importance as
more American vessels, and vessels from Boston, competed with earlier pioneers o f the
trade. Citing the renowned Pacific Northwest researcher Frederic Howay’s estimations,
historian Donald D. Johnson shows that between 1785 and 1794, fifteen American ships
competed with twenty-five British vessels working on the Pacific Northwest coast
Between 1795 and 1804, however, those numbers radically changed. British traders all
but disappeared, dwindling to nine vessels in the trade: meanwhile, Americans had fifty
ships on the coast, more than triple the number in the previous decade.72 Vessel
clearances from Boston paint a finer picture o f increasing commercial competition among
Boston traders in the Pacific Northwest. From 1787 to 1792, seven vessels cleared from
Boston for the ftir trade. Between 1793 and 1798, that number more than doubled to 15.

71 John Adams to John Jay, Nov. 11,1785, as quoted in Johnson, United States in the Pacific, 13.
72 Johnson, United States in the Pacific, 32.
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Between 1799 and 1805, that figure more than doubled again to thirty-five.73
Consequently, the Boston fur trade that Ingraham returned to in 1792 was far more
competitive than the one he left in 1787 and in 1790.
Not surprisingly., James Magee’s own voyage on board the Margaret, between
1791 and 1794, reveals how those increased competitive pressures affected Marine
Society members’ data collecting activities. As competition increased, data that would
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individual trader an edge. As a result, Magee returned with fewer discoveries and
observations than he returned with ethnographic “curiosities” that could be used to
anticipate Native American tastes for future voyages.
During Ingraham’s disastrous first season, Magee sailed around Cape Horn on the
larger and better-supplied Margaret. Like Ingraham, Magee was consciously aware o f
his role within a larger American movement into the Pacific trades. As a long time
member o f the Boston Marine Society, Magee carried the same mandate for navigational
observations as Ingraham, and appears to have taken it seriously at least at first. To
record the discoveries that he was sure to make, Magee shipped onboard Jonathan
Howell as an “historian.” to ensure his findings would return to Boston, and set himself
up to make his requisite observations.
Like Prince, Magee used traditional methods to round Cape Horn, such as
soundings and dead reckoning for getting a position as they approached Cape Horn.
1/16/92: “At 8 PM being 4 to 5 miles from off the land was sounded had 14
fathom o f water over a bottom of Pebble stones;...”

73 Data compiled from Mary Malloy, “Boston Men ” on the Northwest Coast: The American Maritime Fvr
Trade, 1788-1844 (Kingston, Ontario, 1998), Part 2.
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1/18: sounded, determined Lat by observation, “Our Long, by Reckoning at
Meridian was 65°25’ W”

From the journal o f the voyage, it is also clear that Magee calculated lunar distances to
determine longitude. Without any date or time noted, a page o f calculations clearly show

that someone onboard the Margaret had the skills and inclination to slog through the
complicated calculations required to use lunar distance longitudinal calculations.
Magee’s few published observations lacked Ingraham’s detail. In 1795, Magee
published a five paragraph account o f his “discovery” o f a group o f islands in the North
Pacific.74 Unlike Ingraham, who carefully studied prior accounts and analyzed his
islands’ previously recorded positions, Magee simply assumed no one had seen them
before. Nor did he bother to land and find out. During his travels, he gave brief and at
best cursory descriptions o f their location and sailed on.
Magee’s voyage show a marked shift toward commercial and ethnographic, and
not navigational, research. Instead o f the rich navigational materials Ingraham collected,
Magee returned with a large number o f Indian and Islander artifacts that gave insights
into the customs o f the Pacific Northwest Indians. Some o f these items—a stone axe,
thread, a comb, a lance and harpoon, and cordage samples—might have given Magee
ideas about what to ship to the Pacific Northwest on his next venture.75 Other items—a
canoe model, and elk’s horn, lip ornaments, a decoy bird, and bracelets—reveal Magee’s
interest in exploring Pacific Northwest Indian culture for more “scientific” reasons.

74 James Magee, “An Account of the Discovery of a Group of Islands in the North Pacific Ocean..
Collections o f the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, 1795), 261-262.
75 This is a very speculative point—according to Mary Malloy, New Englander designed axes and
manufactured goods sold quite well, suggesting that New Englanders did not need to cater too closely to
Indian tastes. That said, however, these items do closely parallel types of manufactures readily available to
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According to Maiy Malloy, American mariners began collecting artifacts as post-war
American learned societies joined in European societies’ keen interests in categorizing
the human, as w ell as the natural world.76 A s a result, Magee looked to cater to those
interests more than any desire to expand upon navigational knowledge.
Nor did Magee make the important discoveries he had planned upon his departure
from Boston. The ship’s historian, Howell, failed to produce any significant write-up o f
M agee’s voyage at all, and what few navigational observations were recorded were
shoddy in comparison to Ingraham’s work and were o f little use to subsequent voyagers.
As a result, Magee’s voyage indicates that the commercial prospect o f Pacific voyaging
took precedent over the need for navigational information, and implicitly acknowledged
the failure o f Marine Society members to combine commerce and navigational research
as they had successfully done in the Atlantic.

As American navigational research and commercial exploration expanded in the
1790s, the Boston Marine Society found itself unable to grow to meet the demands.
Vocational methods adapted from North Atlantic seafaring were simply not enough for
the more complex navigation required in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Onboard ship,
increased trade and competition for profits forced scientific observations to a marginal
status as American vessels entered the world trade arena and butted up against
competitors. In this realm, BMS mandates for publicly useful nautical observations ran
counter to the commercial interests o f privately funded commercial voyages o f trade and
discovery. Furthermore, trade alone made a successful captain. Ingraham’s

merchants assembling trade goods to be shipped to the Pacific Northwest. For a list of items Magee
collected on his voyage, see Malloy, Souvenirs, 94.
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accomplishments, though praised by those outside the commercial world as expanding
national knowledge o f the Pacific, were not enough to salvage his trading career. Finally,
other information about Native American culture, aesthetics, and tastes displaced
navigational information as trading—and not navigation—emerged as greater hurdles to
American merchants in the Pacific trades.
While Marine Society members reacted to new challenges in expanding American
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organization’s role within the Boston nautical publications market. In facing challenges
brought by researchers such as Clarke, Burges, Blunt and others, the Marine Society
found itself relying upon outside expertise for their review process. By 1794, the Marine
Society had all but completely formed out their chart review functions to the
mathematician Osgood Carleton. In addition, while the Marine Society still relied upon
their practical evaluative techniques, such techniques increasingly fell out o f step with
nautical publications that incorporated theoretically informed methods. In reviewing
Churchman’s Magnetic Atlas, the Marine Society admitted to the seafaring community

that their methods lacked the scientific rigor that new publications were being judged
against. As a result, the Marine Society backed away from reviewing other nautical
works presented to them.
These changes in the market may not have been unwelcome. While the Marine
Society spent many years seeking the role o f scientific arbiter, the advances in American
research must have pleased the older members who could remember the few works that
shed light on New England’s poorly charted coastline. In facing obsolescence, the
Marine Society also embraced success. The Revolution freed the Society to throw their

76 Malloy, Souvenirs, 31-33.
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support behind a new nation heavily dependent upon sea-borne trade. The Marine
Society aided Hamilton’s desires to expand that trade, as a patriotic duty, and as a
patriotic organization wedded commercially and militarily to the republican experiment.
Their assistance also granted them new sources o f political influence. Furthermore, other
interests in the welfare o f the Port o f Boston and in the growth o f Federal involvement in
navigation demanded much o f their attention. Yet changes wrought by a new American
republic soon marginalized the Society from centers o f Federal patronage, as political
changes and market structures diminished much o f the Society’s influence and role in
national navigational research.
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CHAPTER V

MARKET, POLITICS, AND METHODOLOGY: THE END OF VOCATIONAL
SCIENCE, 1800-1807

IT by 1798, the Boston Marine Society could still claim to be leaders o f Boston’s
m aritime community., their status as such was short lived. While no single event marks

the demise o f the Marine Society’s influence, it is clear that changes in national politics
and international affairs undermined the Society’s political and social standing. Just as
the Marine Society was able to use scientific expertise to secure greater political
influence, the loss o f political influence helped to weaken acceptance o f their vocational
scientific methods. Furthermore, fundamental changes in American navigational
research in the first ten years o f the nineteenth century displaced vocational methods
from the forefront o f nautical research. Consequently, the Marine Society’s prestige as
the best and brightest navigators came to an end not simply because better navigational
and surveying methods finally became more widespread. In addition to the better known
changes in navigational practices then affecting the maritime world, changes in national
politics, international affairs, and the increased role o f the open market o f ideas in
determining research accuracy, all undermined the social and scientific foundations upon
which the Marine Society based its authority. By 1811, the Marine Society, perhaps a
victim o f its own success, retired from national politics and their dominant role in the
nautical publications market, and returned to the fundamental issues o f mutual aid and
local port management with which it had begun.
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It can be argued that the BMS’s claim in 1789 to represent a united set o f
m aritim e interests in Boston, ranging from mariner to master to merchant, reflected in

some sense the political reality in the town. Yet through the 1790s fissures within that
unity emerged and split both the mercantile community and the Federalist party.
Beginning with Jay’s Treaty and Adams’ handling o f French tensions in the Caribbean,

merchants divided over how to deal with Britain and France. Such fissures grew through
the decade, allowing new merchants allied with Jefferson’s Republican party to make
steady gains in Boston elections. With Jefferson’s election in 1800, Boston’s mercantile
community, once united under the Federalist banner, sat widely divided.
Jay’s Treaty in 1795 first revealed splits within Boston’s maritime community.
New men in trade and other non-Federalists initially despised the treaty as giving too
much to Britain without anything in return. The treaty supposedly addressed American
concerns for impressed seamen, high seas searches o f cargoes, and British withdrawal
from northwestern forts in the Ohio country, in exchange for favorable trade terms to
British merchants. When the terms o f the treaty returned to the US, however, many felt
that Jay had given up too much for too little, at the expense o f favoring British over
French trade.
As a result, the treaty alienated many new merchants who had staked their
chances on new trade opportunities with France and its West Indian islands. For many
merchants in New England, and Boston in particular, new avenues to trade with France
created new opportunities for aspiring traders unable to break into traditional trades with
British houses. Newly prominent traders—such as fur trader Russel Sturgis, James
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Bowdoin (the son o f the late governor), Samuel Brown (merchant and purchaser o f
Thomas Hutchinon’s estate), Ezra Davis and John Brazer (shipbuilders and merchants),
and grocer Amos Binney—all had developed significant ties to France in the 1790s.1
When, Jay’s Treaty threatened such trade by granting favorable trade status to Britain in
exchange for almost nothing— and to the exclusion o f France—Republican opposition
mounted in increasing force.2
Federalist traders, mostly those who continued traditional trades requiring ties to
British trading firms and British credit lines, supported the treaty as a means to ease
international tensions and stabilize the commercial climate. Jay’s negotiations preserved
American access to British ports and appeared to address American concerns over
western forts on the American frontier. The treaty also appeared to establish clearer
definitions o f which cargoes Royal Navy vessels would seize as war materiel bound for
Revolutionary France, thus reducing confusion and possible losses as the Royal Navy
enforced its blockade. While initially despised as a sell out to British interests at the
expense o f American complaints, Jay’s Treaty went on to receive tremendous public
support fueled by an increasing, and increasingly lucrative, mercantile sector benefiting
from war time prices in Europe.3
As Jay’s treaty revealed new divisions within Boston’s mercantile community, the
XYZ Affair o f 1799 revealed growing splits within the Federalist party, which
traditionally had supported policies favorable to trade with Britain. Beginning in the

1Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans o f Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic
(Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 97-101.
2 Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 97-98, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism:
The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (New York, 1993), 431.
3 For Jay’s Treaty effect on public opinion, see Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, 431-449.
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early 1790s, French corsairs had increasingly attacked and seized American shipping to
the West Indies. Federalist merchants in Boston saw French assaults on American
shipping as yet another reason to ally formally with Britain. These merchants saw the
French Revolution representing the worst elements o f democracy released against a
world o f orderly, peaceful trade. To Federalists, this was readily apparent in the West
Indies, where international warfare and retreating British forces left French colonial
to rritA rio o i n n lto n c
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American vessels as valid war prizes, French privateers poured forth from West Indian
islands hoping to gain great wealth at the expense o f American traders.4
French attacks on American trade effectively drove up insurance rates from 6% in
1796 to more than 33% by 1798. As American losses mounted—with more than 330
American ships seized in 1797 and 1798 alone— American profits and trade declined,
while overhead costs soared.5 For “High Federalists,” such as Secretary o f State and
former Essex County Representative to Congress, Timothy Pickering, privations against
American shipping formed a solid foundation for war against France and an alliance with
Britain, whose naval forces could protect American shipping in the West Indies.
President John Adams, however, sought to avoid war at all costs, or at least use it
only to protect American overseas shipping and reduce insurance rates.6 And while
conservative, pro-British Federalists sought war, Adams worked to restrain such impulses
by balancing the defense o f American trade and honor with the costs and risks o f full-

4 Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, 643-662.
5 Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, 645.
6 Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, 647.
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fledged engagement in the Wars o f the French Revolution then raging across the
Atlantic.7
In 1798 Adams dispatched to France a negotiating team led by Republican
Elbridge Gerry seeking an end to the informal war between the US Navy and French
privateers that had wrought havoc with American trade to the Caribbean. Before Adams’
negotiations for peace could commence, however, French delegates, given the
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such treatment, Federalists claimed the incident vindicated their pro-war position, and,
seeing the bribes as an insult to American national honor, Adam s recalled the entire
delegation in the spring o f 1798. Yet Gerry remained in France, hoping to open
negotiations through informal meetings. With Gerry’s help, and against the advice o f
more hawkish Federalist members o f his cabinet, Adams agreed to re-open negotiations
with France to end the informal war.
Jeffersonian Republicans emerged as the true winners from the whole crisis. As
Federalists split over Adams’ French policies, Republicans continued to make steady
gains within the Boston mercantile community.8 For more common Boston residents,
Jefferson’s popular platform o f the 1790s emerged as an alternative to the elitist
platforms o f Federalists such as Nathaniel Ames, Timothy Pickering and Stephen
Higginson.9 Furthermore, prominent Boston Republicans such as Benjamin Austin, John

7 Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, ch. 14.
8 Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, 725-743; Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, chs. 7 and 8; Ronald P.
Formisano, The Transformation o f Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-1840s (New York,
1983)ch. 3 and 108-110; and Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian
America (New York, 1980), 185-188.
9 Formisano, Transformation, ch. 6. This is not merely a question of populist politics versus deferential
styles of politics. Formisano points out that Jeffersonians used deferential political practices in some
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Sullivan, and Levi Lincoln held strong ties to the populist Hancock faction in Boston
politics from the 1780s and early 1790s, and benefited from Republicanism’s appeal to
popular feelings among artisans and workers in the seaport community.10
Consequently, the split in the Federalist party combined with Jefferson’s
increasing popularity in New England coastal towns and countryside helped propel
Jefferson into the presidency in 1800. The new administration brought with it new feces
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Federalist and Republican at inauguration, within the first years o f his presidency
Jefferson purged 146 incumbents out o f the 316 second-level offices in 1801, or about 46
percent. Out o f those, Carl Prince has identified at least 118 as Federalist office holders
named to the posts by previous Federalist administrations.11 While Federalist judges and
internal revenue inspectors received the brunt o f Jefferson’s removals, the customs
service also took heavy losses. The President removed 50 o f 146 customs officials, 41 o f
whom were Federalists.12 These changes had significant impacts on northeastern port
towns. New York and Philadelphia saw only one incumbent in the entire customs
establishment retained in each port. In New England, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
watched all its customs officers ousted, as did New Haven and Middletown, Connecticut.
Massachusetts saw ten customs officers removed, though not in Boston. There, Jefferson

circumstances while Federalists began to appeal more directly to common voters. Furthermore, Formisano
argues that deferential politics remained a common feature of Massachusetts campaigning well into the
nineteenth century. Consequently, such findings return the matter to substance and the message of the
candidates and their supporters rather than just the style of the campaigns.
10

Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 97,100-101.

11 Carl E. Prince, “The Passing of the Aristocracy. Jefferson’s Removal of the Federalists, 1801-1805.”
Journal o f American History, 57 (1970-1971) 565.
12 Prince, “Passing of the Aristocracy,” 570.
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let Benjamin Lincoln stand in office, likely due to his political moderateness and his
influence with wealthy Boston merchants o f all political creeds. Lincoln also bent with
the change in the political wind. In November, 1802, Lincoln instructed his lieutenants to
remember the appropriate place for partisan politics:
1 know gentlemen that I may appeal to you with the highest confidence that you
will assent to the truth of the declaration that I have never attempted to controul
your political creeds, or influence any of your work in the choice o f officers at
any o f our [ ] meetings. If I have ever said any thing on the subject it has been
[at] the meetings, [it has been to] exercise your rights and give your votes as your
best judgement dictates. 1 also wish that on all proper occasions you will express
your sentiments with firmness & freedom and never feel yourselves under
controul from any quarter, but such as shall be dictated by cool reflection, good
information & judgement To all this I think you are justly entitled. But if any of
you have gone further and have in the public walk, vilified the chief Magistrate
o f the Union in terms rude and indecent and should justify yourselves that herein
you only express your right, I have to ask that you will in future recollect that
there is a difference between Right & the propriety o f expressing that right. A
word to the wise is enough.13

Despite Lincoln’s survival, however, Jefferson’s customs service purges
elsewhere in N ew England had done their damage to Federalist control o f Massachusetts
civil service.14 In other areas o f civic leadership, Republicans were also encroaching
upon Federalist bastions. For example, after his election, Jefferson named physician,
Constitutional delegate and Republican orator Dr. Charles Jarvis to head the Charlestown
Marine Hospital, originally called for by the Marine Society, in 1805. Republicans also
went head-to-head with the Massachusetts Medical Society and Cambridge’s bastion o f
Federalism, Harvard University, to open the institutions to non-Federalist, elite families.15

13 Benjamin Lincoln to [Officers under his direction], Nov. 19,1802, L. Shaw Papers (Massachusetts
Historical Society, Boston, Mass.).
14 On the importance of the customs service because of the patronage attendant with such positions, see
Prince, “Passing of the Aristocracy,” 570.
15 Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 166-169.
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Not surprisingly, Boston also underwent significant changes in its political
representation at the same time. While returning votes for the Federalist candidates for
President, Boston sent Republican Dr. William Eustis to the House o f Representatives in
1800. Also a moderate, but on the Republican side o f the aisle, Eustis had a
distinguished military service in the Revolution and during Shays’ Rebellion, serving as
surgeon in both conflicts. He remained moderate in the vituperative political debates o f
A A tw f Ar tv t r f c
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him as respectable and able to be worked with. Moderate or not, however, Eustis was a
Republican, and one with sufficient ability eventually to serve as Madison’s Secretary o f
War.16 In addition to changes at the Federal level, Massachusetts Republicans made
considerable gains at a local level, controlling the General Court from 1806 to 1812
(except for 1809), winning the executive for the first time in 1807, and repeating the
performance four times from then until 1812.17
Consequently, when the dust cleared after Jefferson’s Revolution o f 1800, the
unified maritime community that the BMS had claimed to represent in 1789 could not
even be imagined. No longer could the BMS present itself as representatives o f the
community, for the community was no longer sufficiently focussed for a single, and
mildly partisan, body to see itself as its leader. Furthermore, the BMS found itself on the
wrong side o f the political spectrum and with significantly fewer ties to government
patronage sources. The Marine Society’s white-paper urging Adams to war in 1798

16Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 98-99.
17Goodman, Democratic-Republicans, 154.
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suggests that they sided with high Federalists.18 Yet with Lincoln hemmed in by
Republican placemen, and planning to retire so o n , and with Boston represented in
Congress by a Republican, the strings to Federal resources that the BMS had been able to
call upon in the 1790s were either severed completely or tied to dead-ends. As long as
Federalists held the Massachusetts executive, the Society could still exercise some
influence in the port, but after 1807 the political forces which they had ridden to success
in the 1790s had washed away. Without a unified community to represent, and without
ties to Federal funds that could serve as such a foundation’s proxy, the BMS’s influence
in Boston politics ebbed.

Jefferson’s election reduced the BMS’s political influence. The test case came in
1803, when it called for the preservation o f a Boston Harbor island called Nick’s Mate.
Similar requests for local improvements had met little resistance in the 1790s. When the
Republican Congress balked at the Society’s proposals, however, it was clear that the
BMS did not hold the same influence that they had a decade earlier.
Since the seventeenth century, a small island called Nick’s, or Nix’s, Mate
marked the Broad Sound approach that ran southeast from Boston harbor. While the
island was large enough to show relatively prominently on Southack’s 1694 chart o f
Boston harbor, by 1800, the island had been all but washed away.

18 See Elkins and McKitrick, Federalism, 619-641, and 665-672, for more lengthy discussions of the
political debates over foe mission within Adams' cabinet
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Figure 14: Detail, John Hills, [Boston Harbour, with the surroundings, etc.].

Figure 15: Detail o f Nixes Mate, U.S. Coast Survey, Boston Harbor.
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In September, 1803, the Marine Society unanimously voted to approach Lincoln
for Federal funds to prop up the island against the elements. Requesting his
recommendation to the State Department, the Society proposed that a wall be constructed
around the island “to protect it from total destruction by the violence o f storms o f the
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approaching season.”19 The society then petitioned Congress directly in December,
basing their appeal, as they had in the past, on their status as “fathers o f the maritime
people”

The Boston Marine Society taking a lively interest in all that concerns the
Communal property o f the United States, and feeling it a Duty incumbent on
them to point out improvements or advantages which may immediately affect the
Communal interests of this Metropolis, beg leave to Express to the Honourable
Congress o f the United States, the necessity o f preserving an ancient Land mark
o f the greatest importance to the Navigation o f the Port o f Boston.20

After describing the extent o f the island’s erosion and its important position to Boston
shipping, the Society also informed Congress that they had approached Thomas Knox,
the island’s owner, about selling the island. In addition to building a wall around it, the
Society also requested that a beacon be erected to mark the channel more clearly.
Ultimately, such improvements were not a local issue, but rather a national one, as “It is
the opinion o f this Society that a [project] increasing to the revenue o f the United States
[ultimately] is the consequence o f such precaution, by preventing many o f those
accidents to which vessels are over exposed in dangerous [and] narrow channels.”21
Their initial request attracted Eustis’ attention, whose request for a budget for the
project in January 1804 compelled the society to call a special meeting. Yet the matter
stalled after Eustis’ initial correspondence. For the next five months the Society had no
word from Eustis, and at their May meeting, the Society voted that Master Nathaniel
Goodwin ask him for an update. The details o f that meeting were not recorded, but

19BMS Minutes, Sept. 6, 1803.
20 BMS Minutes, Dec. 6,1803.
21 BMS Minutes, Dec. 6, 1803.
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subsequent inaction suggests that the Marine Society’s request did not receive
Congressional support At a special meeting in June, the Society moved to take their
appeal to the governor o f Massachusetts.22
Unlike their petition to Congress, their June petition to Governor Caleb Strong
dropped language that spelled out their role within the community. “The Island is o f
importance as a Land mark to all coasting vessels entering this port from the northward
and Eastward, being surrounded by an expansive body o f Rocks, bordering on the main
Channel, which renders it extremely dangerous to approach at all times.”23 Instead o f
relying upon their role in Boston’s maritime community, as they had with their petition to
Eustis, the Society presented its appeal to the state legislature based on pragmatic
considerations. Without appeals to duty or reminders o f obligation, the Society asked
that their petition be laid before the legislature. The Society also implicitly pledged
federal funds to offset state expenses on this account. “A s the object is o f a general as
w ell as o f a local nature, it is presumed that whatever may be done under the immediate
authority o f the State, will be acceded to and reimbursed (as injustice it should be) by the
general government at the next session o f Congress.”24
The Marine Society’s failure to secure Federal funds fomented a change in the
language o f their state petition, a change that revealed a shift in their understandings o f
their own role within the community. Since 1789, the Marine Society had legitimated
their petition on the port’s behalf with their status as fathers o f the maritime people o f the

22 BMS Minutes, Jan. 11, May 1, and June 14,1804.
23 BMS Minutes, July 3, 1804.
24 BMS Minutes, July 3rd, 1804.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190
state. Their petition to Congress carried much o f the traditional tones o f a natural elite
looking after the wards they assumed responsibility for. In approaching the state in 1804,
however, such language disappeared, replaced instead with arguments founded upon
strict utilitarian assessments o f costs and benefits. While their roles within the
community allowed them to make the petition, the importance o f granting it had less to
do with leadership than with protecting shipping. Such a change in language, while
subtle, marks an important change in the Marine Society’s view o f themselves within the
community. Without their powerful friends in Washington, the Marine Society began to
step away from their self-proclaimed role as representatives o f the maritime interests o f
the port. Instead, their petition to the Massachusetts governor indicates a return to a
technical foundation o f their authority. In petitioning the state, the Marine Society’s
expertise as masters, rather than their social roles, formed the foundation o f their appeal.
The governor looked favorably upon the designs o f the Society. On June 22,
1804 Governor Strong passed through the General Court a resolution granting the Marine
Society $3000 for the restoration o f Nick’s Mate and for the construction o f a beacon to
mark the channel. In spite o f this grant and the previous urgency o f the Marine Society’s
earlier appeals, work did not begin until the following year. In the following March, a
Marine society committee sailed to the island to survey the required work, and in June,
the committee joined efforts with one CoL Rice, who was appointed by the state as
superintendent o f the project.25
Work progressed through the summer and into the fall, so that by November, the
remnants o f the island lay surrounded by a 6-foot thick and 16-foot high wall enclosing

2
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BMS Minutes, June 4,1805.
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an area 14-feet long and 32-feet wide. A colum nar beacon 32 feet high, “o f the
magnitude which [the committee] have no doubt w ill answer the purposes contemplated

[for guiding shipping]” also “ stood in the middle o f the stone basement” and marked the
island for incoming traffic.26 Despite the success o f the project, the work outstripped the
initial budget by an additional $4000. In response to a separate appeal presented to the
Massachusetts legislature by the Marine Society and CoL Rice, the General Court granted
the additional funds.
The Nick’s Mate project, while itself a minor affair, brought to the fore a
significant change in the Marine Society’s relationship to the Federal government.
Whereas throughout the 1790s the Marine Society used its close collaboration with
Lincoln and other Federal agents to rely upon Federal funds for local navigational
improvements, political changes in Washington denied them such support by 1803.
Rather than directing Federal resources towards harbor improvements, Jefferson’s
election in 1800 removed Federalists friendly to both the Marine Society’s interests and
to Lincoln’s status within the party. While Eustis may have been interested in supporting
the Marine Society’s petition to Congress, lack o f Federal support forced the Society to
approach the state for funding which had, in the previous decade, emanated from Federal
coffers.
Ultimately, the Embargo o f 1807-1809 polarized Boston’s maritime community
more than all previous crises. Jefferson’s embargo was an attempt to find a third way
between the Scylla o f war with Britain, and the Charybdis o f war with France. Both
options risked alienating important domestic constituents and antagonizing strong

26 BMS Minutes, Nov. 5 , 1805.
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European powers with little respect for American neutral trading or, for that matter,
sovereign rights on the high seas. In Boston, the embargo embittered Federalists who
saw Jefferson’s prohibition o f foreign imports and exports as the president mortgaging
their livelihoods for the sake o f a Francophile administration. For Republican defenders,
the embargo symbolized an American determination not to suffer impressments and
seizures on the high seas from either Britain or France. In refusing to export or import
goods from Europe, Jefferson tried to use America’s commercial weight in the Atlantic
economy to bring the two strongest European powers to the negotiating tables.27
Boston’s opposition to the embargo was very mixed. Boston’s Federalist paper,
the Columbian Centinel, masked their political attacks on the embargo in populist terms.
With news o f the embargo arriving in late December, the Centinel appealed to readers’
sensibilities with a letter from “Jacob Standfast” to “Jonathan Holdfast” recounting how
his friend “Nell’s” plans for marriage had been postponed because her betrothed, “Jack
Anchorstaff” had lost his job with the embargo. “The poor fellow’s turn’d out o f

employment—not mind ye, because he did not conduct right! for he was d'tarnation
good boy and earned money fair.” The embargo had inflicted such misfortune upon the
honest sailor and his dutiful love. Standfast continued to trail the implication o f the
embargo throughout the economy: Jack wanted to buy a fishing smack, but because
Standfast could not sell some land and crops to help him out, such an investment was out
o f the question. The fisheries, the Federalist polemicist continued, were also closed to
Jack as well, with British cruisers able to operate freely along the New England coast.
Carpentry, another o f Jack’s skills to make a living, was also likely to yield no

27 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 209-235.
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recompense during the embargo, as few would likely build with the threat o f war.
“[M]ayhap the plan may be, for we can only guess which[,] is to drive all our sailors and
mechanics to Virginia and the southward to help the slaves plant cotton, rice, tobacco.”28
The Republican Independent Chronicle presented their support for the embargo in
less ambiguous terms, and characterized Federalist partisanship as a denial o f the popular
wilL
The Embargo must be considered by every considerate citizen the most wise and
prudent measure to be adopted by the government. It would be the greatest folly
for the Americans to sport their property between the contending powers of
Europe.. . .To this prudent measure the Essex Junto, or the British Faction, are
opposed, and every method will be taken to raise jealousy and dissension in the
country, to frustrate the embargo.29

The Independent Chronicle’s editors also anticipated Federalists’ populist appeals and
saw opposition to the Embargo as Tory treason.
We shall hear a great deal about the poor farmer and poor tradesman, on account
of the embargo; but the fact is that, the persons who are making the outcry are
those, who care neither for the farmer nor the tradesman. We have in every
seaport a new tangled group o f nom inal m erchants, who are very willing to risk
their vessels and cargoes at sea—knowing that if they are taken, they shall not be
the losers, but the loss will fall on the tradesmen and farmers who trust them ...
.We know “by their roaring,” the government has hit them right.’ The more the
Tories roar, the better for the country. We found this was true in ‘75—and the
same group of Traitors are now growling at the measures of government.50

While Boston may have been still a center o f Federalism before the embargo,
Boston Republicans were making gains and splitting popular support. Both sides
increasingly vilified their domestic political opponents. For Republicans, Federalist
opposition to the embargo signified their willingness to trade seamen’s rights and lives
for continued trade with an unabashedly disrespectful Great Britain, which had been

28 Columbian Centinel, Jan. 2,1808.
29 Boston Independent Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1807.
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forcing American sailors to serve in the Royal Navy against their w ill since 1793 and
before. For Federalists, Republican support for the embargo symbolized their willingness
to destroy the wealth and property o f New England merchants in favor o f abstract
principles and British deserters.31
Despite c laims from successive historians about mobs o f unemployed seamen and
“Jefferson’s nightcaps” sitting on top o f mastheads in protest, researchers into Boston
shipping records reveal a different story'.32 Examining the ship news from the Columbian

Centinel, Robin D. S. Higham, for example, found that coasting voyages almost doubled
during 1808, the only full year o f the embargo. Furthermore, such an increase in the
coasting trade more than made up for decreases in overseas clearances. In 1807,535
coasting vessels cleared into Boston and 486 vessels cleared out. The following year,
1,267 coasting vessels cleared into Boston, with 1,192 vessels departing. Overseas traffic
suffered dramatically, but the trade was not entirely shut down: 1807 saw 907 ships
arrive from overseas and 573 vessels depart. In 1808, such numbers fell to 330 vessels
arriving, and only 71 departing. When outbound vessels are tallied, more ships cleared
out o f Boston in 1808 than did in 1807: a total o f 1,059 ships cleared out o f Boston, on
traditional voyages along the coast, to Europe, and to the West Indies. The following
year, however, that total rose to 1,263 ships, leaving mostly on coasting voyages.
Consequently, the embargo did not shut-down all o f Boston’s shipping.

30 Boston Independent Chronicle, December 21st, 1807.
31 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 218-220.
32 Despite claims as this practice being a symbol of protest, Higham points out quite correctly that capping
mastheads protected the end grain of the spar from drying and developing cracks while the vessel remained
laid up for routine maintenance and during the winter. See Robin D. S. Higham, “The Port of Boston and
the Embargo of 1807-1809,” American Neptune, 16 (1956), 189-210.
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Yet statistics o f arrivals and departures do not tell the full story. W. Jeffrey
Bolster revealed a similar increase in coastwise arrivals and departures in Providence,
Rhode Island during the embargo. But while many vessels were still sailing, Bolster
notes that profits suffered tremendously. Instead o f carrying lucrative cargoes, coasting
ships faced dropping freight rates for several seasons. Vessels that had previously sailed
internationally transferred into the coasting trade at the same time as the embargo
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Providence during the embargo literally carried nothing but “bags o f bags.”33 While
more vessels were still sailing, profits and wages fell o ff dramatically.
Governor James Sullivan’s notorious generosity with shipping permits for Boston
vessels also helped keep some mariners working through the embargo. Throughout 1808,
Sullivan was remarkably lax in allowing Boston masters to run grain to Maine—grain
that often missed Maine entirely and wound up in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
Such smuggling runs, while risky in and o f themselves, also helped keep Boston mariners
at work and ships at sea. Bolster cautions us to be wary o f romanticized visions o f Maine
smuggling. Most Providence vessels that found new ports in Maine during the embargo
cleared their cargoes legally, leaving the tricky smuggling work to locals familiar with
the Passamaquoddy Bay area.34
Whatever its impact on the local economy, the embargo forced the BMS to
withdraw from political affairs as it had from charitable issues. With foreign policy

33 William Jeffrey Bolster, “The Impact of Jefferson’s Embargo on Coastal Commerce,” Log ofM ystic
Seaport, 37 (1986), 111-123.
34Bolster, “Impact,” and Joshua M. Smith, “Patterns of New England Smuggling, 1789-1820,” in The
Early Republic and the Sea: Essays on the Naval and Maritime History o fthe Early United States, ed.
William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford (Washington DC, 2001), 35-54; John D. Forbes, “Boston
Smuggling, ISQ7-I1£\5,” American Neptune, 10(1950), 144-154.
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polarizing Boston’s maritime community, the Marine Society lost much o f its luster as
“fathers o f the maritime people.” While the society said nothing directly about the
embargo itself its long association with Federalists placed them in a camp whose
opposition to the measure ran counter to many mariners’ own growing nationalism and
patriotism.35 Consequently, the Marine Society’s traditional role between 1800 and 1807
grew increasingly out o f step with those they claimed to represent. In November, 1808,
m e lvjuuiuw o O u w i) vuiw u u i a i iiS
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“embarrassing state o f the trade,” and never again would the society dine in public as
they had in the 1790s. After the embargo, annual dinners did reconvene, but the annual
affairs reverted back to the private gatherings that they had been before 1787.
Structural and managerial changes in 1808 further marked a separation from the
community. Instead o f monthly meetings, the society resorted to quarterly meetings,
reducing the days that members gathered as a cohesive civic body. Furthermore, the
society created a board o f trustees (who continued to meet monthly) to manage charity
requests and payments, bond issuance, and the society’s finances. The net effect o f these
changes was to create an internal hierarchy that distanced the members from one another
and the society from the town at large. Quarterly meetings greatly reduced the number o f
times members met not only to discuss business, but to also view themselves as a
concerted group that shared a unique social and vocational role within the community.
Furthermore, trusteeship meant that individual members had less say in how society
funds were allocated and charity distributed.

35 Paul Gilje lays out this dynamic in, “The Meaning of Freedom for Waterfront Workers,” in Devising
Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic, ed. Thomas Koenig (Stanford,
California, 1995) pp. 109-140.
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The Marine Society’s role at the higher levels o f government was all but over on
the eve o f the War o f 1812. Between 1805 and 1811, the society continued to discuss the
management and maintenance o f Boston Harbor buoys and beacons, pilot and port
warden management, and to evaluate the visibility o f Winslow Lewis’ new lighthouse
lamps.36 In 1810, when Winslow Lewis asked their approval for a new design o f
lighthouse lamps—a design that he managed to sell to American lighthouses—the BMS
conducted similar experiments as they had for their review o f Cunningion’s lamps earlier.
Less scientific and more vocational, the society approved o f the lamps and reported
favorably back to Lewis Shortly afterwards, they met with Henry Dearborn, Lincoln’s
successor as Collector for the Port o f Boston about harbor markers.37 While the Society’s
opinion in these mostly local affairs was important, the society did not extend their
interests beyond the Port o f Boston.
Membership trends reveal the society’s decreasing ability to retain its local
relevance and attract new members. New member induction increased dramatically in
the 1790s as the society took more active roles in local charity and politics. Yet, as
Boston’s politics grew more divisive in the late 1790s and early 1800s, the society found
fewer captains willing to join, even at a time when Boston overseas trade expanded
tremendously.

j6 For discussion with Lincoln regarding local buoyage and beacons in Boston Harbor, see BMS Minutes
May 6, June 3, July 1, and Aug. 6, 1806. For Pilot management issues, see BMS Minutes Feb. 3,1807.
For Port Warden management, see BMS Minutes, Nov. 1, 1808. For Winslow Lewis lamps, see BMS
Minutes, June 5,1810.
37 BMS Minutes, July 11,1810.
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Table 6: BMS New Members by Year, 1781-1806.

BMS New Members fayYear, 1781-1806

1781

1786

1791

1796

1801

1806

Year
Source: Baker, Boston Marine Society, 318-369.

Reaching a high o f 20 in 1798—the year the society sent its foreign policy white-paper to
President Adams, new membership dropped o ff dramatically except in 1806 and 1808.
Between 1788 and 1800, the society inducted an average o f about 12.5 new members per
year. Between 1801 and 1812, that figure dropped to seven. To put the matter in more
dramatic terms, the society inducted more new members in the three years from 1798 to
1800 (49) than it did in the first twelve years o f the nineteenth century (48). Furthermore,
the 1808 peak o f eleven new members represents a heightened interest by masters feeing
the economic uncertainty o f the embargo. After the embargo was lifted, the Marine
Society could not attract fresh members
The Society’s union o f navigational science and political influence received the
final blow in 1811, when local planners at home and in Washington did not even feel the
necessity o f consulting the Marine Society regarding the construction o f a lighthouse at
Scituate, Massachusetts. In a shrill petition to Albert Gallatin, the Society found itself
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explaining to Jefferson’s Secretary o f the Treasury why his decision to erect a light at
Scituate Harbor should have included their input
In this instance it may not be irrelevant to state to you the situation which this
Society has now been placed for many years, to demonstrate more clearly their
motives on this occasion. The Boston Marine Society originated in an
Association o f old and respectable Ship Masters in the year 1742, with a view to
promote the general interests o f navigation and to assist the unfortunate
members and their families. Since which period this Society has increased in
numbers and respectability with an accumulation of considerable funds; and is
now composed o f upwards one hundred former masters who have been retired
from the Sea with adequate fortunes, many o f whom are largely interested in the
insurance Offices and as Underwriters [emphasis in original], and about fifty of
the most respectable merchants & Ship owners and Gentlemen of the highest
stations in the Commonwealth, the rest of the society is composed of the more
active & younger Mariners who still follow the Seas as a professional business.
The importance o f this Society, connected with the knowledge & experience of
its members, has been recognized by the Legislature o f this State in various
instances, and their immediate agency and recommendation are necessary to the
appointment o f Pilots and many other Officers connected with the general
affairs of Commerce.

After informing the Secretary o f their past experience, the Society expressed their
displeasure at realizing that “The first notice the Marine Society had o f the intended Light
House was the publication o f proposals for erecting the Buildings, &c.”38 Calling a
special meeting to discuss the new light, the Marine Society opposed the construction o f
a light on a variety o f grounds. First, the potential for confusing incoming masters who
may have been at sea when the light was announced remained too high for the light to be
lit.
Cape Cod Light is now a steady fixed Light, eight leagues from Cape
Cod Light W by S is Plymouth Light also a fixed Light, Six Leagues NW by N
from Plymouth Light is Scituate Light, at present intended to be a fixed light,
four leagues from Scituate Light NW is Boston Light, the whole distance being
about 18 leagues forming nearly a segment o f a circle by the horizon. Vessels
approaching either o f the above mentioned lights in the usual course from the
East by North, they will each be seen in about the same direction, say South
westwardly, and in the night no land being seen, the Light is o f course the only
guide, the destinations being Boston or one of the nearest Ports, it is absolutely
38 BMS Minutes, OcL 9, 1811.
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necessary that the Light be seen should be known, as the course and distance
from one being mistaken for the other would almost inevitably lose the vessel,
cargo, and lives.

Secondly, placing a light at Scituate Harbor invited new dangers, as more ships would
seek refuge in the small harbor.
To increase the danger, the Cohasset Rocks lying in a North and Westerly
direction from Scituate two leagues from the shore are always considered the
most dangerous to approach & always fatal when a ship strikes on them; these
rocks may have been originally the cause o f the petition for the Light on Scituate,
but the intention o f a Light House being to point the safe way to a Harbour, this
object is totally lost in the present case for Scituate is a harbour dangerous to
approach in bad weather and cannot be entered except at high water when there is
only ten feet water, and it is only used by a few small coasting vessels in the
daytime and simmer season. All of these observation will apply to Scituate Light
where it shall be universally known as an established Light, with how much
greater force they apply now when so such knowledge exists and no notice has
been given.

Finally, if the light should be constructed, the Society recommended that some means o f
making it distinct at night would also help prevent confusion.
As they had done in 1768 with Gurnet Point Light in Plymouth, and in 1798 with
Cape Cod Light, the Society offered their expertise to help notify the public.
And in the mean time, the Boston Marine Society will endeavor to have prepared
and published general directions as may point out the marks, bearings, distances,
and situations of each of the Lights on this coast, which may be circulated
through the medium o f the Custom House to aid our maritime Brethren in
reaching their Port of destination in Safety.39

Finally, the Society recommended that the government postpone lighting Scituate station
until March, 1812, to give time for ships at sea to return and receive appropriate public
notice o f the new light to avoid confusion.40

j9 BMS Minutes, Oct. 9,1811.
40BMS Minutes, Oct. 9,1811.
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Despite the good sense o f the Society’s ideas, Gallatin did not accept their
recommendations. Scituate Light was lit in 1811, and the society never published sailing
directions taking the new light into account. Furthermore, a petition from the Society
presented to Congress on behalf o f the residents o f Truro, Cape Cod for building a
lighthouse at Race Point fell upon equally unreceptive ears. While the Society submitted
the proposal in February, 1811, the light itself was not constructed until 1816.
By 1811, the BMS’s role in Boston’s community had radically changed, 'while
there may not have ever been a wholly unified maritime interest, it was clear that the
changing political landscape and embargo politics highlighted divisions that even the
Marine Society could not ignore. Facing a breakdown o f unity within a community they
had sought to represent, the society retreated from scientific evaluations to port
management affairs where its authority remained strong.

As the Marine Society lost its ability to wield political influence, it also lost its
authority over Boston’s—and the nation’s—nautical publications market. Two trends in
the organization o f American navigational science converged in the first decade o f the
nineteenth century to undermine the BMS’s vocational approach, and consequently, their
social status derived from that work. First, market-share, and not social status as
navigators, emerged as a key determinant o f the accuracy o f any given set o f charts or
plans. Beginning in the late 1790s, Edmund March Blunt responded to a growing
American demand for charts, pilot books, and navigational texts fuelled by the expansion
o f American shipping. By combining older vocational navigation methods with newer
ones— such as Maskelyne’s lunar distance method—that required more tr aining with new
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instruments and more complicated calculations, Blunt realized great success with the

American Coast Pilot and The New American Practical Navigator whose popularity
quickly set the standard. Second, beginning in 1807, the Federal government took a more
active leadership role in the promulgation o f navigational research and surveying than it
had before. The creation o f the US Coast Survey in that year, set up along European
academic lines rather than American vocational lines, marked the Federal government’s
first attempt at creating a permanent, government funded center for navigational science.
Both these pressures converged by 1807 to make vocational science, and the BMS, less
relevant in the scientific realm than they had been before.
Blunt entered the nineteenth century undeterred by the BMS’s condemnation o f
his charts in 1798. Before submitting his chart o f Georges Bank to the BMS, Blunt had
already received wide acclaim for his publication o f Capt. Lawrence Furlong’s American

Coast Pilot (1796). In many ways, this work represented the best that vocational
surveying methods could produce. In a single volume, Blunt and Furlong published
sailing directions for every major port along the North American coast. Despite Blunt’s
claims to be completely original, many parts o f the work were copied from earlier coast
pilots such as John Norman’s American Pilot (1791), and Cyprian Southack’s 60 year old

New England Coast Pilot (ca. 1729-1734), which included material copied from John
Sellers’ The English Pilot: The Fourth Book (1689).41 Its original aspects emanated not
from an academically trained surveyor, but from a mariner with years o f experience
sailing along the North American coast. His experience, guided the composition,
organization, and publication o f the American Coast Pilot. What made Blunt’s work

41 John F. Campbell, History and Bibliography ofThc New American Practical Navigator and The
American Coast Pilot (Salem, Mass., 1964), 29.
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unique, however, was that neither Norman, nor Southack, nor Sellers included directions
for so many harbors in a clearly organized single source. In prior sources, both Southack
and Norman squeezed the specific directions for a given port in the margins o f a larger
chart, which, in a way made sense—giving the directions for the relevant ports on the
area in focus. Yet following that line, captains only had directions for harbors for which
they had charts. In compiling a comprehensive collection o f sailing directions, Blunt
presented a new tool to the maritime community that, while not completely accurate,
gave much more information more efficiently. Blunt’s success stemmed not from the
accuracy o f the directions, but from the comprehensiveness o f the collection and the
work’s ease o f use. Consequently, masters embraced the single compendium
enthusiastically, despite its potential inaccuracies. Given the state o f marine surveying
throughout the eighteenth century, few mariners would have been surprised to find that
directions and charts carried glaring inaccuracies.
To help sales, Blunt went to other respected members o f the navigational
community. In February, 1796, Blunt submitted the work to the Newburyport Marine
Society, who, along with the branch pilots for Newburyport, and other coasting captains
along the eastern seaboard communities, filled similar roles as the BMS did for Boston.
Locally known and respected pilots and masters were the best informed on the navigation
o f their respective home harbors. Furthermore, as fellow Newburyport residents, Blunt
and Furlong both had connections to the pilots and coasting captains operating out o f
Newburyport, and likely discussed pre-press editions before the final publication date.42

42 As a member of the Newburyport maritime community, Furlong would certainly have had dealings with
the branch pilots and other captains, and may have actually taken some of his directions from their shared
logs. Blunt, as newspaper publisher and seller of nautical and religious books, also was likely to have had
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The work met with quick success, and Blunt ran revisions in 1798 and 1800, and in 1804
greatly expanded the work to include small charts for key harbors along the coast43
Blunt’s success with the American Coast Pilot represents, in one sense, the
success o f vocational science methods. Without deferring to the BMS, Blunt embraced all
the major foundations o f the Marine Society’s authority over nautical publications in the
late 1790s. Like the Marine Society, Blunt relied upon masters with long-term sea
service and experience for his information. Like the Marine Society, he distributed his
work to other captains for peer review and approval. And, like the Marine Society, he
made sure that such approvals were prominently and publicly printed in the volume in
question.
Blunt’s works differed from the Marine Society’s review projects in one crucial
way. Where the Marine Society’s local reputation gave them the authority to determine
accuracy, Blunt’s works were received as accurate because o f their market popularity. In
bypassing the BMS, Blunt went to the centers o f critical review that would more likely
see the work favorably, and not the most established and revered group in the area. For
Blunt, the endorsements o f masters and pilots were not ends in and o f themselves, but
rather the means by which his publication would sell more rapidly. In addition, the
commercial success that Blunt realized with the American Coast Pilot sidelined most
other competitors in the nautical publications market, and helped undermine BMS

strong ties to local captains, thereby giving him access to their expertise in compiling earlier drafts of the
work.
4->Harold L. Burstyn, At the Sign o f the Quadrant: An Account o fthe Contributions to American
Hydrography Made by Edmund March Blunt and His Sons (Mystic, Conn., 1957) 16; Campbell, History
and Bibliography, 31.
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authority.44 In doing so, however, Blunt was doing more than merely ignoring
established centers o f authority. He was taking advantage o f an expanding publishing
market to achieve financial success, creative autonomy, and ultimately authority him self
over nautical publications.
While Blunt’s American Coast Pilot gave his press the reputation as a solid
nautical publishing house, it was Blunt’s publication o f Bowditch’s New American

Practical Navigator that cemented his place as an authority over American, and later
British, nautical publications. While the New Practical Navigator was a study in the
calculation o f position and the American Coast Pilot was a compendium o f sailing
directions, the two works had a common theme. Beginning in 1799, Blunt printed and
sold editions o f Jonathan Hamilton Moore’s New Practical Navigator (1772). Like The

American Coast Pilot, Moore’s work was part original, and part plagiarized from John
Robertson’s The Elements o f Navigation (1754). Moore and Blunt, however, shared the
same secret for success: it was not the novelty o f the ideas that gave them their fortune
and fame, but rather the comprehensiveness o f presentation. In revising Robertson.
Moore included writings and tables from Astronomer Royal N evil Maskelyne and others
whose independent innovations worked to simplify navigation.45
Firmly rooted in the maritime community, however, Blunt recognized that the
more complicated mathematics and tables contained in Moore were likely beyond his
maritime colleagues’ skills. Consequently, Blunt called upon longtime BMS ally and

44 Burstyn makes this claim wife no evidence supporting it, but Campbell’s references to die repeated
revisions supports Burstyn’s claim well. See Burstyn, At the Sign o f the Quadrant, 16; Campbell, History
and Bibliography, 31.
45 Campbell, History and Bibliography, 14-15.
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advisor Osgood Carleton and Nathaniel Bowditch to correct the calculations and simplify
the tables in the first two editions o f The New Practical Navigator.*6 Bowditch sat
astride two sets o f navigation practice: older methods o f navigation embraced by masters
such as those o f the Marine Society, and the new methods coming from London requiring
more mathematical training and understanding. A native o f Salem, he went to work in a
counting house at an early age, and at 22 began the first o f five sea voyages to the East
Indies, during which he worked as supercargo and eventually master. Bowditch’s innate
talents showed early, however, and encouraged by such Salem literati as Rev. William
Bently, he learned Latin by reading Newton’s Principia, and embraced complex
mathematics.47
In many ways, Bowditch represents a transitional figure in the change from
vocational science to more academic studies. As ship captain, Bowditch knew the
demands and practical limitations o f com plex observations and calculations made while
driving a ship in the open-ocean, fatigued and sleep deprived, and under less than ideal
circumstances. At the same time, however, he had the intellect and training to engage
academic navigational research on its own terms, and in several different languages—
skills which he used to translate Laplace’s Mecanique Celeste (1829,1832, 1834, and
1839). Consequently he blended the theoretical, mathematical, and geometrical
intricacies o f navigational calculations, w hile at the same time considering the many
other demands upon a captain’s time while a vessel was underway. Ultimately, Bowditch

46 Campbell, History and Bibliography, 16.
47 For more detailed biographies, see Nathan Reingold’s biographical sketch in Dictionary o f Scientific
Biography, Charles Coulston Gillispie, ed., s.v. “Nathaniel Bowditch.” See also Stephanie Ocko,
“Nathaniel Bowditch,” Early American Life, 10 (1979), 38-39 and 70-74. In addition to Reingold’s piece,
Campbell has the best bibliography of works by and about Bowditch; Campbell, History and Bibliography,
50-61.
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did more than just correct Moore’s tables—he redid them. By 1802 this comprehensive
revision compelled Blunt to sell the work under an entirely new title as The New

American Practical Navigator. He simplified the procedures and made position
calculations more accessible to ordinary, commonly educated mariners.
In choosing to publish Moore, and then Bowditch, Blunt appealed to a different
category o f navigator whose interest lay beyond just the sailing directions contained in
Furlong. I f Furlong appealed to Blunt’s simpler navigators, Moore appealed to those
moving into the regions beyond the Capes that required masters to understand how to
calculate longitude by methods that went beyond simple dead reckoning—in particular,
using lunar distances. Blunt’s decision to publish Moore revealed his acknowledgement
that new methods, requiring more specialized training, were coming into the American
shipping industry. By publishing Moore, Blunt was also covering the bases and
introducing to American mariners a practice o f navigation that utilized academic research
and thereby required navigators to have a greater mathematical understanding.
Bowditch’s revisions and simplifications were so successful that in 1802 Blunt
had sold the rights to an English edition for 200 Guineas. Even as more academically
trained astronomers came to challenge Blunt’s claims o f accuracy, his reputation and
dominant market share helped ensure that The New American Practical Navigator and
the American Coast Pilot would remain standards within the navigational field.48 With
both the American Coast Pilot and The New American Practical Navigator, Blunt’s
reputation for accuracy rested upon more than just improved methods—a claim which he

48 For a discussion of Blunt’s work as the national standard and the challenges he faced from the
astronomer Edward Hitchcock, see Jordan D. Marche II, “Restoring a ‘Public Standard’ to Accuracy:
Authority, Social Class, and Utility in the American Almanac Controversy, 1814-1818,” Journal o f the
Early Republic, 18 (1998), 693-710.
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would not hold onto for long. In addition to the technical innovations introduced by
Bowditch, the popularity and market share o f Blunt's publications allowed him, and
subsequently his sons, to become the acknowledged center o f navigation publications
until the US Hydrographic Office assumed the publication responsibilities for the New

American Practical Navigator in 1867.49

Jefferson’s election marked not only an important change in American politics,
but also an important change in the organization o f American science in the early
nineteenth century. Under the Washington and Adams administration, sciences received
very little, if any, funding from federal sources. Concerned over the war debt, Congress
proved reluctant to approve funds for proposals sent to the national assembly. In
addition, Congress was unwilling to set precedents for funding national scientific work.
With the exception o f a national copyright law, Congress backed away from granting
funds to scientific expeditions for fear o f recreating the patronage networks many felt
were un-republican.50 Furthermore, Federalists used Jefferson’s academic scientific
interests against him during the elections as a symbol o f his Deism, his Francophilia, and
his inability to understand the more immediate needs o f a new nation.51

49 Burstyn, At the Sign o fthe Quadrant, 85.
50 Brooke Hindle, Pursuit o fScience in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789 (Chapel Hill, 1956), 259. A.
Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History o f Policies and Activities to 1940
(Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 14. For the debate over Federal developments and fears of un-republican
patronage, see John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise o f
Popular Government in the Early United States (Chapel Mil, 2001).
51 Linda Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca, New York,
1970), 67-94. See also Dupree, Science in the Federal Government, 21.
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Jefferson’s election, for the first time, placed an Enlightenment savant in the
national executive office. And while Jefferson and other scientists were forced to bend to
the more utilitarian desires o f their Congressional colleagues, Jefferson’s interest in
science as an academic and philosophical pursuit influenced his scientific policies. In
proposing the Lewis and Clark expedition to Congress in 1802, for example, Jefferson
argued that the expedition’s voyages through then Spanish-held territory held potentially
useful and practical commercial advantages for the young nation. Yet when Jefferson
approached the Spanish government with the idea earlier in 1802, the president
emphasized the expedition’s scientific goals. As George H. Daniels has argued, such
inconsistencies were not necessarily mutually incompatible. Regardless o f the ultimate
goal o f the expedition, Jefferson was not content to merely send surveyors and
outdoorsmen—those whose occupations made them ideal for the work and who could
have provided some scientific observations. Instead, Jefferson ensured that he sent along
academically trained naturalists to record, in systematic fashion, all the natural history
and anthropological information that could be obtained.
In creating the US Coast Survey in 1807, however, Jefferson did more to
undermine the Marine Society’s scientific authority than all other changes in American
science. In many ways, Jefferson took on the mantle that the Marine Society had laid
before Congress in the late 1790s for a systematic survey o f the coast Some argue that

52 George H. Daniels, American Science in the Age o fJackson (New York, 1968). 25. See also George H.
Daniels, Science in American Society: A Social History (New York, 1971), 177-179. As John Gascoigne
and Miller and Reill have also shown, science and commerce were key elements to the British Empire at
home and abroad at roughly the same time. See John Gascoigne, Science in the Service o f Empire: Joseph
Banks, the British State, and the Uses ofScience in the Age o f Revolution (Cambridge, 1998); David Philip
Miller, “Joseph Banks, Empire, and ‘Centers of Calculation in late Hanoverian London,”; and Alan Frost,
“The Antipodean Exchange: European Horticulture and Imperial Designs,” in Visions o f Empire: Voyages,
Botany, and Representations o f Nature, ed. David Philip Miller and Peter Hanns Reill (Cambridge, 1996),
21-37 and 58-79.
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the impetus for a coast survey came from the American Philosophical Society, as Robert
Patterson and John V aughn, both o f the APS, submitted the idea to Jefferson possibly as
early as 1800.53 Yet the language creating the survey closely mimicked the language the
Marine Society used in their charter defining their survey work. The director o f the Coast
Survey was authorized to survey “the islands and shoals with the roads or places o f
anchorage, within twenty leagues o f any part o f the shores o f the United States; and also
the respective courses and distances between the principle headlands, together with such
other matters as he may deem proper for completing an accurate chart o f every part o f the
coasts.”54 Furthermore, as the Marine Society requested in 1798 and inexplicably
dropped, the Coast Survey was also ordered to undertake a detailed survey o f Georges
Bank and Nantucket Shoals.
Although the original idea for the Coast Survey might have originated with the
Marine Society, its members would not have any role in its direction. Rather than
appointing Marine Society members, who were arguably some o f the most experienced
navigators in America, Jefferson went instead with Swiss bom Ferdinand Hassler in
1807. Hassler carried all the training that Jefferson felt a proper scientific surveyor
should have. Trained in Europe in trigonometric and geodetic surveying, he also carried
the academic pedigree o f having studied at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris where he had
met chemist Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier and astronomer Jean-Baptiste Delambre.

53 Hugh Richard Slotten, Patronage, Practice, and the Culture o f American Science: Alexander Bache and
the U.S. Coast Survey (Cambridge, 1994), 42; Gustavus A. Weber, The Coast and Geodetic Survey: Its
History, Activities and Organization (Baltimore, 1923), 1-2; A. Joseph Wraight and Elliot B. Roberts, The
Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1807-1957 (Washington DC, 1957), 4-6.
54 2 Stat. L., 413, as quoted in Weber, Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1.
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Carrying this impressive vita with him to America in 1807, he rapidly fell into favor with
Jefferson as a gentleman o f the highest scientific training available.
Taken together, Jefferson’s role as Enlightenment savant and philosopher, his
faith in academic training, his hand in the Lewis and Clark expedition, and his shaping o f
the Coast Survey all marked an important shift in the organization o f American science.
As specialized learned societies and societies for the promotion o f useful knowledge
formed in other areas o f scientific interest, Jefferson led the Federal government into the
navigational science world that had hitherto been run by marine societies and nautical
publishers.55 Jefferson’s choice o f Hassler, rather than an American with the vocational
experience that had previously served as adequate credentials, signaled the end o f
vocational science as a dominant force in the American scientific world. Even though the
Coast Survey did not begin its work until after the war o f 1812, the creation o f the office
removed the last special claim the Marine Society held with Washington.
The federalization o f coastal surveying marked an end to the brief moment when
the Marine Society’s vocational methods held their greatest effect, and the Marine
Society its greatest influence. It is important to stress, however, that new methods were
not the driving agent o f change in the American scientific world. New navigational
techniques had indeed emerged by 1810 to replace older, less accurate ones. These new
methods, however, allowed new researchers and publisher to capture markets with new
manuals and texts catering to new techniques. Furthermore, newly available methods
that relied heavily upon higher mathematics opened a door for theoretical researchers to

55 For the advent of specialized learned societies, see Daniels, Science in American Society, 145-149; John
C. Greene, “Science, Learning, and Utility: Patterns and Organization in the Early American Republic.” in,
The Pursuit o fKnowledge in the Early American Republic: American Scientific and Learned Societiesfrom
Colonial Times to the Civil War, ed. Alexandra Oleson, and Sanborn C. Brown (Baltimore, 1976), 1-20.
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enter into the realm o f navigational practice. Bowditch and Hassler represent the leading
edge o f this spectrum. Their success signaled the transition from navigational research
performed by vocationally adept investigators to research based more heavily upon
theoretical principles and academic disciplines. With government leading academically
trained surveyors, and Blunt’s popular works setting the standard for practical accuracy,
little room remained for the Marine Society’s former influence over Boston’s nautical
publications market. Perhaps grudgingly, perhaps with relief, the Marine society retired
from its active role in navigational science by 1812, and returned to its original emphasis
upon mutual aid and local port administration, a focus it has retained to this day.
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CONCLUSION

In many ways, the Marine Society was a victim o f its own success. It entered the
1790s with clear goals—to improve navigational aids along the coast, work with the
Federal government to build more lighthouses, establish marine hospitals, and secure
Federal support for a systematic coastal survey. By 1807, the Society had accomplished
these goals, and as new centers o f governmental support and funding eventually took on
the responsibility o f ensuring safer navigation, the Marine Society returned to their
immediate task o f aid in the management o f Boston’s own waterfront.

From a historical perspective, however, the Marine Society accomplished much
more than just navigational improvements. Between 1750 and 1812, the Boston Marine
Society was a center o f colonial scientific investigation independent from European
learned societies and academies. In responding to their unique colonial situation—one
defined by mercantile trade and imperial political relations—the Marine Society adapted
their charitable institution to produce the kind o f scientific knowledge required by the
city’s main source o f economic growth. In doing so, they took on responsibilities that
other American scientific societies and universities were reluctant to embrace. Unlike
other American academies that historians have argued lacked the independence to direct
their own efforts, the Marine society defined a research agenda, developed
methodologies, utilized available instrumentation and resources, analyzed findings, and
presented their results to the larger community. Far from dependent upon the accolades
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and patronage o f European bodies, the Marine Society forged ahead on its own,
investigating the natural world to address local needs.
Recognizing what the Marine Society did outside academic centers o f research
helps to correct an important bias in the history o f American science. In research
published from the 1950s onward, science has been strictly—and teleologically—defined
by reference to the institutions which would emerge in the nineteenth century as centers
o f scientific inquiry'. Such strict definitions marginalized other forms o f research that
productively operated in a different late-eighteenth century climate. The feet that the
Marine Society’s vocational science approach did not survive into the nineteenth century
does not mean their work was less effective than other research done contemporaneously.
Before the second quarter o f the nineteenth century, science remained an open field to
many who would not later be considered scientists.
N ot only did the Marine Society emerge as an alternative center o f research, it
also developed new methods adapted from daily navigational practices. Those vocational
methods existed side-by-side with other methods requiring intricate instrumentation and
training in complex theories emanating from academies. Just as the Society adapted itself
to meet the research needs o f colonial Boston, it developed methods that utilized the
limited skills and instruments available in the colonial shipping community. Far from
crippled by the dearth o f learned academies and instrument makers, the Marine Society
overcame colonial shortcomings in both institutions and methods by taking advantage o f
local resources.
Domestically, navigational research formed the foundation for the Marine Society
to expand their work into quasi-govemmental and political realms. In addition to
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cataloging N ew England’s maritime resources, the Marine Society’s role in chart-making
and chart publication highlighted their ability—and suitability—to wield significant
influence in the nautical publications market and in Boston’s political affairs. Similar to
Joseph Banks in London, albeit on a smaller scale, the Marine Society successfully, but
briefly, used their scientific authority to promote their own political agenda.
The Marine Society’s actions in the 1790s also reveal important new angles on
contemporary American political culture. Most importantly, the Marine Society’s work
with Hamilton and other Federal representatives demonstrates that political deference
was not simply handed over to Federal authorities after the ratification o f the Federal
Constitution in 1789. Such support emerged through a complex process o f negotiation
and exchange, whereby Hamilton earned political support by responding to the needs—
and in some cases demands— o f locally important organizations. This process also
highlights the importance o f local affairs in national politics in the early Republic. As
other scholars have shown, Federalists cared far more about local affairs than had been
previously acknowledged. The Marine Society’s concerns over local maritime
improvements was but one set o f interests Federalists had to consider to retain power.
Finally, the Marine Society’s experience after 1795 shows the complex process
through which important technologies change. Vocational methods lost their prominence
in Boston’s seafaring community not simply because better methods came along. In fact,
the basic practices the Marine Society members used in the 1760s continued to be used
by ship captains w ell into the nineteenth century. The Marine Society’s vocational
methods were overshadowed by new challenges arising from expanding American
commerce and changes in the marketplace o f ideas. It was not enough that dead
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reckoning and simple running traverses were not good enough to bring American vessels
into the Pacific trades. Rather those simpler methods could not do so on a commercially
competitive level. The purpose o f the voyage— in this case commerce— was just as
important as how the ship was navigated. Furthermore, the right to proclaim accuracy
shifted away from respected bodies such as the Marine Society. As tim e went on,
publications’ sales and market share alone were presented to the public as sufficiently
reliable indicators o f accuracy. In addition to newer and better navigational methods, the
forces o f market and commercial competition converged to undermine the Society’s
authority in Boston’s nautical research world.
The Marine Society developed navigational methods that allowed them to
maximize the skills and instrumentation they had at their disposal in colonial and post

colonial Boston. They did so to help ensure safer navigation, reduce shipping costs, and
introduce some modicum o f stability in an uncertain industry. In the process, they also
came to wield significant influence within the community itself. They used this influence
to further their desires for improved navigation through Federalist administrations
sympathetic to the needs o f international and coastal shipping. Far more than merely a
practice limited to a few technically adept masters, navigational science briefly defined
influence and power as the young nation developed new understandings o f leadership and
authority.
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APPENDIX A

‘Directions to Sail into Plymouth,” The English Pilot: The Fourth Book (London 1698),
p. 20.
Seven Leagues exactly West from the Point o f Cape Cod lieth the Haven o f
Plymouth, lying in West, known by a round Hummock o f Land, Lying on the North-side,
called the Gurnet, and on the South-side a high double Land, called the Monument-Land;
you must sail in by the Gurnet-Land, which is the Channel-side, for the Pay' from the
Monument-Land three quarters over is exceeding bad, Shoal, and Quick-Sand, dry in
divers places; but nearest the Gurnet is a fair sailing Channel, where you may ride safe
against all winds but an Easterly Wind, which is forced from your Anchors, you must run
further up, and anchor within Sandy-Island lying on the West-side called Brown’s Island,
be carfeul for there is dry Sands on both sides, the Ground is generally foul in the
Harbour, especially the first entering.
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APPENDIX B

Directionsfor Sailing in and out of Plymouth Harbour; Taken by Moses Bennett, William
Rhodes, Thomas Alien, and Nathaniel Green. . .In July, 1768 (1768; Boston 1785).
The Light-House stands on the Gurnet Head, with two Lanthoms placed N.N.W.

lA W. and S.S.W. X
A E. at 11 Feet 6 Inches Distance.
These Lights are about 86 Feet from the Surface o f the Sea, and cannot be brought
into one to the Northward, unless you are on shore—But to the Southward, you may
bring them in one, which is a very good Mark to clear you o f Brown’s Island or Sand
Bank.
The High Land o f the Monument bears from the Lights S. %W. 3 miles, and
Monument Point S.S.E. 3 Leagues, and Branches Point N. X
A W. about 3 Leagues, and
Saquash Head W. X
A S. 2 Miles, and the Easternmost part o f Brown’s Island or Shoal that
dries S.S.W. one Mile and Quarter, and the Gurnet Rock from the Body o f the Light
House E. by S. 3A S. the third part o f a Mile; on this Rock you have but 3 Feet at Low
Water which you must observe; all the Soundings are taken—When you have shut the
first Sandy Hill with Gurnet Head, you are clear o f the Rock; after which you must mind
not to hale in too close to the Head, as there are many sunken Rocks some Distance from
Shore. When you bring Saquash Head to bear W. by N., you may then steer up W. by
S., and if you are bound for Plymouth, you must keep that Course for a large red C liff on
the Main, which is a very good Mark to cany you clear o f Dick’s Flat; then you must
steer more Southerly for Beach Point, or run up untill you are abreast o f Saquash Head,
giving it a Quarter Mile Distance; then steer W. by S. A S. which will clear you o f Dick’s
Flat, and carry you directly for Reach Point, keeping within 25 or 50 Yards o f the Sandy
Point, steering away to the Southward, keeping that Distance untill you have shut in the
Lights, where you may anchor in 3 and 4 Fathoms, but the Channel is very narrow,
having nothing but a Flat all the Way to Plymouth, except this small Channel which runs
close by this Neck o f Land, you w ill have 4 and 5 Fathoms close to this Point. If you are
bound into the Cowyard, you must steer as before directed, which will clear you o f
Dick’s Flat and the Muscle Bank, observing to keep the House on the Gurnet Head just
open with Saquash Head, untill you have opened the High Pines with Clarke’s Islands;
then you are clear o f the Muscle Bank, when you may steer N.W., untill you have 3
Fathoms at low Water, not running into less.
In coming from the Northward bound into Plymouth, you must not bring the
Lights more Southerly than S. by W., to avoid high Pine Ledge, which lays N. from the
Gurnet Head about 2 X
A and 3 Miles: When you are on the shoalest Part o f this Ledge,
some Part o f which appears at low Ebbs, you will have the High Pines in Range with
Captain’s Hill, which will then bear W. by S.—This Ledge o f Rock lays one and a half
M ile from the Shore, extending about N.N.E. for near a Mile, and close to this Ledge you
w ill have 4 & 5 Fathoms, and deepens gradually as you run from it to the Eastward;
within a Mile you have 10 and 12 Fathoms.
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In coming from the Southward, bound into Plymouth, you must not open the
Northern Light to the Westward, but may keep them in one which w ill carry you in 5
Fathoms by the Easternmost Part o f Brown’s Islands or Shoal, keeping that Course, untill
you are within a half M ile o f the Gurnet Head or higher, where you w ill have but 4
Fathoms; then Saquash Head w ill bear W by N a little Northerly, and the two outermost
Trees on the Head in one, then you may steer directly for them until you bring the Light
House to bear E.N.E. and the House on Saquash to bear N.W. just open with the first
Sandy Beach, where you may anchor in 4 Fathoms in Saquash Road in good clear
Bottom; but if you are bound for Plymouth, or the Cowyard, you must steer as before
directed.— If in the Night, it is best to anchor here, as it is difficult to Make Beasch Point,
if dark, or to go into the Cowyard.
In turning into Plymouth, you must not stand into the Northward in than 3
rauiUiuS, oS it xum
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Heads Lays o ff a Point o f Rocks a good Way from the Shore, many o f them are just
under Water at low Ebbs—And all the Way from Saquash on the Muscle Bank, you have
shoals water: to that you must not stand in less than before mentioned—And in standing
over for the Sands to the Southward, you must go about as soon as you have shoalen your
Water to 4 Fathoms, as it is bold too, and you may observe the Ripps, unless it is very
smooth. This Sand extends from abreast o f the Lights to Beach Point, most o f which is
dry at low Ebbs. From the Easternmost Part o f the Sand to Dick’s Flat, it rounds in a
considerable Sweep: you have but 5 Fathoms Water from the Easternmost Part o f
Brown’s Island to the Gurnet Head, and no more than 7 or 8 untill you are abreast o f
Dick’s Flat, where you will have 13 or 14 Fathoms, a deep Hole, and then shoalen to 5
Fathoms, abreast o f Beach Point.
I f you should fell into the Southward o f Brown’s Islands or Sands, betwixt them
and the Monument Land where you have 20 Fathoms in some Places, you must not
attempt to run for the Lights, until you have them shut in on with the other, when they
w ill bear N.N.W . Vi W., if you do, you may depend on being on Brown’s Islands or
Sands, as there is no Passage for even a Boat at Low Water.
In coming in from the Northward in the Night, you must not bring the Lights to
bear more Southerly than S. by W. to avoid High Pine Ledge, and keep that Course untill
you have them to bear N.W. or N.W. by W., when you w ill be clear o f the Rock, when
you may steer up W. by S. untill you have the Lights to bear E.N.E., where you had best
anchor in the Night. Here the Tide runs Strong Channel Course from the Gurnet to Race
Point o f Cape Cod, the Course is E. Vi N. about 6 Leagues Distance: and from the
Gumetto the Point going into Cape Cod Harbour, is E. by S. 7 Leagues.— I f you should
make the Lights in hard Northerly or N.W. Winds, and cannot get into Plymouth, you
may then run for Cape Cod Harbour, bringing the Lights to bear W. by N., and steer
directly for the Harbour, which you may do unless very dark, as it is bold too— and you
may see Sandy Hills before you can get on Shore. You may keep within a Hundred
Yards o f the Shore, untill you are up with the Point that runs out to the Eastward, which
you must give a Quarter Mile Distance, and then steer up N.W. If it should blow to hard
that you cannot turn up the Harbour, you may anchor o ff the Point, clear Bottom, you
have 8 and 9 Fathoms very nigh the Shore, so that there is no Danger o f being one it,
unless very dark.
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At the Gurnet and Plymouth, the Tides are much the same as at Boston: that is, a
S. by E. Moon makes a Full Sea.
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APPENDIX C

Bernard Romans, [Map o f East Florida], Maps of East and West Florida (New York,
1781), Library o f Congress.
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APPENDIX D

Bernard Romans, [Map o f West Florida], Maps o f East and West Florida (New York,
1781), Library o f Congress.
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